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SUPPLEMENT TO CARIBBEAN MONTHLY BULLETIN

1. DOCUMENTS ON THE INVASION OF GRENADA, OCTOBER 1983 10.00

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FOREWORD

In November 1983, in my capacity as Publications Director, I submitted a formal request to the Director of the Institute of Caribbean Studies to prepare and publish a Supplement to the Caribbean Monthly Bulletin on the events which took place in Grenada on 25 October 1983. The publication would be in the form of a White Paper, as a collation of official documents from various sources useful to Caribbean scholars and interested persons.

It was decided to limit the documentation to more or less official statements, for to include personal statements or analyses would both make the publication too bulky and involve it in the area of interpretation, with all of its attendant difficulties. The publication of writings of a judgmental character must await another place and another time. Having said that much, however, it seems permissible to observe - a conclusion that surely all analysts of events must share - that the supreme lesson of Grenada is that the event demonstrates the urgent need for the countries of the region to organise a real collective security and economic cooperation system which will finally terminate the pattern of outside intervention in their affairs. The Caribbean, starting with the English-speaking Caribbean, must now employ all of its gifts of leadership and statecraft to put its house in order.

I would like especially to commend Dale Mathews, appointed Editor of the Caribbean Monthly Bulletin in September of 1983. In addition to the very difficult task of bringing the Bulletin up to date, we gave him the additional task of collecting material for the White Paper on Grenada. Mr. Mathews has done a very commendable job. I want to thank our Caribbean friends for providing material, to mention just two, Ambassador O'Neill Lewis, of the Trinidad and Tobago Embassy in Washington, and Dr. Basil Ince, Minister of External Affairs of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.
Most importantly, this publication has been a cooperative effort of the Institute of Caribbean Studies. I personally thank the members of our Publications Committee - Professor Faut M. Andic, Dr. Thomas G. Mathews, Professor Luis A Passalacqua, and Bibliographer Neida Pagán Jiménez for their unstinting cooperation. To the Director, Professor Gordon K. Lewis, the Publications Committee is grateful for his encouraging support and guidance. Last but not least our thanks to Ms. Dolores Dávila who prepared the material for offset. All gave unstinting help toward the completion of this project.

This publication, we hope, will be of assistance to Caribbean scholars as a means of providing official documents at their disposal in the interpretation of the events of Grenada, 25 October 1983.

Sybil Farrell Lewis
Publications Director
Institute of Caribbean Studies
April 1984
On Tuesday 25 October, 1983, the sovereign island-state of Grenada was invaded by Marines and Army Rangers of the United States of America. They were accompanied by several hundred troops from Jamaica, Barbados and members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States. This action by the United States was unprecedented in the recent history of the English-Speaking Caribbean and evoked strong response from the world community as evidenced in the text of the United Nations Security Council Resolution concerning the invasion.

The Institute of Caribbean Studies of the University of Puerto Rico has deemed it fit to publish a White Paper composed of public declarations, official speeches, diplomatic notes and other documents issued by those governments closest to, or more directly involved in these events. Included are statements by leaders of the governments of Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, concerning the invasion. In addition, included are statements from leaders and government officials of the United States of America, Canada, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and France. We have also provided statements broadcasted by members of the Grenadian Revolutionary Military Council prior to the invasion. The Appendices include extracts from the Caribbean Community Treaty and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Treaty.

We hope that these documents will provide Caribbeans of all relevant disciplines with a source of useful information on the events of October 1983 in Grenada.

Dale T. Mathews
Editor
Caribbean Monthly Bulletin
April 1984
TEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
ON THE INVASION OF GRENADA
(Source: New York Times - 29 October 1983)

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Oct. 28

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
HAVING HEARD the statements made in connection with the situation in Grenada,

RECALLING the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among states,

RECALLING also the principles concerning the inadmissibility of intervention and interference in the internal affairs of States,

REAFFIRMING the sovereign and inalienable right of Grenada freely to determine its own political, economic and social system and to develop its international relations which outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever,

DEEPLY DEPLORING the events in Grenada which led to the killing of the Prime Minister, Mr. Maurice Bishop, and other prominent Grenadians,

BEARING IN MIND that, in accordance with Article 2, (4), of the Charter of the United Nations, all member states are obliged to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or to act in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

GRAVELY CONCERNED at the military intervention taking place and determined to insure a speedy return to normalcy in Grenada.

CONSCIOUS of the need for states to show consistent respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. DEEPLY DEPLORES the armed intervention in Grenada, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that state;

2. DEPLORES the deaths of innocent civilians resulting from the armed intervention;

3. CALLS ON all states to show strictest respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Grenada;

4. CALLS FOR an immediate cessation of the armed intervention and the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Grenada;

5. REQUESTS the Secretary General to follow closely the development of the situation in Grenada and to report to the Council within 48 hours on the implementation of this resolution.
Dear Comrades:

The New Jewel Movement wishes to speak to you tonight about the unfortunate situation which presently exists in the country.

During the past four and a half years of our revolution, our party and people together have faced several difficult moments. There has been the events of December/November 1979, and of June 19th and November 18th 1980. We have also faced many problems and difficulties both in bringing about the revolution and afterwards overcoming the division between our people and building unity in our country; in moving towards solving unemployment; in getting rid of corruption; in developing our education and health services; in building the economy of our country and in overcoming the propaganda directed at sabotaging the revolution.

Yet, in our opinion, the present situation is the most difficult which our party and our people have yet had to face. Our party has taken a decision to give a frank account to the people of Grenada on the events which have led up to this crisis so that our people should understand fully the present political situation which faces our party and the revolution.

Sisters and Brothers:

As you know, it has always been the policy of our party to be fully truthful to our people on all matters, including the policy of our party, the state of our economy and the strengths and weaknesses of our work in our country as a whole. But there is one matter we have never revealed to our people and that is the serious internal problems that have taken place within our party, especially during the past year. We have never spoken about these problems, publicly, because we thought it was vital to maintain an appearance of full unity of our party at all costs, especially considering the attacks that the Grenada revolution has received from outside. However, the truth is that during the past year, our party has faced the serious problem of the constantly growing desire of Comrade Maurice Bishop to exercise sole and exclusive power and authority.

One of the main principles of our party is that of collective leadership - that is, that all important decisions must be made by the leadership of our party together - by our Central Committee - and not by any one member of the party leadership. Yet, during the past four and a half years at many important moments in our country's history, and on many important issues, Comrade Maurice Bishop has deeply resented this collective leadership, and has taken the position that no action should be taken to which he is opposed. At the same time, he has become increasingly hostile to criticism and increasingly suspicious that other members of the leadership of the party may be seeking to seize power from him.
Matters first came to a head one year ago when his suspicions focused on Comrade Coard, then the deputy leader of our party. On that occasion, Cde. Bernard Coard felt that in order to avoid division in our party he should remove himself from the leadership of our party and that this would also make it clear to Cde. Maurice Bishop that he had no wish to usurp him as leader.

The Central Committee of the party, mistakenly as it turned out, agreed with this decision and permitted Comrade Coard to resign from the political bureau and central committee of the party and to concentrate on his work as Minister of Finance, Trade and Planning.

During the past year, however, things have not gotten better -- it has gotten worse. When members of the Political Bureau and Central Committee of the party have disagreed with Comrade Bishop, he has become angry and increasingly hostile. His attention has become increasingly focused on the question of power and who he thinks wants to take it away from him. He has imagined conspiracies within the Central Committee aimed at removing him as leader of the country.

Brothers and Sisters:

At the same time as we experienced an increasing concentration of power in the hands of one man, the work of the party and the revolution has begun to decline because the truth is that Cde. Maurice's strengths have always been in his direct link with the masses and his weakness has been that he has never been able to adequately organise, supervise and guide the work of the party.

During the past several months, the party has been receiving increasing complaints from the masses concerning supporters of the revolution being denied work by elements in the civil service hostile to the revolution. Complaints of strong, hard-working supporters of the revolution being the first ones to be laid off their jobs often after long years of service, while inefficient and hostile elements were deliberately kept on. Complaints have also been received about the lack of control and care of agricultural machinery and equipment received as gifts from friendly countries; the worsening state of our roads; the constant electricity blackouts and the abuse of workers by some managers and supervisors.

The masses of our country have also been seriously concerned about the disorganised state of the Centre for Popular Education, the militia, the House-Repair Programme and mass organisations and about the increasing boldness of counter-revolutionary elements in some of our work places and communities.

All of the complaints brought by the masses to the attention of the party have been discussed by the leadership in our Central Committee yet less and less action has been taken to solve these problems.

Of course there have been some objective difficulties. For instance, lack of finance to undertake some projects and the old generators in the power station.

Let us make it clear - we are not trying to blame Comrade Bishop for all of the problems. However, the major problem has been lack of strong leadership
from the top and the unwillingness of Comrade Bishop to take firm decisions to solve the problems, while at the same time trying to concentrate power in his own hands. He also simply could not solve all the problems. The party, therefore, became paralysed - almost unable to take firm action on any matter.

By last month the situation within the party had reached a crisis point. The Central Committee decided to hold an emergency meeting and at that meeting it was decided to restore what had always existed in the past - but this time to establish it formally - a joint leadership of our party: Comrade Maurice doing what he has always done best - work among the masses, and Comrade Bernard Coard doing what he has always done best - namely, guiding and organising the political work of the party.

The Central Committee believed that by dividing up the work this way based on the strengths of both comrades, the overall work of the party and the revolution must improve. The New Jewel Movement wishes to stress that the establishment of joint leadership of our party is an internal question and has nothing whatever to do with who is prime minister and minister of the state.

There was never any suggestion or intention to remove Comrade Bishop from his post as Prime Minister of Grenada and leader of our revolution and this was made very clear to him.

Joint leadership of the party was aimed at giving both comrades the necessary authority in their respective areas of work in order to push forward the political work of the party. The problem, however, Sisters and Brothers, is that Comrade Bishop had allowed his power and authority to go to his head and he refused to accept the decision of the Central Committee of the party. The matter therefore had to be taken to a full meeting of members of the party.

At that 15-hour meeting, the party unanimously voted in favour of joint leadership of the party, including Comrade Maurice Bishop himself. The next day, Comrade Bishop left for Hungary. However, on his return home, the party discovered that he had changed his mind and that he was again refusing to accept the party's decision on joint leadership. Moreover, the party learned that he intended to try to overturn the party's decision by taking an internal party matter to the streets. Members of the party's Central Committee became deeply concerned about the possibility of Comrade Bishop causing a public scandal and therefore planned to raise the matter at a meeting scheduled for last Wednesday, October 12th.

However, that very same day, the rumour hit the streets of Grenada that Comrade Coard and his wife were planning to assassinate Comrade Bishop. At lunch time, the Central Committee learned that one of Comrade Bishop's security officers had given a sworn statement to the security forces stating that Comrade Bishop and himself and his chief personal security officer Cletus St. Paul - had had a list of names that morning and that Comrade Bishop had instructed them to contact all the names on the list and tell them that Bernard Coard and his wife were planning to assassinate him. Last Thursday night the matter was taken to a full meeting of the members of the party. All the evidence against Comrade Bishop that the party so far possessed in terms of his involvement with the rumour was laid before the members.
Comrade Bishop spoke for 45 minutes in his own defence. After hearing both Comrade Bishop and all the evidence - including evidence provided by members of his personal security unit - the overwhelming sentiment of the hundreds of party members present at that meeting was that for having disgraced the party and the revolution, Comrade Bishop should be removed from the Central Committee of the party and expelled from the party itself.

However, the Central Committee is to take the final decision when the security forces have completed their investigation of the matter.

It should be stressed that Comrade Bishop at first stated that he would wish to speak later in the meeting after two personal comrades gave a blow by blow account of his part in directing the rumour. Comrade Bishop was asked by members of the Central Committee if he wished to reply and he said no. He did not even maintain his innocence.

Sisters and Brothers:

Over the past four and a half years, the Central Committee of the party has struggled very hard to win Comrade Bishop to a position of collective leadership. We have tried to keep the problem away from the masses in order to maintain the unity of the party and the unity and prestige of the Grenada revolution. The Central Committee took a decision of maintaining the unity of the party at all costs and as it turns out, this position has been incorrect because it has allowed the problems to get worse. However, finally the situation had to be dealt with within the party because not to have dealt with it would have been to release one-man rule in Grenada once more, and this we could not. If we did not act now to stop the steady growth of one-man rule in our party, would it have been any easier to stop it one year from now, two years from now, or even three years from now?

One of the main struggles of our party over the years was against one-man rule. How can the New Jewel Movement now decide simply not to deal with this question because of our attachment to Comrade Bishop or because we wanted to take the easy way out of this problem?

It is the firm decision of our party that the interests of our party and the revolution must be put above the interests of any one man.

Sisters and Brothers:

Over the past few days a lot of our people have said to us: "We understand what the party is saying. If you are a member of an organisation or a party, then you have to abide by its rules and decisions. We see that Comrade Bishop was wrong. We agree that the party has to discipline him. But that is a matter for inside the party. Why take it onto the streets?"

Comrades:

This is a very good question. That is the exact position of the Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement. It is our position that we should have
resolved this issue quietly because this matter did not affect who is the prime minister and who is running the government, or the running of the ministry.

The political and economic policies of the party have not been affected in any way because there were not disputes in the party over these issues and there still isn't.

The fact is that it was Comrade Bishop who chose to take this matter outside of the party and on the streets using an ugly rumour in order to whip up the masses and playing on the love of the masses for him which did not develop as a result of his work only, but as a result of the work of the party over the past ten and a half years. Comrade Bishop was hoping to use the masses' love for him to violate the principled stand taken by the Central Committee of the party; to use the masses to force the party to change its position on an internal matter.

The rumour that Comrade Bishop sent out on the streets tries to make out there is some kind of power struggle going on in the party.

Comrades:

If that is so, how come two-thirds of our Central Committee and all except a tiny handful of our party membership fully supports the decisions of the Central Committee on joint leadership of our party, and even with all the love and admiration which exists in our party for Comrade Maurice? The entire membership except for a very tiny minority fully supports the position of the Central Committee. The truth is, comrades, that there has never been any struggle in our party for power. The struggle of Comrade Bishop has been the struggle of one man to exercise unlimited power. And that our party cannot and will not permit.

The people of Grenada must understand that it has taken enormous moral courage on the part of our party to take a step that we know would be unpopular amongst many sections of our people.

But our party stands for principle, and we believe that principle for one must be principle for all. No one loves Comrade Bishop more than the members of the party, but a decision of this matter must be based on principle alone. In other words - right is right and wrong is wrong - no matter who does it. And no more one-man rule can be permitted in our country.

The party understands that our people are concerned about where Comrade Bishop is and whether or not he is safe. The New Jewel Movement wishes to assure the people that Comrade Bishop is at home and is quite safe.

Our party also understands our people's concern to know who is in charge of the country at this moment, especially in light of a nasty lie put out by the CANA News Agency to the effect that there has been a military take-over in Grenada. The New Jewel Movement wishes to assure our people that the Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement is in full control of the running of the country at this moment just as it has been during the past four and a half years of the revolution.
The New Jewel Movement - which is the same party that has led the struggles of our people over the past four and a half years - the party which made the revolution - will continue to push the revolution forward to complete our international airport; to bring further benefits to our people and to solve the problems still facing our people.

We call on our people to have courage at this difficult moment in our history, to continue to develop our revolution and the gains of the revolution, and to maintain unity in order to ensure that imperialism does not take advantage of this moment of difficulty.

Our people must also be on guard against any attempts to create panic and confusion. In keeping with the revolutionary desire of our people, the New Jewel Movement is still making efforts to settle this problem within our party. We call for the support and solidarity of our people at this time.

Comrades:

As a people we must stand firm at this moment and it is a conviction of our party that if we as a people stand firm and remain united and settle this matter on the basis of principle, you will find that the revolution is unbreakable.

Long Live Our Strong and Courageous People!
Long Live the Struggle of our Working People to build our Country!
Long Live the New Jewel Movement!
Long Live the Revolution!
Forward Ever! Backward Never!

Transcribed 17 October 1983
STATEMENT BY GENERAL HUDSON AUSTIN ON BEHALF OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL, MONITORED ON RADIO FREE GRENADE, 10:00 P.M. OCTOBER 19, 1983

BROTHERS AND SISTERS:

Last night a delegation from the Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement made a formal offer to Comrade Bishop for him to continue as Prime Minister, to continue as member of the Party and work closely with the NJM Central Committee in running the country.

Comrade Bishop's position was that he would consider the offer but was not willing to talk last night.

This morning at nine-thirty, a crowd led by Unison Whiteman, Vincent Noel and two businessmen stormed Maurice Bishop's home. The soldiers guarding the Mount Royal road had instructions not to fire on the people. The people therefore broke through the barrier and stormed through the gates of the house. Again the soldiers were instructed not to fire on the people but to fire above the people's heads -- not at the masses.

The crowd, realising that the soldiers had instructions not to fire on the people, broke into the house. Maurice Bishop went with them and then led the crowd of innocent people to seize Fort Rupert, the headquarters of the Armed Forces.

Again, the soldiers at Fort Rupert were told not to fire on the people, who stormed the fort. Attempts were made by the Armed Forces to establish communication with Maurice Bishop, and Unison Whiteman in order to continue negotiations for a peaceful solution and in order to persuade them to let the civilians leave the fort.

Bishop and Whiteman declared: 'No compromise, No negotiations.'

They then disarmed Officers of the General Staff as well as the rank and file soldiers guarding Fort Rupert and began to arm the crowd.

They declared their intention to arrest and wipe out the entire General Committee and the senior members of the Party and the entire leadership of the Armed Forces as well as to smash the Revolutionary Armed Forces.

At that point the Revolutionary Armed Forces sent a company of soldiers to reestablish control of Fort Rupert. Maurice Bishop and his group fired on the soldiers killing two members of the PRA -- Sargeant Dorcas Peters and Warrant Officer, Raphael Morrison, and wounding several others.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces were forced to storm the fort, and in the process the following persons were killed: Maurice Bishop, Unison Whiteman, Vincent Noel, Jacqueline Creft, Norris Bain and Fitzroy Bain among others.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces then evacuated the wounded and assisted several persons in getting to hospital.

Comrades,
The People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces has all along stayed off the street in the hope that (it) could be resolved internally by the Party. However, in a situation where Maurice Bishop had declared his intentions to wipe out the entire leadership of the Party and the Army in a situation in which he had linked up with counter-revolutionaries, in order to do so the Revolution itself would have been wiped out.

Our working people have suffered too much for too many years to allow imperialism and counter-revolutionaries to take over our People’s Revolution.

The People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces has as of 3:00 P.M. today established a Revolutionary Military Council which will form the government of the country until normality is restored.

Let it be clearly understood that the Revolutionary Armed Forces will govern with absolute strictness. Anyone who seeks to demonstrate or disturb the peace will be shot. An all day and all night curfew will be established for the next four days, from now until next Monday at 6:00 P.M.

No one is to leave their house. Anyone violating this curfew will be shot on sight. All schools are closed and all workplaces except for the essential services until further notice.

The personal safety and property of all citizens will be guaranteed by the Armed Forces. Let it be clearly understood that the People’s Revolutionary Army is totally united. We are also clear that our major task at this moment is to protect and defend our country against any attack by imperialism.

Our people must be clear that imperialism will seek to take advantage of this situation. We must also realise clearly that a military invasion would bring about the deaths of thousands of our people and that any confusion in Grenada at this time opens the way for such intervention by imperialism.

Whatever each man’s personal views on this situation at this time, we must unite to defend our country against any attack by outside forces.

The Armed Forces for their part will defend the revolution with all our might!

LONG LIVE THE REVOLUTION!
LONG LIVE OUR PEOPLE!
LONG LIVE GRENADE!
FORWARD EVER! BACKWARD NEVER!
STATEMENT ISSUED BY MAJOR CHRISTOPHER STROUDE, MEMBER OF THE GRENAIAN REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL ON OCTOBER 20, 1983

Further facts concerning the events of yesterday have been received as members of the general staff of the PRA spoke with soldiers who were present at Fort Rupert yesterday. In addition many phone calls have been received from Grenadians all over the country and additional information provided by civilians present at the fort.

The People's Revolutionary Armed Forces wish to let the Grenadian people know the further facts which have come to light. First of all, comrades, it must be clear to most people by now that the Revolutionary Armed Forces made every effort humanely possible to avoid bloodshed yesterday.

When the crowd approached Comrade Bishop's house early in the morning the soldiers had specific orders not to fire on the masses and they did not fire despite a lot of provocation by sections of the crowd led by Vincent Noel.

Indeed when the crowd broke through the barrier at the lower gate they shouted confidently "We know they are not going to fire at us; we know they would not shoot the masses."

In trying to prevent the people from storming Comrade Bishop's house the soldiers again under instructions fired in the air only, even when the crowd carried away Maurice Bishop.

The discipline of the soldiers and their love for the masses was seen again later when the soldiers obeyed instructions not to shoot at the leader or the crowd although they were fully armed and capable of defending the Fort. Rather than cause bloodshed the soldiers gave up their weapons to the masses.

Comrades, the events that took place during the hour which was spent at the Fort show us an entirely different side to the man whom we of the armed forces fully respected as our Commander-in-Chief. First of all Maurice Bishop ordered that the soldiers' canteen be opened for the crowd to take drinks. When an officer refused to do this he permitted the crowd to loot and damage the canteen.

In his presence many soldiers including female soldiers were stripped of their uniforms publicly. Vincent Noel himself tore off a female soldier's uniform and part of her underwear, many soldiers were abused and threatened and some boxed and cuffed. The man who so many times spoke in favour of women's rights stood by while female soldiers were boxed, beaten and humiliated.

Another very serious thing that occurred was that with the permission of Maurice Bishop the secret room was broken into and some secret documents with plans for the defence of our country against imperialist attacks were destroyed or read by civilians.

Most of the soldiers present at the Fort refused to be part of this madness. The majority stripped off their uniforms to signal their rejection of this type of behaviour.
The armoury was then opened and action began to arm some of the crowd, which included not only genuine former secret police and criminal elements. The soldiers felt deeply concerned but under instructions to avoid violence they did not resist being disarmed.

Comrades, it must be very clear to everyone that it was never the intention of the armed forces to shed the blood of our people. That is why the armed forces had firm instructions not to fire when the people invaded Maurice Bishop's house and even when they invaded the Fort.

But comrades the seizure of the military headquarters of the army changed the whole character of the issue. Let us be clear that blood was shed because Maurice Bishop led a civilian crowd into a military camp, and secondly because when the army came to restore control his group led by Vincent Noel fired on the military.

The first blood was shed by his group and by certain of the armed civilians when in firing on the military they killed three soldiers. A fourth has since died and we have to report tonight the tragic death of officer cadet Comrade Meyers, an outstanding officer of the armed forces from River Road, St. George's.

In addition several civilians were tragically killed in the cross fire. In all, many persons have lost their lives as a result of the irresponsible and crazy action of Maurice Bishop in carrying civilians including women and school children into a military installation. Maurice Bishop as Minister of Defence must have known what would happen as a result of that action.

He could have carried the people to the park or spoken to them in the Market Square or even moved to the radio station to address the masses, but why carry the masses into an army camp? Then why fire on the military? This made it impossible for them to re-take the Fort peacefully, it forced them to return fire and he must have known that in doing so both soldiers and civilians would have been killed.

Comrades, in addition it is now known that it was the intention of Maurice Bishop to have all of the officers of the Army present at Fort Rupert executed almost immediately. Indeed, had the armed forces delayed their action to re-take the Fort by just 10 or 15 minutes all the officers would have been killed.

Comrades, we wish to let the people know furthermore that despite the heat of the moment efforts were made to capture the leadership of the group alive but led by Vincent Noel they continued to fire on the soldiers who were then forced to return the fire. Comrades, the most tragic aspect of this incident is that it could have been avoided.

After Maurice Bishop seized the Fort the armed forces units outside tried repeatedly to establish communications with him to ask him to continue negotiations with the NJM Central Committee to settle the matter and to make the civilians leave the Fort.

Unison Whiteman came on the radio and shouted 'no negotiations, no compromise.' After that, Vincent Noel came on the radio. He also refused to hold talks. After that day they refused to answer the army's calls.
Comrades, a lot of lies are being told on the regional radio stations. Some stories try to make out that Cde. Bishop was deliberately murdered by the army in the Market Square or that the army stormed the hospital. All the stories are continuing to repeat the lie that there is a power struggle between two factions of Grenada.

The regional radio and newspaper who have always hated the Grenada revolution dearly wish to smash it now. And those Prime Ministers like Tom Adams (of Barbados) and Eugenia Charles (of Dominica) who always hated Maurice, who always cursed and threatened him, have suddenly discovered that they really loved him and what a great man he was.

Comrades, let us not be deceived. Those exploiters of the Caribbean masses always hated the Grenada revolution and feared that its example of giving benefits to the masses will be demanded by their own masses also. We of the armed forces regret very much that Bishop and Whiteman were determined to use bloodshed to solve this problem, because we recognise it has caused a big setback to the Grenada revolution and that the big exploiter governments of the region will seize this opportunity to attack us as bad and worse than they did in the early days of freedom to improve our conditions of life, to educate ourselves, to achieve a better future for our people.

The revolution brought us great gains, great benefits and we must ensure that those are not turned back. The Revolutionary Military Council is committed to continuing the work of the revolution and improving it.

To improve life for our people and to build a secure and better future for all our children, we call on our people to take part to unite and to continue to work to build our people's revolution.

LONG LIVE ALL OUR GRENADIAN BROTHERS AND SISTERS!

LONG LIVE THE REVOLUTION!

FORWARD EVER BACKWARD NEVER!
WASHINGTON, Oct. 25, 1983 (Reuters) - Following is the text of President Reagan's announcement on the landing on Grenada today by United States and Caribbean troops, as made available by the White House:

On Sunday, Oct. 23, the United States received an urgent, formal request from the five member nations of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States to assist in a joint effort to restore order and democracy on the island of Grenada.

We acceded to the request to become part of a multinational effort with contingents from Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the United States. I might add that two of those, Barbados and Jamaica, are not members of the organization but were first approached, as we later were, by the O.E.C.S. and asked to join in that undertaking. And then all of them joined unanimously in asking us to participate.

Early this morning, forces from six Caribbean democracies and the United States began a landing, or landings, on the island of Grenada in the eastern Caribbean.

We have taken this decisive action for three reasons:

First, of overriding importance, to protect innocent lives, including up to 1,000 Americans whose personal safety is, of course, my paramount concern.

Second, to forestall further chaos.

And third, to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions to the island of Grenada, where a brutal group of leftist thugs violently seized power, killing the Prime Minister, three Cabinet ministers, two labor leaders and other civilians, including children.

Let there be no misunderstanding. This collective action has been forced on us by events that have no precedent in the eastern Caribbean and no place in any civilized society.

American lives are at stake, so we have been following the situation as closely as possible.

Between 800 and 1,000 Americans, including many medical students and senior citizens, make up the largest single group of foreign residents in Grenada.

From the start, we have consciously sought to calm fears. We were determined not to make an already bad situation worse and increase the risks our citizens faced.
But when I received reports that a large number of our citizens were seeking to escape the island, thereby exposing themselves to great danger, and after receiving a formal request for help, a unanimous request from our neighboring states, I concluded the United States had no choice but to act strongly and decisively.

Let me repeat: The United States objectives are clear -- to protect our own citizens, to facilitate the evacuation of those who want to leave and to help in the restoration of democratic institutions in Grenada.

I understand that several Caribbean states are asking that the Organization of American States consider the situation in Grenada.

Our diplomatic efforts will be in close cooperation with the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and the other countries participating in this multinational effort.
Good afternoon. I'd like first to cover four points.

First, the reasons for the President's decision to commit U.S. forces in Grenada. Second, our objectives as we undertake this effort. Third, the chain of events as they led up to the President's decision in the immediate days preceding it. And fourth, the situation on the ground very generally as it is of about a half an hour ago.

There are two basic reasons that determined the President's decision. First was his concern for the welfare of American citizens living on Grenada. There are roughly a thousand of them and what we saw was an atmosphere of violent uncertainty, of the Prime Minister of the country first put under house arrest, freed from house arrest by a large number of demonstrators estimated in the thousands, with that demonstration in one way or another becoming attacked, and with the Prime Minister and some of his Cabinet members being executed.

We see no responsible government in the country. We see arrests of leading figures, we see a shoot-on-sight curfew in effect. Reports -- their validity uncertain but reports rife about arrests, deaths and so forth, and certainly random sporadic firing that one could hear.

A VIOLENT ATMOSPHERE

All of these things are part of an atmosphere of violent uncertainty that certainly caused anxiety among U.S. citizens and caused the President to be very concerned about their safety and welfare. He felt that it is better under the circumstances to act before they might be hurt or be hostage than to take any chance, given the great uncertainty clearly present in the situation. So that is the first reason why the President acted as he did.

Second, the President received an urgent request from the countries closest to the area -- the Organization of East Caribbean States -- who, of course, followed these developments closely over a long period of time, and intensively in recent days, and who determined for themselves that there were developments of grave concern to their safety and peace taking place. They brought in Jamaica and Barbados and, along with those two countries, made a request to the United States to help them in their desire to insure peace and stability in their area. So their analysis of the situation in terms of the atmosphere of violent uncertainty paralleled our own. And so, in response to the request of this organization, and in line -- a request that they made pursuant to Article 8 of their treaty bringing the states together, the President decided to respond to their request and to look after the welfare of American citizens in this atmosphere of uncertainty and violence.
THE U.S. OBJECTIVES

Second, insofar as our objectives are concerned, they are basically two and very simple. First of all, to secure the safety of American citizens and, for that matter, the citizens of other countries, and to assure that any who wish to leave may do so. And second, to help the O.E.C.S. states establish law and order in the country and establish again governmental institutions responsive to the will of the people of Grenada.

Now third, let me just review very briefly the chain of events here. I think you undoubtedly know that on Oct. 13, Prime Minister Bishop was placed under house arrest and subsequently on Oct. 19, the demonstration and the freeing of him from house arrest took place and then his death -- our information is by execution -- taking place on that date.

On Thursday, Oct. 20, as information about these developments was coming in to us here in the United States -- of course, the President was receiving them and he had the Vice President chair a meeting in the situation room reviewing these events. That meeting took place in the late afternoon. I was not present at the beginning of the meeting since I was testifying before a Senate committee -- a closed-door session -- but I came in with Ambassador Motley about halfway through the meeting. And essentially it was a meeting to review the grave turn of events and to consider their implications for the American citizen on the island.

PRESIDENT'S DECISION

Subsequent to that meeting, and on the recommendation of that group, the President decided to divert some naval ships in the area, among them the task force that was carrying the group that would be the normal routine replacement of the marines who are in Lebanon, and diverted them in the direction of Grenada. Other ships were also included. That was essentially precautionary so that if the situation became worse we would have a capability nearby.

There were various discussions during the course of Friday, but on Saturday, Oct. 22, a message came in from Bridgetown in Barbados. It reached me at 2:45 A.M. in Augusta and I discussed it with Bud McFarlane, and about half, three-quarters of an hour later the Vice President, convening the key national security advisers in Washington, in their discussion. We joined with him through a secure conference call to again evaluate the situation and the information in the cable.

The information in the cable, basically, gave the O.E.C.S. states' analysis of the situation and stated their very strong feeling that they must do something about it on Grenada and their feeling that they were not able to do it on their own. And so they asked if we would help them. I think you should note that by this time they had not only gathered themselves together but they had brought Barbados and Jamaica in their councils.

PRESIDENT WAS AWAKENED

We shortly got the President up and we went through this material with him and went over the views of various people that were taking part in the Vice President's meeting. The President talked to the Vice President, talked to the
Secretary of Defense, heard their views, gave his own reactions. The meeting chaired by the Vice President reconvened at 9 on Saturday morning; the President spoke to them by telephone. I might say we considered whether or not to return, and we felt that if we were going to respond to this request, then the element of secrecy should be maintained, and if there was a sudden change of the President's plans it would obviously call great attention to that possibility. So we stayed there.

On Sunday, Oct. 23, of course, that night we received the tragic news from Lebanon of the attack on the Marines and that stunning news caused the President to decide in the early-morning hours that we should return right away to Washington, and we did so.

During the day on Sunday, we met first from 9 to 11 and then again later in the afternoon from 4 to 7. However, tracking back to the decisions on Oct. 22, it was felt that we should explore carefully with the leaders of the O.E.C.S. and Jamaica and Barbados their information, their analysis and their intentions. And so Ambassador McNeil and Major General Krist were sent to Bridgetown. They left early Sunday; they met in the afternoon and evening in Barbados with leaders there, and they were on the telephone to us through this period, giving us more information about the evaluation being made in the area and the options that were before us.

THE MEETING ON SUNDAY

It was in the meeting on Sunday, the last meeting on Sunday, that the President made what I think one would call a tentative decision that we should respond to this urgent request and that, particularly so, since their analysis and ours was of a very uncertain and violent situation threatening to our citizens.

On Monday, the 24th of October, of course the plans were being made and the forces organized and so forth. The President met in the afternoon from roughly 2:15 to 3:30, something like that, with the Secretary of Defense and the chiefs, and at the conclusion of that meeting made a sort of semifinal military decision, he having had the advice of all his advisers the previous day that, on general grounds, we should proceed. And I think the directive of the President to proceed was signed at about 6 P.M. yesterday. So that's kind of the chronology.

Now, finally, where do we stand on the ground? Both airports at Pearls and Point Salines have been secured. The elements of the Caribbean task force that is of the countries from the Caribbean are at Point Salines; they landed approximately at 10:45 this morning. I think there are about 150 there now. The southern campus of the medical college near Point Salines has been secured. There are no reports of injuries to any American civilians. There are pockets of resistance in the St. George's area; I don't want to identify further precisely where, because this is an ongoing operation and the military people need to be able to conduct their operations secure from any such disclosure.

So that is the situation on the ground very generally at this point. Now, for your questions.
O.A.S. CHARTER

Q: The charter of the Organization of American States, of which the United States is a member, provides that no state or group of states has a right to intervene directly or indirectly for any reason whatever in the internal or external affairs of any other state. This prohibits not only armed force, but also any other form of interference. Aren't we in violation of that charter, sir? And if not, why not?

A: The Organization of East Caribbean States provides for their collective security. Those states are not members of the Rio Treaty, under which the clause that you mentioned would operate, so they have asserted themselves under their treaty and asked us to help them. Now, as they view it, and perhaps you heard Prime Minister Charles today express their views most eloquently -- as they view it, the developments on Grenada pose definite security and peace risks to them, and that is the basis for their desire to act. So they are not -- they are members, some are members of the O.A.S., but they are not members of the Rio Treaty and their equivalent of the Rio Treaty is their own treaty.

ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY

Q: Mr. Secretary, yesterday in testifying to the Senate, you said: At stake is the right of a small country to decide for itself how to achieve its sovereign objectives free of outside pressure or threat or blackmail. You were taking about Lebanon then, but why should not that same standard apply to Grenada?

A: Well, it does, and in Grenada what you have at the present time is a set of events like this. In 1979, a constitutional government being in power, it was displaced by a bloodless coup and Prime Minister Bishop has been in charge since that time. In the events that I described to you, Prime Minister Bishop was placed under house arrest and then executed, and for all intents and purposes there is no semblance of a genuine government present. There is a vacuum of governmental responsibility. The only genuine evidence of governmental authority being a shoot-on-sight curfew. And so, in the light of that and in the light of the affinity that the other states feel together, they felt that they had to protect their peace and their security by taking this action, and in doing so would help reconstitute legitimate government in Grenada.

SIGNAL TO MOSCOW

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the Cubans and the Soviets were in any way responsible for the execution of Prime Minister Bishop? And to what extent was the action taken, at least in general terms, as a signal to Havana and Moscow that the United States was prepared to act to protect its own security?

A: Well, I've tried to give very carefully what the considerations of the President were, and those are the reasons and the considerations for this action. So this was not taken as a signal about anything else. It was taken in the light of the threat to the lives and welfare of American citizens and in the light of a request from the local states who are close to the situation and whose analysis of the situation was parallel, and in fact went a lot further than our own.
Q: About the first part of the question, sir. Do you have any reason to believe that the Soviets or the Cubans were in any way responsible for the overthrow of the Bishop Government?

A: We don’t have any direct information on that point. However, the O.E.C.S. states feel that such is the case. But that is not the basis of this action on our part.

DURATION OF EFFORT

Q: Mr. Secretary, you’ve said that one of our two objectives there was to help the U.S.-O.E.C.S. states establish law and order and governmental institutions. Does that mean that our troops will remain in Grenada until that is done, and what is your time estimate for how long that will take?

A: Our troops will leave as soon as they possibly can. The forces of the other countries in the Caribbean who have initiated this action will be in the lead in working with Grenadians in trying to establish law and order and some form of provisional government, and it will be their decisions to make in seeing how this situation unfolds. And we will leave as soon as we possibly can, leaving the island to those who are closest to it.

Q: Does that mean that our troops will stay there until they are satisfied that law and order has been established?

A: I think they will be leaving very, very promptly, and we will have to decide for ourselves what the proper conditions are. We will work with the people from the other governments involved and they will have a leading role in making these decisions. I might say that the situation is one in which, in many of these countries, there really is no armed force at all. And Prime Minister Charles expressed herself, I might say to the amusement, I guess, of Secretary Weinberger, she said: When I took office I decided the worst thing in the world you could have is an army, so I abolished it, and I saved myself a lot of money and I saved conflict between the military and the police force on the island. And so that’s what they have, and their belief is that the way to have law and order is not to have a military establishment, but just a police force, and I imagine that they will work somewhat along those lines, although Grenada has a population of a hundred thousand, so you have to take measures. I think you have the next question?

CONTRAST TO BEIRUT

Q: Thank you. The United States has now invaded this island with help from some other democracies in the Caribbean to save and protect the lives of a thousand people, none of whom, so far as we know, I guess, have been injured or killed. Why did it take the deaths of 200 Marines in Beirut to send Commander Kelley there to start thinking about additional preventive precautionary measures to save those lives?

A: Well, of course we have been concerned about the safety of our Marines all along as they have been there. It didn’t take this terrible tragedy to create that concern. I think it is certainly the right thing to do to have the commandant of the Marine Corps go promptly to the area and evaluate the security
situation in a fresh way. And I think also that when you are establishing a
presence in an operating commercial international airport, naturally you make
decisions that involve some sort of balance between security risks on the one
hand and what it takes for an airport to operate on the other. Now I think
that certainly in the light of this terrible tragedy, that balance needs to be
shifted, and the emphasis on security will have to be heightened very signi-
ficantly. But of course we look for General Kelley's report.

Now, I think there is a certain pertinence to your question because it
seems to me, and the President had to weigh this -- with the violent and un-
certain atmosphere that certainly was present on Grenada, the question is:
Should he act to prevent Americans from being hurt or taken hostage? I think
that if he waited and they were taken hostage or many were killed, then you
would be asking me that same question: Why didn't you in the light of this
clear, violent situation, take some action to protect American citizens there?
I don't want to get in the position of second-guessing myself, but I'm trying
to -- or the President -- but rather to say one has to weigh these considera-
tions and be willing to take a decision in the light of all of the circumstan-
ces, and that is what the President did.

THE BRITISH VIEW

Q: Mr. Secretary, as you know, Grenada is a former British colony and
the man, the Governor General there, was appointed by the British -- the person
you spoke of a while ago. Mrs. Thatcher has said in the Parliament over there
that their Government advised against it, and that the British did not wish to
go along with it. I'd like to ask you two things flowing from that: First of
all, does the fact that the British do not go along with it cause some cloud
over the Governor General, the British-appointed person now being the one we
look to? And secondly, in view of their experience on the island, why did the
United States disregard their recommendations?

A: We responded to the urgent request of the states in the area, which
are now independent states -- they are no longer British colonies, although
obviously the British have had great experience there. So have we. The Carib-
bean is in our neighborhood, too. So we have a very legitimate affinity for
those people.

We responded to their request just as Barbados and Jamaica did. British
or other states that may or may not have been asked -- I don't have the list of
who the O.E.C.S. asked to help them -- but each state has to take its own
decision and the President took ours. As far as the establishment of authority
on the island is concerned, we think -- we believe that the Governor General is
the logical person, given the fact that there is a vacuum of government there,
and we expect that that will occur that way. We are, of course, always im-
pressed with the views of the British Government and Mrs. Thatcher, but that
doesn't mean that we always have to agree with them. And, of course, we also
have to make decisions in the light of the security situation of our citizens
as we see it.

REPORT ON CASUALTIES

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you give us a report on casualties, including
whether there have been Cuban casualties in combat with Americans, and the
status of the Cubans and the Soviets on the island?
A: I can't give you an account of casualties; I don't have that information at hand. But it will be made available as soon as we have it. I think probably the appropriate place, since they have it, is at the Pentagon. As far as the Soviet Union and Cuba are concerned, as the operation got underway, we notified both the Soviet Union and Cuba of the fact of the operation, of our intentions and of our readinessto look to the safety of their people on the island. It's my understanding that the Soviets that are there have been identified; they are safe and their safety is being looked to.

On the other hand, in the case of the Cubans, there are many more there -- I think there are some 600 Cubans there, presumably construction workers -- but it is the case that some number -- I don't know how many and perhaps the military don't know at this point how many -- are resisting and firing at our forces. And of course, that would cause us to fire back.

WHO'S IN CHARGE?

Q: Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask two questions, one factual and one more philosophical. Who's in charge of Grenada tonight? I mean, at this minute? Where is Mr. Austin? Are we running the country or are they still running the country? And secondly, even though your intention may not have been to send a message, do you think anybody in the Caribbean or anywhere else in the world gets a message from this action?

A: I don't -- I can't identify the whereabouts of Mr. Austin, who is not genuinely in charge, so far as we could see, in any case. So as far as who's running the country is concerned, the country is in, has been, in a state since the house arrest of Prime Minister Bishop -- essentially of a kind of vacuum of governmental authority, and that still exists, although, as the forces of the Caribbean task force are able to develop their contacts there, presumably a governmental structure will emerge.

As far as your philosophic question is concerned, of course, those who want to receive a message will have to receive it. That was not the purpose of this operation; the purpose was as I have stated it.

MODERATOR: Mr. Kalb and then Mr. Schieffer.

YANKEE FORCE

Q: Traditionally, in this part of the world there's been a great concern about Yankee force, Yankee imperialism, Yankee aggression, etc. How do you plan, how do you intend to counter the impression that the United States is once again using its overwhelming military superiority in this part of the world to achieve a specific political objective?

A: I think the principal point here is that the concerns and the request for help came from the states in the region, and they have put their own forces into this picture. The fact that their forces are small in comparison with ours is only a reflection of the fact that they don't invest very much in the way of resources into military capability and, of course, they don't have that much to invest in the first place. It's in the nature of these countries that they're essentially peaceful, but they have put what they can of their own forces forward and they have taken the lead in suggesting this, and they are there now.
in the early stages of this effort. And as law and order returns, they will
basically be in charge, not us, so there is no effort on our part to gain control
of any other country.

LATIN REACTION

Q: If I may just follow up. The British, who have been critical of this
action, took an independent action against the Falklands last year when they
thought it was necessary. If they cannot accept the American justification,
how do you think -- or how many countries in Latin America do you feel will
accept the American explanation now?

A: Well, certainly Jamaica, Barbados and the Caribbean states involved,
they have asked us very explicitly -- not only in the first instances I brought
out but on further probing from Ambassador McNeil, to really be sure that they
had analyzed the situation carefully and they were making a thoughtful and
thoroughly thought-through request, which they were and are. So I think that
that's the thing that you have to rest on, and it seems to me people ought to
recognize where this request came from and also the fact that we will leave
promptly. We have no intention of staying there, and the government that will
be produced by the people of Grenada is entirely up to them as far as we're con-
cerned.

CONTACTS WITH SOVIET

Q: Just to clear up one thing, Mr. Secretary. You said that there were
contacts with the Cubans and with the Soviet Union to inform them that what
we were about to do and had just done -- have there been any contacts at any
level since then, and what have you heard from the Soviet Union about this?

A: Well I don't want to go into detail about diplomatic exchanges, but
of course in general their response has been that they expect us to look to the
safety of their citizens and certainly, as one might expect, they object
strenuously to this action.

I have to go -- I've got to go up to the House and talk to them and then
the Senate, so I'm on my way to the Congress.
DISCUSSION OF GRENADA

Now I know another part of the world is very much on our minds. A place much closer to our shores. Grenada. The island is only twice the size of the District of Columbia with a total population of about 110,000 people. Grenada and a half-dozen other Caribbean islands here were, until recently, British colonies. They are now independent states and members of the British Commonwealth.

While they respect each other's independence they also feel a kinship with each other and think of themselves as one people. In 1979 trouble came to Grenada. Maurice Bishop, a protégé of Fidel Castro, staged a military coup and overthrew the government which had been elected under the constitution left to the people by the British.

He sought the help of Cuba in building an airport, which he claimed was for tourist trade, but which looked suspiciously suitable for military aircraft, including Soviet-built long-range bombers. The six sovereign countries and one remaining colony are joined together in what they call the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. The six became increasingly alarmed as Bishop built an army greater than all of theirs combined.

Obviously it was not purely for defense. In this last year or so, Prime Minister Bishop gave indications that he might like better relations with the United States. He even made a trip to our country and met with senior officials at the White House and the State Department. Whether he was serious or not we'll never know.

HE WAS ARRESTED OCT. 12

On Oct. 12, a small group in his militia seized him and put him under arrest. They were, if anything, even more radical and more devoted to Castro's Cuba than he had been. Several days later, a crowd of citizens appeared before Bishop's home, freed him and escorted him toward the headquarters of the Military Council. They were fired upon. A number, including some children, were killed and Bishop was seized. He and several members of his Cabinet were subsequently executed and a 24-hour shoot-to-kill curfew was put in effect.

Grenada was without a government, its only authority exercised by a self-proclaimed band of military men.

There were then about 1,000 of our citizens on Grenada, 800 of them students in St. George's University Medical School. Concerned that they'd be harmed or held as hostage, I ordered a flotilla of ships then on its way to Lebanon with Marines -- part of our regular rotation program -- to circle south on a course that would put them somewhere in the vicinity of Grenada in case there should be a need to evacuate our people.

Last weekend I was awakened in the early morning hours and told that six members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States joined by Jamaica and
Barbados had sent an urgent request that we join them in a military operation to restore order and democracy to Grenada.

They were proposing this action under the terms of a treaty, a mutual assistance pact that existed among them. These small peaceful nations needed our help. Three of them don't have armies at all and the others have very limited forces.

CONCERN FOR CITIZENS A FACTOR

The legitimacy of their request plus my own concern for our citizens dictated my decision. I believe our Government has a responsibility to go to the aid of its citizens if their right to life and liberty is threatened. The nightmare of our hostages in Iran must never be repeated.

We knew we had little time and that complete secrecy was vital to insure both the safety of the young men who would undertake this mission and the Americans they were about to rescue.

The joint chiefs worked around the clock to come up with a plan. They had little intelligence information about conditions on the island. We had to assume that several hundred Cubans working on the airport could be military reserves. As it turned out the number was much larger and they were a military force. Six hundred of them have been taken prisoner and we have discovered a complete base with weapons and communications equipment which makes it clear a Cuban occupation of the island had been planned.

HE CITES PHOTOS OF WAREHOUSE

Two hours ago we released the first photos from Grenada. They included pictures of a warehouse of military equipment, one of three we’ve uncovered so far. This warehouse contained weapons and ammunition stacked almost to the ceiling, enough to supply thousands of terrorists.

Grenada, we were told, was a friendly island paradise for tourism. Well it wasn’t. It was a Soviet-Cuban colony being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy.

We got there just in time.

I can’t say enough in praise of our military. Army Rangers and paratroopers, Navy Marine and Air Force personnel, those who planned a brilliant campaign and those who carried it out.

Almost instantly our military seized the two airports, secured the campus where most of our students were and they’re now in the mopping-up phase.

It should be noted that in all the planning, a top priority was to minimize risk, to avoid casualties to our own men and also the Grenadian forces as much as humanly possible. But there were casualties. And we all owe a debt to those who lost their lives or were wounded. They were few in number but even one is a tragic price to pay.
It's our intention to get our men out as soon as possible.

Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica -- I called that wrong, she pronounces it Dom-in-Il-kuh -- she is chairman of O.E.C.S. She's calling for help from Commonwealth nations in giving the people their right to establish a constitutional government on Grenada. We anticipate that the Governor General, a Grenadian, will participate in setting up a provisional government in the interim.

The events in Lebanon and Grenada, though oceans apart, are closely related. Not only has Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries, but it provides direct support through a network of surrogates and terrorists. It is no coincidence that when the thugs tried to wrest control of Grenada, there were 30 Soviet advisers and hundreds of Cuban military and paramilitary forces on the island. At the moment of our landing we communicated with the governments of Cuba and the Soviet Union and told them we would offer shelter and security to their people on Grenada. Regrettably, Castro ordered his men to fight to the death and some did. The others will be sent to their homelands.

Now there was a time when our national security was based on a standing army here within our own borders and shore batteries of artillery along our coast, and of course a navy to keep the sea lanes open for the shipping of things necessary to our well being. The world has changed. Today our national security can be threatened in far-away places. It's up to all of us to be aware of the strategic importance of such places and to be able to identify them.

Sam Rayburn once said that freedom is not something a nation can work for once and win forever. He said it's like an insurance policy; its premiums must be kept up to date. In order to keep it we have to keep working for it and sacrificing for it just as long as we live. If we do not, our children may not know the pleasure of working to keep it for it may not be theirs to keep.

In these last few days, I've been more sure than I've ever been that we Americans of today will keep freedom and maintain peace. I've been made to feel that by the magnificent spirit of our young men and women in uniform, and by something here in our nation's capital.

In this city, where political strife is so much a part of our lives, I've seen Democratic leaders in the Congress join their Republican colleagues, send a message to the world that we're all Americans before we're anything else, and when our country is threatened, we stand shoulder to shoulder in support of men and women in the armed forces...
Following is the transcript of President Reagan's and Prime Minister Charles' remarks and the question and answer session:

President Reagan: Ladies and gentlemen, on Sunday, October 23, the United States received an urgent, formal request from the five member nations of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States to assist in a joint effort to restore order and democracy on the island of Grenada.

"We acceded to the request to become part of a multinational effort with contingents from Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the United States.

"I might add that two of those, Barbados and Jamaica, are not members of the organisation, but were first approached, as we later were, by the OECS and asked to join in that undertaking. And then all of them joined unanimously in asking us to participate.

"Early this morning forces from six Caribbean democracies and the United States began a landing or landing on the island of Grenada in the Eastern Caribbean.

"We have taken this decisive action for three reasons. First, and of overriding importance, to protect innocent lives, including up to 1,000 Americans whose personal safety is, of course, my paramount concern. Second, to forestall further chaos. And third, to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions to the island of Grenada, where a brutal group of leftist thugs violently seized power, killing the Prime Minister, three Cabinet members, two labour leaders and other civilians, including children.

"Let there be no misunderstanding, this collective action has been forced on us by events that have no precedent in the Eastern Caribbean and no place in any civilised society.

American lives are at stake. We've been following the situation as closely as possible. Between 800 and 1,000 Americans, including many medical students and senior citizens, make up the largest single group of foreign residents in Grenada.

"From the start, we have consciously sought to calm fears. We were determined not to make an already bad situation worse and increase the risks our citizens faced. But when I received reports that a large number of our citizens were seeking to escape the island, thereby exposing themselves to great danger, and after receiving a formal request for help, a unanimous request from our neighbouring states, I concluded the United States had no choice but to act strongly and decisively.
"Let me repeat, the United States objectives are clear, to protect our own citizens, to facilitate the evacuation of those who want to leave, and to help in the restoration of democratic institutions in Grenada.

"I understand that several Caribbean states are asking that the Organisation of American States (OAS) consider the situation of Grenada.

"Our diplomatic efforts will be in close co-operation with the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States and the other countries participating in this multinational effort.

"And now, I am very proud to present to you the chairman of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States and the Prime Minister of Dominica, Prime Minister Charles.

Prime Minister Charles: I think we were all very horrified at the events took place recently in Grenada.

"We, as part of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, realising that we are, of course, one region, we belong to each, are kith and kin. We all have members of our states living in Grenada.

"We are very concerned that this event should take place again.

"It is true that we have managed to live with the regime since March '79. And we felt quite clearly and we had good reason to believe that the Bishop regime was seeing it our way and was on the way to have elections. And we think this is the reason why himself and his cabinet were destroyed.

"Because he realised that the pressure we put on him to have elections was worthwhile was right. And he began to see that democratic institutions must be put in place in any of these small countries.

"It is even more important in a small island state, poor island state, to have the democratic institutions. And this we've had for a long time, and we've continued it and we wish to continue it. Grenada was an aberration in this respect.

"But that these men, who had for all these years accepted the Bishop regime should then on -- for their own reasons, and I think the power hungry reasons -- decide to destroy the persons whom they had accepted as their leaders for so long, made us realise that this sort of assassination must not be allowed to continue in our country.

"It means that our people there are not safe. It means that Grenadians had never been given the chance to choose for themselves the country that they want. And, therefore, it is necessary for us to see to it that they have the opportunity to do so.

To do this, we have to isolate the persons who have committed the acts that they did last week, in killing off most of the cabinet. And we have to ensure that, in fact, an interim government of persons of -- not political greed, but persons who are good administrators and who are Grenadians who can
run the country for a new month for the pure purpose of putting the country back on a democratic status, so that elections can take place as soon as possible, this is what we want to do so that Grenadians can choose for themselves the government they want and not have, every few years have government imposed on them by people who will otherwise.

Question: Do you have information that the Soviets and the Cubans were behind this takeover of Grenada? Did the joint chiefs tell you that yesterday afternoon?

Charles: Yes, we do have this information. I can't give you all the details because of the safety of people concerned. But we noted with great -- in the two weeks before the assassination took place the movements between the Soviet embassies and known activists and the activists return to Grenada, obviously a conduit between some of these Russians and some of these.

Q: Can you tell us -- are all the Americans safe, Sir? can you tell us that? And how long will the American forces be on the ground there? What's their role?

Reagan: We don't know how long that will be. We want to be out as quickly as possible, because this -- our purpose in being there is only for them to enable -- to take over their own affairs. As far as we know, the citizens are safe. We have been monitoring that very closely. And one of our prime objectives in the actual invasion that was almost instantly done was the securing of that St. George's Medical College where several hundred of the students were.

Q: Mr. President, as late as yesterday, your own spokesman said that Americans on Grenada were in no danger. Did you have information that things had changed?

Reagan: They were in no danger in the sense of that, right now, anything was being done to them. But we know that there was concern on the part of those, because already we'd been informed of several hundred who wanted to leave. But the airports were closed. There was no way of leaving. This was a case of not waiting until something actually happened to them. But we did manage to get some intelligence out of the island, intelligence information on this. And the tenuous situation was, as I said, the only authority that you could say of a governmental nature on that island was a 24-hour curfew with orders to 'shoot on sight' anyone found moving in those 24 hours.

Q: What is the military situation now, Sir, in Grenada?

Reagan: I can only tell you that we've secured both the airports and the landings have been completed. But we are yielding to the influence of General Vessey in that we don't think in these early hours of that landing that we should be on the horn asking the commanders to stop and give us detailed reports.

Q: Do you think that the United States has the right to invade another country to change its government?
Charles: I don't think it's an invasion, if I may answer that question. This is a question of our asking for support. We are one region. Grenada is part and parcel of us -- an organisation. And we don't have the capacity, ourselves, to see to it that Grenadians get the freedom that they're required to have to choose their own government.

Q: With what's happening in Lebanon, are we spread too thin, Mr. President?

Reagan: Wait one second here. No, we are not spread too thin. And let me augment what the Prime Minister just said. Once these nations which were once British colonies were freed, they -- themselves -- had a treaty, and their treaty was one of mutual support. And Grenada is one of those countries, signatories to that treaty -- and observe that treaty at one time when they had a democratic government and a constitution -- a constitutional government, the constitution that was left to them by the British. So this action that is being taken under the umbrella of an existing treaty.

Q: There are reports that a helicopter has been shot down, that a U.S. helicopter has been shot down on Grenada. Do you have any information of any U.S. casualties on the island?

Reagan: No, I have been in meetings. And we both have been busy since we arrived here. And I've only had the first report of our landings and so forth. So I don't know whether that's true or not.

Q: What report have you received on the success of the U.S. Caribbean operation?

Reagan: Of the initial operation of landings, securing the immediate targets, taking control of the airports: completely successful.

Now, the Prime Minister and I are going to depart, but I know there are going to be a lot, more technical questions of that kind and ambassador Mottley is here, and I'm going to put him before you to ask all of the technical questions you may have."
Good evening:

The days that have passed since October 13, 1983 have been longer than the ten days that shook the world, as the Russian Revolution of October 1917 was described, and while certainly not so spectacular, they have surely made up two weeks that have shaken the Caribbean.

The Governments of our Islands have been forced to consider unprecedented situations and ultimately some of us have agreed on seeking logical and necessary, but unprecedented solutions. We have attracted the attention of the world in a stark, indeed a violent way far removed from the familiar pattern of Caribbean tourism and industrialisation, services and social welfare, hard work and enterprise that has comprised the main interests of our Governments for 20 years and more.

How has all this come about? This evening I want to analyse and describe for the benefit of our nation, our neighbours and those outside the Caribbean, the circumstances that have led to the joint action taken in the last few days to restore law, order and constitutional government in Grenada and a measure of peace and security in our part of the Caribbean.

Some disturbance in the Eastern Caribbean could safely be predicted after the Grenada coup of March, 1979. A constitutional government was overthrown by force, an unprecedented event in our islands; and a new regime having been recognised on the basis that elections would be held to legitimise it. Such were not held. Instead Grenada moved in a direction that introduced great power confrontation into the Eastern Caribbean. When after three or four years, the regime of Maurice Bishop, in the words of the New York Times began 'to drift towards moderation' this aroused ideological passions in the bosom of his Party, passions which soon consumed Bishop and Party alike.

The timetable of the resulting explosion, from Barbados' point of view is easy to reconstruct. On Friday October 14 our Foreign Ministry was informed by a friendly diplomatic source -- not the United States -- that, following ideological disagreement, Maurice Bishop had been placed under house arrest and that Bernard Coard would be taking over as Prime Minister. This was apparently announced in St. Georges, but was very badly received by the Grenadian People. I considered that house arrest of a Prime Minister was an act so extreme as to imply some measure of imminent violence and disorder and when that afternoon I was notified that Unison Whiteman, Grenada's Foreign Minister, was in Barbados in transit to Grenada I made arrangements to speak to him on the telephone. I suggested to him that it might not be safe to return home and that he would be welcome to stay in Barbados, indeed to have political asylum if he wished. We spoke cordially, but he declined my offer and returned home, that afternoon.

A further day of confusion in Grenada followed, while some of us discussed the situation. I concluded that, whatever our differences in the past, Mr. Bishop deserved the support of Caribbean governments in the circumstances and sought opinion on whether he could be got out of the hands of his enemies and the situation given an opportunity to stabilise. On this day also, Saturday October 15, an official of the Ministry of Defence and Security reported to me
that he had been tentatively approached by a United States official about the prospect of rescuing Maurice Bishop from his captors and had been made an offer of transport. This raised a number of questions: Would the regime perhaps allow Bishop to leave and go into exile? If not, would Bishop wish to be rescued? There were many other political prisoners in Grenada, put there by Bishop's Government. It would clearly not have been right to attempt to save Bishop but ignore the detainees, some of whom had spent more than four years behind bars.

This was a point put especially strongly by Prime Minister Cato of St. Vincent and the Grenadines when I approached him about the matter as one of the heads of government of the member countries of our regional security pact.

I spoke also to other pact members and to officials of two friendly non-Caribbean countries, and took the advice of Colonel, now Brigadier Lewis, the Regional Security Co-ordinator. Talks about a possible rescue continued.

Further days of confusion followed in Grenada. There were marches, arrests and detentions and then on Tuesday, October 18, Unison Whiteman gave a telephone interview to the media in Barbados indicating his support for Mr. Bishop's restoration to office as Prime Minister.

Some of us in government discussed the matter and some considered that Mr. Bishop would return to power and all would be well. I feared that Mr. Whiteman had signed his own death warrant. And so it eventually proved.

But before that, an emergency meeting of the Barbados cabinet was held on Wednesday, October 19, to consider what steps should be taken to deal with the obviously deteriorating situation. It was agreed to proceed with a rescue plan, in collaboration with Eastern Caribbean countries and larger non-Caribbean countries with the resources necessary to carry out such an intricate operation.

As we all now know, this proved to be in vain. While we were sitting in Cabinet the crowd rescued Bishop and led him unwittingly to his brutal death at the hands of his political opponents. Many of his Cabinet died with him. So did innocent men, women and children. Grenada descended into a brutal anarchy, with no government and no institutions other than those maintained by the whim of a gang of murderers.

The very next day, Thursday 20 October, I was telephoned by Prime Minister Compton of St. Lucia who expressed himself in the strongest possible terms that the situation in Grenada could not remain as it was and he proposed that there be a Caribbean initiative to intervene in Grenada on a multi-national basis to restore law and order and to lead the country to an early election. He emphasised that the entire Caribbean be invited to join and to seek assistance in effecting our purpose. I agreed, and later that day the Cabinet of Barbados decided to support a multi-national intervention in Grenada after Caribbean leaders had had an opportunity of discussing the situation and of jointly initiating action.

To Prime Minister Compton fell the duty of requesting a meeting of Caribbean Heads of Government. He telephoned Prime Minister Chambers of Trinidad and Tobago, the current Chairman of the CARICOM Heads of Government, and asked him to summon a meeting of the Heads in Barbados. Prime Minister Chambers did
not consult me, but summoned the meeting in Port-of-Spain instead. Some con-
fusion ensued, as in fact most people were summoned for both places, and since
a telephone call to Trinidad for me to speak to Mr. Chambers was not received
or at least not returned, it was only on Friday October 21 that Trinidad was
finally selected as the venue.

The OECS countries and Jamaica, however, all came to Barbados on the
Friday October 21. During that day I saw the diplomatic representatives of
four countries. I first saw the High Commissioner for Trinidad and Tobago and
explained to him, in confidence for transmission to his Prime Minister, that I
would be unable to attend the Caribbean heads of government the next day in
Trinidad since a military intervention in Grenada was being contemplated by the
OECS with Barbados and other countries, in which the participation of all
CARICOM countries would be invited. I told him that my presence would be
absolutely necessary in Barbados to conduct negotiations with countries taking
part, and also to take such decisions on the military details as fell to the
Chairman of the Defence Board.

At 12:30 p.m. I saw the British High Commissioner and told him also what
was contemplated and that Britain would be invited to participate. I next saw
the United States Ambassador and told him the same thing and that an invitation
was likely to be extended to Britain. He undertook to convey the facts to
President Reagan while awaiting a formal request should one be issued.

At 5 p.m. I saw the High Commissioner for Canada at his request, and dis-
cussed the situation in Grenada generally. He gave me the views of his Prime
Minister and I responded. Although it had not been contemplated by those of
us who had discussed the matter that Canada would have been invited, in de-
ference to the outstandingly close relations of Canada and Barbados and the
very high regard I have for Prime Minister Trudeau, I did tell the High Com-
missioner that my view of the Grenada situation was that the only solution was
a military intervention.

That evening the OECS, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, with Montserrat held a meeting -- first
a formal meeting of their Ministers of Defence and then a meeting of their
governing Authority, and unanimously agreed to invoke Article 8 of their Treaty
of Association and to seek the assistance of friendly countries to stabilise the
situation and to establish a peacekeeping force. It is important to note that
neither Grenada nor any Eastern Caribbean country, including Barbados, although
members of the Organisation of American States, are signatories of the 1947 Río
Treaty and that the OAS is therefore ruled out as a peacekeeping body in our
immediate area.

I was requested to attend the OECS meeting and issued with an invitation
for Barbados to participate. I agreed within the terms of our Cabinet's de-
cision. Troop numbers were settled and the staff of the Regional Security
Organisation of which Barbados and most of the Eastern Caribbean States are
members were deputed to do the necessary military planning.

I was then deputed by the OECS, formally to notify Britain and the United
States, through their local diplomatic representatives of the decision and to
make known our wish for their participation in the multi-national force.
Later that evening, Prime Minister Eugenia Charles and I met Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica, who on behalf of Jamaica accepted the invitation to participate, and jointly we formally invited the participation of the US through its Ambassador whom I saw for a second time.

That night, as I later read in the Press, a United States Task Force bound for the Mediterranean was diverted to the Caribbean.

I have given these details at great length, since many accusations have been thrown about relating to the time of invitations and consultations. I trust that the facts will assist in the search for the truth. Next day, Saturday, October 22nd, I saw Prime Minister Price of Belize, who indicated that he did not wish to participate and could not in any event without the consent of the British Government, make any military commitment for Belize. I again saw the British High Commissioner and made a fully formal verbal request, indicating that a document of invitation would follow. This document was eventually delivered on Monday morning.

No reply to the request for assistance was at first received from the United States but staff and planning talks between a general officer of the US Marine Corps, a senior officer of the Jamaica Defence Force and officers of the Regional Security Force were initiated. I was informed, all through Saturday, October 22 and Sunday, October 23 that no decision had been taken by President Reagan and that although the planning might go forward no assumption should be made that the United States would agree to take part.

Meanwhile, in Port-of-Spain, the remaining Heads of Government were informed and a long and inconclusive debate ensued on the night of Saturday, October 22 until after 2 a.m. I made contact between 2 a.m. and 4 a.m. in the morning with a number of the Heads and when the meeting resumed on Sunday morning the subject was not discussed further. Instead, by a majority of 11 to 1, the Heads agreed on sanctions against Grenada and to refer an agreed proposal for restructuring CARICOM to include human rights and democracy qualifications and to remove the strict unanimity rule in some areas, to the Regions Attorneys-General for advice on how to effectuate it. The sole dissenter, Guyana, indicated that it would not wish to participate in CARICOM II.

I may mention that my fears, and those of many of my regional colleagues as to the confidentiality of the Port-of-Spain meeting were fully realised. It was faithfully reported to the Press, and not by the Chairman, that the OECS were seeking support for a military intervention in Grenada, an act of at least indiscretion which led directly to the improvement of the defences of the Island.

To the foregoing narrative should be added one major theme which ran through all the planning. At all points it was agreed that the Governor-General of Grenada was the only constitutional authority remaining in the country and the only one who, in addition to any treaty rights which might and did exist, could issue a formal invitation to foreign countries to enter Grenada to restore order.

Accordingly, the participating countries have had no difficulty in deciding that he should be invested with formal authority as soon as his person should be secured -- and this was made a number one priority at operations level.
Now that Sir Paul Scoon is safe, I can reveal that by the kind offices of a friendly government, albeit non-participating government, his views were sought well before the military operations commenced on the issuing of an invitation of friendly countries to enter Grenada and restore order. According to my information Sir Paul agreed to do so as soon as possible. He has now given his sanction and Brigadier Lewis is in possession of his signed letter of invitation to the OECS and other participating governments. He will address Grenadians tomorrow. The remainder of the story has of course been the subject of news constantly during the past few days.

On Monday night at 8:10 the American Ambassador attended my residence and read out to me a formal note from President Reagan indicating that the United States would accept the invitation of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States and participate in the intervention in Grenada. The intervention proceeded and has been successful. An interim administration will soon be appointed and it is intended that the Elections Office in Barbados which has participated in the supervision of elections in Zimbabwe and Uganda, and has carried out computerised electoral registration programmes for Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent will do the same for Grenada. The Supervisor informs me that the job will take about three months. In three months or less after that we will expect the interim administration to hand over to an elected government. Grenada will have democracy after five years.

The pros and cons of the action of the Caribbean Governments will long be debated. So will those of President Reagan in coming to our aid. But I think that history will agree with the verdict of public opinion in the Eastern Caribbean. There has seldom in these islands been such virtually unanimous support in the media and at political and popular level for an action so potentially divisive. West Indians have shown that we have a view of our future that is democratic, peace-loving, devoted to constitutional and not arbitrary government. We have shown that we can cut through the sometimes artificial controversies generated by today's media and go right to the heart of things -- what is best for our people. The United States and President Reagan have to their eternal credit come to the same conclusion as we have.

Finally a word of heartfelt thanks especially to you, the people of Barbados. You have responded magnificently and supported your country with a full measure of patriotism and loyalty. Your Defence Force, under its outstanding commander Brigadier Lewis and a team of fine officers and men has gone into action and our pride in its performance is equalled only by its industry and steadiness. All of you must be proud of the firm commitment we have shown to the preservation of the human values which we hold so dear.
It has now become clear that for several weeks, perhaps months, a profound conflict within the leadership and ranks of the ruling party in Grenada had been developing. When Maurice Bishop, main leader of the Party and Prime Minister of Grenada, made a brief 36-hour stopover in Cuba between the night of Thursday, October 6, and the morning of Saturday the 8th, following official visits to Hungary and Czechoslovakia, he made no mention at all in his talks with Comrade Fidel and other Cuban leaders of the serious discussions and differences within the New Jewel, the name by which the ruling party in his country is known, thus demonstrating great dignity and respect for his Party and for Cuba. The talks all centered around Cuban cooperation with Grenada; arrangements for cooperation undertaken by the Grenadian delegation in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, with which he was very pleased; and other international matters.

On Friday, October 7, Fidel accompanied Bishop on a tour of important sites under construction in Cienfuegos, showing him the progress of our development programs and the excellent attitude of our workers, with whom both of them talked extensively.

A few days later, on Wednesday, October 12, our embassy in Grenada reported the surprising and unpleasant news that there had been profound divisions in the Central Committee of the Party in Grenada. On the morning of that day, Bishop had informed the embassy staff of the differences that had arisen some time before and that discussions had been carried out to try to reach a solution, but that he never imagined that the situation would become so serious in his absence. He simply reported the differences but did not ask for our opinion or cooperation to try to overcome them, once again demonstrating his great respect for Cuba's foreign policy and for the internal affairs of his own Party.

That afternoon it became known that Bishop's opponents had obtained a majority in the Central Committee of the Party and in the political apparatus of the army and security forces, and that Bishop had been removed from his post in the Party and placed under house arrest.

Since this was a purely internal matter, in spite of our friendship with Bishop and our trust in his integrity and leadership abilities, the Cuban Party and government instructed their representatives in Grenada to refrain completely from interfering in the internal affairs of the Party and of Grenada, in keeping with the principles and standards of Cuban foreign policy.

During the following few days the news flowed in from our embassy of the positions and reasoning of the two sides involved in the conflict. Actually, in our opinion, more than a substantive conflict there appeared to be personality clashes and disputes on methods of leadership in which other subjective factors also played a role.

On Saturday, October 15, Comrade Fidel sent a message to the Central Committee of the New Jewel clearly expressing the Cuban position of total non-interference in the internal affairs of the Party and country. He also expressed his deep concern over the fact that the split which had developed could considerably damage the image of the revolutionary process in Grenada within the country and abroad; that even in Cuba where Bishop was very well regarded, it would not
be easy to explain the events; and that he harbored the hope that the difficulties could be overcome with the greatest wisdom, calm, loyalty to principles and generosity.

Essentially, Cuba's concern was centered around preventing the situation from leading to a violent and bloody confrontation.

The message also said that Cuba's cooperation with the people of Grenada was a commitment that would continue regardless of any changes in the Party and national leadership, since this was a purely internal matter.

For several days more the situation remained at an impasse. At times it seemed that an honorable, intelligent and peaceful solution could be found. It was clear that the people supported Bishop and wanted him on the scene.

The Western press was involved in all sorts of speculation about the events. We didn't say a single word to avoid having our public statement appear as interference in the internal affairs of Grenada, given our close, broad and fraternal relations with that sister country. We had thus remained true to our principle of respect for the internal affairs of sister parties and countries.

Yesterday morning, October 19, brought the news that the workers had gone on strike and the people had taken to the streets to support Bishop. A big demonstration had gone to his residence and released him from house arrest. The reports are still not clear, but it would appear that the people took over a military installation. The army sent troops to the area. There are reports that they fired on the people, killing and wounding some. The army regained control of the installation and arrested many people. There was no news of the fate of Bishop and the other leaders with him.

The dramatic outcome became known in the afternoon. An official communiqué announced the death of Maurice Bishop, Prime Minister; Unison Whiteman, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Jacqueline Creft, Minister of Education; Vincent Noel, first vice-president of the Grenada Trade Union Congress; Norris Bain, Minister of Housing; and Fitzroy Bain, General Secretary of the Agricultural Workers Union. The exact circumstances under which Bishop and the other leaders died is not yet clear.

Bishop was one of the political leaders best liked and most respected by our people because of his talent, modesty, sincerity, revolutionary honesty and proven friendship with our country. He also enjoyed great international prestige. The news of his death deeply moved the Party leadership and we pay the most heartfelt tribute to his memory.

Unfortunately, the division among the Grenadian revolutionaries led to this bloody drama.

No doctrine, no principle or proclaimed revolutionary position and no internal division can justify atrocious acts such as the physical elimination of Bishop and the prominent group of honest and worthy leaders who died yesterday.

The death of Bishop and his comrades must be cleared up. If they were executed in cold blood, the guilty should receive exemplary punishment.
Now imperialism will try to use this tragedy and the serious mistakes made by the Grenadian revolutionaries to sweep away the revolutionary process in Grenada and place the country under imperial and neocolonialist rule once again.

The situation is extremely difficult and complex. Only a miracle of common sense, equanimity and wisdom on the part of the Grenadian revolutionaries, and serenity in the reaction and conduct of the international progressive movement can still save the process.

No steps should be taken which could aid imperialism in its plans.

In Grenada there are many doctors, teachers, technicians in various fields and hundreds of Cuban construction workers helping out in vital services for the people and working on key projects for economic development.

Although we feel deeply bitter about the events, we will not rush into any steps with regard to our technical and economic cooperation since that could affect basic services and vital economic interests of the people of Grenada, for whom we have sincere and deep feelings of admiration and affection.

After yesterday's tragic outcome, we will closely follow the course of events; we will adhere strictly to the principle of not interfering in Grenada's internal affairs; and above all we will take into account the interests of the Grenadian people as to economic and technical cooperation, if such cooperation is possible in the new situation. However, our political relations with the new leaders of Grenada will have to undergo profound and serious analysis.

Nonetheless, if the revolutionary process in Grenada is saved, we will do everything we can to help.

We only hope that the tragic events which have taken place will cause all revolutionaries in Grenada and the rest of the world to reflect deeply and that the concept that no crime can be committed in the name of revolution and freedom will prevail.

October 20, 1983

(Source: Editora Política, 1983, La Habana, Cuba)
The painful internal developments in Grenada that brought about the death of comrade Bishop and other Grenadian leaders, are well known by all the people. In its statement of October 20, the Cuban Government explained in detail the unfolding of events and stated our country's unequivocal and honorable position regarding these developments while cautioning that imperialism would try to derive utmost benefit from this tragedy.

But, above all, it stressed the rigorous policy of Cuba of totally refraining from any form of intervention in the internal affairs of the Grenadian Party and people.

The merits of such a policy of principles can be noted now more than ever, since it has become evident that the Cuban personnel in Grenada had the combat capability with which they could have attempted to influence the course of internal events. The weapons in the hands of the Cuban construction personnel and cooperation workers in Grenada had been given to them by Bishop and the Grenadian Party and Government leadership so that they could defend themselves in the event of a foreign aggression against Grenada, as has unfortunately been the case. These were mainly light infantry weapons. Our own personnel kept custody over those weapons in their living quarters. They were not meant to be used in any domestic conflict and they were never, and will never be used for those ends. Neither had any type of fortification work been undertaken since it was illogical to do so in times of peace, at the site of a purely civilian airport. And another thing; when the invasion of Grenada took place, the weapons in Cuban hands were less than one ammunition module per rifle.

After Bishop's death and Cuba's statements, relations between our Party and the new Grenadian leadership were very cold and somewhat strained. But under no circumstances were we willing to play into the hands of imperialism, foreseaking the Grenadian people by stopping our cooperation and halting the work of our construction crews, doctors, teachers and other specialists. We did not even immediately recall our military and security advisors.

Future relations with the new leadership would be determined by its conduct, its domestic and foreign policy, and by the hope that the revolutionary process could be saved, even though this appeared to be possible only through a miracle of wisdom and serenity on the part of the Grenadians themselves and of the international progressive movement.

Relations with the new Government were yet to be defined. But notwithstanding the aforementioned reasons regarding our cooperation with the people of Grenada, from the moment the news of a powerful U.S. naval force advancing on Grenada was made public, it became morally impossible to consider the evacuation of Cuban personnel in that country.

On the other hand, the new Grenadian leadership, faced with the imminent danger of an invasion and invoking their homeland's security, requested our cooperation, an appeal to which it was not easy to accede in view of the events that had taken place in that country.

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Numerous messages regarding these matters were exchanged between Cuba and our representatives in Grenada, who conveyed the Grenadian requests.

Due to the imminence of the aggression, during the afternoon of Saturday, October 22, comrade Fidel sent the following message to the Cuban representatives in Grenada:

"I believe that organizing our personnel's immediate evacuation at a time when U.S. warships are approaching might be highly demoralizing and dishonorable for our country in the eyes of the world public opinion.

A large-scale Yankee aggression against us can take place at any moment in Grenada against our cooperation workers; in Nicaragua against our doctors, teachers, technicians, construction workers, etc.; in Angola against our troops, civilian personnel and others, or even in Cuba itself. We must always be ready and keep our morale high in the face of these painful possibilities.

I understand how bitter it is for you, as well as for us here, to risk compatriots in Grenada, after the gross mistakes the Grenadian Party has made and the tragic developments to which they gave rise. But our position has been unequivocally and honorably clarified, so much so that it has been received with great respect everywhere. It is not the new Grenadian Government we must think of now, but of Cuba, its honor, its people, its fighting morale.

I believe that in the face of this new situation, we must strengthen our defenses, keeping in mind the possibility of a surprise attack by the Yankees. The existing danger fully justifies our doing so. If the United States intervenes, we must vigorously defend ourselves as if we were in Cuba, in our campsites, in our work places close by, but only if we are directly attacked. I repeat: only if we are directly attacked. We would thus be defending ourselves, not the Government or its deeds. If the Yankees land on the runway section near the University or on its surroundings to evacuate their citizens, fully refrain from interfering.

Advisors from the Army and the Ministry of the Interior are to stay in their posts awaiting new orders, so as to receive information and try to exert as much positive influence as possible on the behavior of the Army and the Security forces towards the people.

The Viet Nam Heroico vessel is to be kept there by all means, and efforts should be made to put children and people who are not essential to indispensable services and work there on the first plane that lands on the island.

Convey to Austin and Layne the following oral reply to their proposals:

That our force, essentially made up of civilian cooperation workers, is too small to be considered as a significant military factor vis-a-vis a large-scale U.S. invasion.

That sending reinforcements is impossible and unthinkable.

That the political situation created inside the country due to the people's estrangement on account of the death of Bishop and other leaders, isolation from the outside world, etc. considerably weaken the country's defense capabilities,
a logical consequence derived from the serious errors made by Grenadian revolutionaries. That due to the above situation, the present military and political conditions are the worst for organizing a firm and efficient resistance against the invaders, an action which is practically impossible without the people's participation. That they have to find a way to reach a reconciliation with the people, perhaps one way would be to clarify the death of Bishop and the other leaders and seek out those responsible.

That the Grenadian Government may try to prevent affording a pretext for intervention by publicly offering and reiterating total guarantees and facilities for the security and evacuation of U.S., English and other nationals.

That if, however, the invasion were to take place anyway, it is their duty to die fighting, no matter how difficult and disadvantageous the circumstances may be.

That the Cuban personnel have been instructed to remain in their camps and to continue the works of airport. That they are to adopt defensive measures and fortify their positions as much as possible in order to be prepared in case of a surprise foreign aggression. That you are to be in constant communication with our Party's leadership, and should an imperialist attack take place, you will receive immediate instructions regarding what you should do.

That in these circumstances, they should keep utmost equanimity and restraint, if they wish to preserve the Grenadian revolutionary process's opportunity to survive.

That Cuba will do its best to promote, together with all progressive countries, a strong campaign to counter the U.S. threats against Grenada.

At 9:00 p.m. on Saturday, October 22, we sent the following message to the Government of the United States through its Interests Section:

"That the U.S. side is aware of the developments in Grenada; that it is also aware of our position on these developments and of our determination of not interfering in the internal affairs of that country. That we are aware of their concern about the numerous U.S. residents there. That we are also concerned about the hundreds of Cuban cooperation personnel working there in different fields and about the news that U.S. naval forces are approaching Grenada.

That according to the reports, we have, no US or foreign national, nor our personnel has had any problems. It is convenient to keep in touch on this matter, so as to contribute to solve favorably any difficulty that may arise or action that may be taken relating to the security of these individuals, without violence or intervention in the country."

Once the agreements adopted by a group of Yankee satellites in the Caribbean area to dispatch troops to Grenada became known, the new leadership in that country renewed its requests for the sending of reinforcements by Cuba. On Sunday, October 23, Comrade Fidel sent the following message to the Cuban representatives in Grenada:

"Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Barbados have no forces to invade Grenada. If this were to occur, it is a mere pretext by the Yankees for their immediate intervention afterwards. In this case you should strictly abide by the instructions received yesterday.
Convey the following answer orally to the Grenadian leadership:

"That Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Barbados have no forces to invade Grenada, and in that case they could defeat them with their own forces without greater difficulties.

That behind this intervention, were it actually to take place, there might be a pretext for the Yankees to act directly; in that case, the Grenadian revolutionaries should try to win over the people for the defense of the country, be ready to fight until the very last man and create conditions for a protracted resistance to the invasion and foreign occupation.

That Cuba cannot send reinforcements not only because it is materially impossible in the face of the overwhelming U.S. air and naval superiority in the area, but also because politically, if this were to be merely a struggle among Caribbeans, it should not do so in order not to justify U.S. intervention.

That, on the other hand, the unfortunate developments in Grenada render the useless sacrifice entailed by the dispatching of such reinforcements in a struggle against the United States morally impossible before our people and the world.

That, as a matter of our country's honor, morality and dignity we will keep the Cuban personnel there at a time when powerful Yankee naval forces are approaching Grenada.

That, if Grenada is invaded by the United States, the Cuban personnel will defend their positions in their camps and working areas with all their energy and courage.

That, due to the limited number of those forces, it is impossible to assign them any other mission.

That Grenadian revolutionaries themselves are the only ones responsible for the creation of this disadvantageous and difficult situation for the revolutionary process politically and militarily.

That within the difficult conditions created, the Cuban personnel in Grenada shall honorably meet the duties our revolution has assigned to them under these circumstances.

That, as regards military advising, they will receive all possible cooperation in the face of this situation.

That it is necessary to continue making adequate political and diplomatic efforts on their part to prevent the intervention without compromising on any principles or backing down. That, on our part, we will do our best in this connection."

The Grenadian side continued to insist on plans that in our judgement, were, in some respects, unrealistic and politically unsound. They even hoped to sign a formal agreement on what each side should do in the military field, and intended to subordinate the Cuban construction and cooperation workers to the Grenadian army. On Monday, October 24, the following principal points were conveyed to the Grenadian leadership:
"--That the Cuban personnel will defend their positions, that is, the runway up to the Hardy Bay filling and the area between Point Saline and Morne Rouge, in case of a large-scale U.S. invasion.

--That, in the present conditions, our personnel have neither the means nor forces to undertake any other mission, nor the moral and international justification to do so in areas outside their work site.

--It is clear to us that were it just a question of evacuating foreign personnel, there would be no invasion, and presumably under those circumstances they would find a solution with the parties concerned. That, due to this, the American University and its premises should be under the custody of Grenadians if they deem it necessary and convenient (the U.S. University is located at one end of the runway under construction by the Cubans). Perhaps it would be better if that area were free of military personnel so that it would not be regarded as a battle ground which could justify armed actions by imperialism under the pretext of evacuating its citizens.

--That there is no need for any formal agreement between us.

--That the instructions regarding what the Cuban personnel is to do in case of war can only be issued by the Government of Cuba."

This message, which should have been delivered at 8 o'clock in the morning, Tuesday the 25th, did not even reach the hands of its addressees. The intervention of the United States in Grenada occurred at the break of day.

The Cuban representatives and personnel strictly followed the instructions of the Party and Government of Cuba: to fight if they were attacked in their camps and work areas.

During the early hours of the day, while U.S. troops were landing with helicopters in the University area, there was no combat at all with the Cubans, who had taken strictly defensive positions in the above mentioned sites. Around 8:00 a.m. local time (7 a.m. Cuban time), U.S. troops advanced from different directions on the Cuban facilities, and the fighting began.

At 8:30 a.m. (Cuban time) on the 25th -- almost three days later -- the Government of the United States replied with the following note to the Cuban message sent on Saturday the 22nd:

"The United States of America Interests Section of the Embassy of Switzerland presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Cuba and has the honor to inform the Ministry that the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, acting out of the grave concern of its members for the anarchy, bloodshed, and callous disregard for human life of the Island of Grenada, has asked the United States Government to facilitate armed forces of its member states in the restoration of security in Grenada. In response to the request, and taking into due account the need to safeguard the lives of several hundred United States citizens now in Grenada, the United States Government has agreed to this request.

Consequently, armed forces from the member states of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, supported by those of the United States. Barbados and Jamaica have entered Grenada for the purpose of restoring order and public safety.

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The United States Government is aware that military and civilian personnel of the Republic of Cuba are present in Grenada. It has taken into full account the message on this subject which was delivered on the night of October 22 from the Ministry of Foreign Relations to the Acting Chief of the United States Interests Section in Havana. It wishes to assure the Government of the Republic of Cuba that all efforts are being and will continue to be made to ensure the safety of these persons while order is being restored. These personnel will be granted safe passage from Grenada as soon as conditions permit. The Government of the United States agrees to the Cuban proposal of October 22 to maintain contact concerning the safety of the personnel of each side. The appropriate civilian representatives with the United States Armed Forces presently in Grenada have been instructed to be in contact with the Cuban Ambassador in Grenada to ensure that every consideration is given to the safety of Cuban personnel on the island and to facilitate the necessary steps by Grenadian authorities for their prompt evacuation. The United States Armed Forces will be prepared to assure this evacuation at the earliest possible moment on ships of third countries. Alternatively, should there be a vessel of the Cuban merchant marine -- not a warship -- in Grenadian waters at present that vessel may be authorized to conduct the evacuation of Cuban personnel.

In addition, any Cuban views communicated to the Department of State through the Cuban Interests Section in Washington or through the United States Interests Section in Havana will be given immediate attention.

The Government of the United States calls upon the Government of the Republic of Cuba, in the interest of the personal safety of all concerned, to advise its citizens and forces in Grenada to remain calm and to cooperate fully with the forces of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and with those of the United States, Jamaica and Barbados. It asks that they be instructed to avoid any steps which might exacerbate the delicate situation in Grenada. Above all, the Government of the United States cautions the Government of the Republic of Cuba to refrain from sending any new military unit or personnel to Grenada.

The United States of America Interests Section of the Embassy of Switzerland avails of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Cuba the assurances of its highest and most distinguished consideration."

When this note from the Government of the United States arrived, one and a half hours had elapsed since troops from the country started their attack on Cuban personnel and three hours since they had begun the landings.

Throughout the whole day today, Tuesday 25, the Cuban people have been informed in as much detail is possible, on the development of the fighting and the resolute and heroic resistance of Cuban construction and cooperation workers, who practically had not even had time to dig trenches or fortify their positions in the rocky terrain, in the face of the sea, air and ground attacks by U.S. elite troops.

The people are familiar with the contents of the message exchanged between the Commander in Chief and Colonel Tortoló, who is in command of the Cuban personnel. This chief, who had not yet been in that country for 24 hours and who was on a work visit, with his actions and words has written a chapter in our contemporary history worthy of Antonio Maceo.
At 5 p.m. in the evening, while intense fighting was taking place, the Government of the United States, through Mr. Ferch, head of the Interests Section, sent the following message to Cuba:

"The Cuban personnel stationed in Grenada is not a target for the actions by U.S. troops.

The United States is ready to cooperate with Cuban authorities in the evacuation of Cuban personnel to Cuba.

The United States is aware that armed Cuban personnel do not have either the weapons or the ammunition stocks needed for a protracted action thus maintaining a belligerent position would entail a useless loss of human life.

The United States does not wish to present the departure of Cuban armed personnel as a surrender.

Lastly it regrets the armed clashes between men from both countries, and considers that they have occurred due to confusion and accidents brought about by our men's proximity to the area of operations of the multinational troops."

At 8:30 p.m., the following reply was handed over to Mr. Ferch to be conveyed to the Government of the United States:

"1. That we did our best to prevent the intervention, and that in our note dated Saturday we explained that, according to our reports, no U.S. or foreign citizen was in danger, while at the same time we expressed our readiness to cooperate so that the problems could be resolved without violence or intervention.

2. That the intervention is totally unjustifiable. That we had absolutely refrained from meddling in the country's internal affairs, despite our friendship with and sympathies for Bishop.

3. That the answer to our constructive note delivered on Saturday 22, at 9 p.m., arrived on Tuesday 25, at 8:30 a.m., when our personnel and installations at the airport had been under attack by U.S. troops for one and a half hours.

4. That we have no soldiers, but actually construction workers and civilian advisors in Grenada, with the exception of a few tens. (sic.) of military advisors who were working with the army and the security forces before Bishop's death. Our personnel had been instructed to fight back only if attacked, and they were not the first to shoot. Furthermore, they had been given instructions not to obstruct any action for the evacuation of U.S. citizens in the area of the runway near the U.S. University. It was evident that if any attempt was made to occupy Cuban installations, they would clash with them.

5. That our personnel has suffered an indeterminate number of casualties in today's combats.

6. That the attack by U.S. troops came as a surprise, without any previous warning.

7. That although the Cuban personnel that is still in a position to resist stands at an absolute numerical, technical and military disadvantage, their morale remains high and they are firmly ready to continue defending themselves, were the attacks to continue.

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8. That if there is a real intention to forestall further bloodshed, attacks against the Cuban and Grenadian personnel who are still fighting should stop and an honorable way should be sought to put an end to a battle that far from honors the United States; a battle against small forces that, though unable to resist the overwhelming military superiority of the U.S. forces, even when losing the battle and sacrificing themselves, could still inflict a costly moral defeat on the United States -- the most powerful country in the world, engaged in a war against one of the tiniest countries on Earth.

9. That the head of the Cuban personnel in Grenada has been instructed to receive any parleyer that might approach him, listen to his views and convey them to Cuba.

10. It cannot be ignored that some Grenadian units are also fighting, and that the treatment given to the Cubans should not differ from the one they are to receive."

During this evening the Cuban construction and cooperation personnel were still holding some of their positions in an uneven and difficult struggle but with high morale and steadfastness. Later into the night there was little news forthcoming from Grenada and communications were becoming difficult.

The courageous and heroic Cuban construction and cooperation personnel have written an unforgettable chapter in the annals of international solidarity; but in a larger sense, in Grenada they have been waging a battle for the small countries of the world and for all the peoples of the Third World in the face of a brutal imperialist aggression. They have also fought for the American continent and for their own homeland as if there, in Grenada, they were in the first line of defense of the sovereignty and integrity of Cuba.

Grenada may become for Yankee imperialists in Latin America and the Caribbean what the Moncada garrison meant to the Batista tyranny in Cuba.

Eternal glory to the Cubans who have fallen and to those who have fought and are still fighting to defend their honor, their principles, their internationalist work, their homeland, and their own personal lives threatened by the unjustified treacherous and criminal imperialist attack.

Patria o Muerte
Venceremos

Cuba, October 25, 1983

(Source: Editora Política, 1983 La Habana, Cuba)

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: The Cuban forces will continue fighting as long as they are attacked.

JOURNALIST (Newsweek): How many dead do you think there are among the Cubans, and how many wounded? As far as you know, have any been taken prisoner?

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: We do not have enough information yet to give the exact number of dead, since the Cubans were defending themselves in various positions and we were not in communication with all of those points. We were in touch with the diplomatic representation, and the diplomats were sometimes in contact with the command post, but it was impossible to know the details about each of the places, which were isolated, with intense fighting going on all day long.

With regard to prisoners, we know, as I have explained, that the Cuban personnel had light infantry weapons, and, unfortunately -- because it did not occur to anybody that the things that have happened would take place in that country, since there seemed to be a situation of peace and nobody expected these events: first the internal events; then the external events -- each rifle had a 0.9 module. It is felt that three modules, plus several in reserve, are needed for a fight; the Cubans had less than one -- that is, less than 300 rounds per rifle -- and, after hours and hours of fighting, their ammunition was running out in some of the positions. Thus, it is possible that there may be some prisoners -- we cannot say exactly how many -- possibly some 100 or 150. There were women there too; noncombatants, because nearly all of the Cuban personnel in Grenada had gathered there, and we do not have the exact figures now.

JOURNALIST (Newsweek): Another related question: There was a report -- I think from AP -- that Soviet advisers were there too, and that some of them had been captured.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: I do not have any knowledge -- none at all -- that there were any Soviet military advisers or Soviet technical advisers there. Really, I do not have any knowledge of that, and I believe that there were no Soviet advisers. There were no military advisers, and possibly no civilians either. What there was, I believe, was a Soviet diplomatic representation, consisting of a small group of Soviets. It is not true that there were Soviet advisers there -- at least, I don't have any information that there were.

JOURNALIST (AFP): Has the U.S. government answered the Cuban note of response that was presented yesterday? If not, does the Cuban government expect that it will be answered?

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: Well, there is always a time lapse between the moment a note arrives, it's translated into Spanish, the reply is drafted and then presented.
We had the note in our hands at around 6:00 p.m. It was translated quickly. A reply was given quickly; it was presented to the U.S. government at 8:30. I think there was enough time to transmit it to the U.S. government. It was very clear, concrete and precise, and they had enough time to analyze it. Now, what decision they are going to make, whether they will try to find a solution, stop the fighting, halt the attacks, seek an honorable solution there, or whether they intend to wipe out the rest of those putting up resistance, that is something we do not know, but we have received reports that they were mobilizing the 82nd Airborne Division to be dropped on Grenada tomorrow. We do not know what decision they will make in the end, but the U.S. government has had time to receive our reply, and whether or not the fighting continues tomorrow, whether or not efforts are made to wipe out those who are putting up resistance and a military victory is sought -- which would be a Pyrrhic victory and a disastrous moral defeat -- will depend on it.

JOURNALIST (Time): You said that you were in indirect communication with the Cuban workers in Grenada. When did you lose direct communication with the Cuban workers, today?

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: There is a very curious thing: we remained in telephone communication with the representation, the embassy, nearly all the time. Sometimes, we were also in contact with the headquarters of the military personnel, but, when the fighting grew worse, they destroyed the means of communication. Then there was communication of another kind with the embassy or with the Cuban merchant ship that is in Grenadian waters, and contact was maintained by other means -- conventional means of communication. Sometimes, the embassy was in contact with the headquarters of our personnel.

That was how we received various reports. That was how, for example, we received the news about the head of the Cuban personnel when the U.S. troops sent over a construction worker who had been taken prisoner to explain that they did not want any problems with the Cubans -- after the fighting had been going on for many hours -- and this coincides with the message we received officially later on.

Meanwhile, we heard that a group of hostages -- the personnel who had run out of ammunition -- was being moved up in front of some jeeps armed with guns and machine guns, toward our positions. We thought they might be trying to parley, to talk.

The Cuban military commander, voicing the feelings of all his comrades, stated that they would never surrender. The emissary had to tell him that they were not proposing surrender, but he requested instructions. First, they were congratulated for their conduct; they were told not to surrender under any circumstances but that, if the enemy troops sent an emissary, they were to listen to what he had to say and immediately inform Cuba.

Their reply was, I think very courageous, very responsible. They said that they understood their instructions and that they would not surrender under any circumstances. That was what the commander of the Cuban military personnel told us.

Afterwards, the fighting continued. Planes were used, helicopters were used a lot of sophisticated military hardware has been used, and until the evening, there had been intense fighting.
Now, during the night, there is a relative calm: planes are flying, helicopters are flying and there is some shooting, but, according to the latest reports we have, there has been no intense fighting during the night.

JOURNALIST (Miami News): Exactly how many Cubans are there in Grenada? How many military advisers and construction workers?

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: I can tell you this; there is nothing secret about it.

I am sorry I do not have the exact figures with me, but there are a little over 700 Cubans, most of whom -- over 550 -- are construction workers. There is also a large group of doctors, some teachers, some agricultural technicians and around 40 military advisers.

I did not include those figures here so as not to make this statement too long, but there is no secret whatsoever about this. Moreover, it is easy to prove that they are civilian workers, not military personnel. Of course, as workers, like all workers in Cuba, they have received military training. Proof of the fact that they are construction workers is the excellent airport they built in such a short time, where dozens of U.S. planes landed, even though it is not finished yet -- it was scheduled to be completed by March. It is an excellent airport. I think that that is full proof of their being workers.

Moreover, members of the U.S. press can surely talk with the prisoners or hostages who were moved up in front of the jeeps, and they will be able to verify whether they are soldiers, professionals, or construction workers, if the airport isn't proof enough.

JOURNALIST (Miami News): Do you know when the ship will come back to Cuba? When do you expect the Cuban personnel will return to Cuba?

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: It is impossible to know what is going to happen; that does not depend just on us. The ship -- an unarmed ship -- was ordered out of the bay. I understand that it was heading around 12 miles from the bay. It has a crew of a few dozen men. Planes have been overflying it at very low altitude all night -- psychological warfare, perhaps. But, right now, I really cannot say what is going to happen to the ship and to the Cuban personnel.

JOURNALIST (CBS): Mister President, have you reconsidered the possibility of reinforcing the Cubans in (sic) an honorable solution to this problem. What would that solution be?

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: Well, Grenada now? If not, you said previously that there might actually, as I explained in the message to the Grenadians, sending reinforcements before the fighting was impossible -- and unthinkable. It was impossible because the U.S. squadron and aircraft carriers were on their way to Grenada; we did not have any means of transportation for sending reinforcements. Moreover, no matter how many reinforcements we sent, they would never compare with the sea, air and land forces of the United States.

Thus, it was impossible in practice. We said that it was politically impossible, as well, because, after the events that had taken place, after the errors committed by the revolutionaries themselves, there was no moral justification.
for sacrificing reinforcements who would not even have the possibility of getting there. It would have been a practically symbolic action. Thus, it was absolutely impossible for us to send reinforcements, from the practical point of view. From the political point of view, we did not feel it was justified to make a useless sacrifice.

I would say that an honorable solution would mean, first of all, that all attacks against our forces should cease. I also think that the attacks against the Grenadian forces should cease. Then a solution might be sought. But, as long as they remain under attack, the only answer is defense and combat there is no alternative.

I have not made any exhaustive analysis. The will exists -- and, thus there must be some formula -- but the attacks must be halted -- the attacks, actually, for what our forces have been doing is defending themselves.

JOURNALIST (CBS): Isn't there a possibility that you may sacrifice the Cubans?

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: If the Cubans are sacrificed, it would be the United States, not us, that would be sacrificing them, because it was the United States that initiated the attack, it is they that have kept up the attack. As a basic principle of honor and a legitimate right to defense, we will defend ourselves against attack, and, if our comrades have to die in the attack, they will be dying in an act of absolute and legitimate defense. What we cannot tell them is not to defend themselves if they are attacked.

JOURNALIST (Miami Herald): What can you tell us regarding the present Grenadian government and the participation of Grenadian troops in the fighting?

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: Well, our views about the government -- no, not the government; we do not want to judge the government, because we have no right to do so. We start from the fact that there was a split among the revolutionaries -- a very painful, very disagreeable split. We foresaw that it would do a lot of harm to the country, and we even contacted the Grenadian leaders, the members of the Central Committee, and asked them to try to solve their problems peacefully, without any violence, since violence could seriously damage Grenada's image.

The people rose up in support of Bishop. Passions were inflamed, which determined Bishop's tragic death. We still do not know the details of the circumstances surrounding it, but, I believe that they will come out sooner or later. We strongly opposed that split, we were aware of the damage it did and were deeply moved by Bishop's physical elimination.

What was your other question? There were two.

JOURNALIST (Miami Herald): (sic.)

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: As far as we know, the Grenadian government still existed up until this evening. The capital had not been captured yet, and the Grenadians were putting up resistance against the attacks at various points. That was what was happening, even though we did not have any information about what was happening to the Grenadian units.
JOURNALIST (NBC): If the Americans were not motivated in this action by concern over their citizens, what do you think was the United States' motive?

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: Well, it is difficult to understand, and I will tell you why. First, no U.S. citizens or nationals of any other country were in danger, because the Grenadians had taken special measures to provide them with guarantees, in the interest of forestalling pretexts for intervention.

But, for example, there is a group of 500 or 600 U.S. medical students. The head of the university spoke with the government, with the authorities, and they gave him full guarantees. The students were perfectly calm; only around 14 or 15 wanted to leave. As I understand it from news reports that have been made public, the dean, or head of the university, was strongly opposed to and has been very critical of the intervention, because there was no reason for it.

However, the situation of the Grenadian revolutionary process itself was very difficult; internal developments had isolated it from the outside world and resulted in serious economic difficulties. It was not easy for the new Grenadian government to overcome this.

It is clear that the United States wanted to eliminate a process that was only just surviving -- miraculously, at that -- and which was facing serious problems. I think it wanted to show its muscle to apply a philosophy of force; I think it was an opportunistic policy, taking advantage of all those difficulties in order to crush a symbol, because Grenada is a very tiny country. Under no circumstances can it be said that it was of strategic importance or posed the slightest threat to the United States. So, what reason could there be, other than a show of force?

It seems ever stranger since it coincides with the recent events in Lebanon, in which more than 200 Americans were killed. What sense, what rationale, could there be in diverting forces that were on their way to Lebanon and sending them to Grenada? It seems absurd.

Really, I believe it has been an enormous political mistake that will not benefit the United States at all, because the Malvinas events -- which shook all of Latin America when the United States sides with England, forgetting all about the OAS and its agreements -- are still fresh. Now, however, it is invoking the agreements of a so-called group of Caribbean countries to intervene in Grenada, I think this deeply hurts the feelings of and creates a lot of restlessness in all the countries in Latin America and the world. I really do not understand it, I regard it as an enormous, unnecessary, unjustifiable mistake by the United States.

JOURNALIST (NBC): The U.S. notes suggest that the Cubans may leave Grenada now if the attacks stop, if you ask them to leave Grenada and if they agree to do so.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: But the Grenadian government has not asked us to leave Grenada; to the contrary, it has asked us for more help. There is not even a new government in Grenada. To my understanding the United States is not the Grenadian government -- and, therefore, cannot ask the Cubans to leave. We are there at the request of the government; it is not a matter of our being interested in remaining there. We are even ready to complete that airport, to continue our cooperation, regardless of Grenada's internal problems. Who is asking
us to leave? Unquestionably, we cannot remain in a country that has been invaded and occupied. There is no need for anyone to ask us to leave; there is no reason for us to stay in a country that has been invaded and occupied.

JOURNALIST (EFE): How do you assess the reactions that have been taking place throughout the day in various countries, particularly the reactions of the European countries?

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: I have not had an opportunity to examine them carefully, but it is noteworthy that the government of England made a critical statement regarding the intervention in Grenada. I think this is very significant and should be taken into account. I think that world public opinion will be firmly and strongly opposed to the developments. To my understanding most of the Latin American countries have spoken out strongly against the intervention. This is, obviously, an action by the most powerful country on earth against one of the tiniest countries in the world. No one can look kindly on that.

JOURNALIST (AP): If there are any wounded Cubans on the island, what are you plans; to care for them and treat them?

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: Well, some Cuban doctors were there. We have cared for all the wounded we could. We have also been informed that there were some wounded among the prisoners. I believe that, out of a basic sense of humanity, the government of the United States is giving them medical care.

According to the information we have -- and I should be honest -- the wounded are not being mistreated by the troops. Even the Cubans have reported that they were under the impression -- they had had some contacts, because a prisoner came to talk to them there -- that there was no mistreatment. I do not have to tell an lies or conceal the truth.

We do not have any news, but it would be utterly illogical for the U.S. troop to vent their cruelty on the wounded, on those prisoners. We hope they will be looked after correctly just as we would look after any wounded U.S. citizen we had captured.

JOURNALIST (Radio Caracol): We heard over the Voice of America today that Cuba and the Soviet Union were expecting the coup in Grenada. Would you care to comment on that, Comandante?

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: I do not think that is even worth answering because I believe that Cuba's position is clear, as were its relations with Bishop. Bishop was so decent and respectful that, when he came through Cuba, he did not say anything about the problems they had there.

Later on, Cuba made its position well known through its public statements. Furthermore, that doesn't make any sense. We felt that Bishop was the right leader for the country. He had tremendous international prestige and was a very intelligent person. Moreover, he was not an extremist; he was a revolutionary who fully understood his country's situation, and we felt he was leading the country well. He was responsible for Grenada's having scored great achievements. Grenada was receiving broad international cooperation and its Gross National Production was growing. He seemed an exceptional person and the right man for the process in Grenada.
Furthermore, everything that we said in our messages has been proved -- all our warnings have been borne out: the split was tragic. Therefore, it is completely illogical to think that we could be behind that absurd change.

JOURNALIST (Diario 16): Mister President, a while ago you spoke about odd coincidences in the unfolding of the situation in Grenada, and there has even been talk that this could be part of a series of provocations in Central America and the Caribbean. What would you like to say about this?

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: A series of provocations in the area? I would say that it is the application of a philosophy and a policy of force, an assumption of the role of gendarme in the area. It is an attempt to set a precedent, but it's absurd; I do not see any rationale for it. What sense was there in intervening in such a tiny country, with a government that was having a hard time simply trying to survive? Not a single U.S. citizen was wounded or hurt; none of their lives was endangered. No big economic interests were involved. It seems to me this was the application of a philosophy and a policy of force which they are trying to extend all over the world.

Moreover, I think it was absurd, an enormous mistake. A provocation against whom? We could not be provoked, since we lacked the means to reach Grenada; we have no air, naval or other means to get there. A provocation against us? What could be gained by a provocation, since we were not intervening in their internal affairs? We scrupulously respected the Grenadian Party and government's decision despite the fact that we had the combat capability and could have tried to influence them, but we abided by the principle of nonintervention.

There was no pretext for attacking us. We were even at our work posts. What could the United States gain in the world by attacking the Cuban workers there, who were helping a tiny Third World country? What could it gain? All it could do was to turn a tiny country into a martyr, make a small population and the Cubans who were there martyrs for freedom and for the defense of the Third World countries, since our position has been irreproachable and unobjectionable. Besides, there are the messages.

I could not have invented the message I said I had sent to the United States, because they have it there. I could not have invented the United States' reply or the efforts we made on the 22nd to advise that nation that the intervention was unnecessary, that it should refrain from making the mistake of intervening, that we were willing to cooperate with any measure that would ensure the safety of citizens, without resorting to violence, without resorting to intervention. This, we might say, was an unusual gesture on our part -- addressing the United States a service when we tried to persuade it not to do that, that it was unnecessary, that we had information and that we were willing to cooperate, to seek solutions without any violence or intervention, in order to guarantee U.S. citizens' safety in Grenada.

I could not have invented all that. It is part of the record. We do not usually refer to messages; we are discreet. But the United States said today that it had sent us a message cautioning us -- no, not cautioning but warning us -- and the Secretary of State has practically said that he gave us a warning. The attack began at 6:30 a.m. Grenadian time (5:30 a.m. Cuban time), and we received the United States' reply at 8:30 a.m. Cuban time (9:30 a.m. Grenadian time) -- an hour and a half after the attacks on our personnel there began.
That is, this statement contains incontrovertible facts. I have not launched into emotional arguments, adjectives or rhetoric. I have tried to speak calmly, setting forth everything that has happened, facts that no one can deny.

JOURNALIST (Diario 16): One last thing, Mister President.

The reply to Cuba's last message may take a couple of days or so to arrive. What is your opinion on this?

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: Well, I do not know. I hope that message will have some influence; I hope the attacks end tomorrow -- because the other alternative is to try to wipe out all remaining resistance. Naturally, I do not want that. Undoubtedly, if those who are resisting are urged to surrender, they will not do so and will have to be wiped out.

The United States may feel tempted to use the 82nd Airborne Division. It would really be a shame, but no one knows what may happen tomorrow. We have already witnessed so many mistakes that even more serious ones may be made tomorrow.

JOURNALIST (BBC): Comandante, I would like to ask you to comment on the Central American crisis. For instance, if a similar invasion were to take place against Nicaragua, how far would Cuba support Nicaragua?

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: We would try to do everything possible for Nicaragua, but we would face the same problem as in Grenada: we lack the naval and air means to send direct assistance to Grenada. Those are the facts: we do not have any other options. However, that does not worry me, because the situation in Nicaragua is very different from the one in Grenada. Grenada has a population of 120,000; Nicaragua, 3.5 million. Nicaragua has considerable fighting experience. Nicaragua has tens of thousands of fighters. There, the United States would have to fight against an armed people in an unwinnable war in which not one, not ten airborne divisions would suffice. Those are the facts: neither the peoples nor Nicaragua should be underestimated. I believe that it would be an incredibly serious error to attempt an invasion of Nicaragua, because the Nicaraguan people are courageous and combative. I think that all of the attacks against Nicaragua have strengthened rather than weakened the Revolution, for they have given the people experience. I believe that Nicaragua cannot be occupied or ruled by the United States and that no technology or sophisticated weapons can solve the problems entailed in a struggle against an entire nation that is armed.

Grenada's present situation is a far cry from this, since, due to its internal problems, the army collected the militia's weapons and, therefore, the people weren't armed for resistance. That is not the situation in Nicaragua. Let us hope that this terrible mistake may serve to prevent even worse mistakes from being made in Nicaragua, in the future.

RICARDO ALARCON: For the last question, the representative of L'Humanité.

JOURNALIST (L'Humanité): Only a clarification, Comandante, of point 10 in the last message that was sent.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: Which one? There were a lot of messages -- to the Cubans, to the...?
JOURNALIST (L'Humanité): Excuse me, Comandante; the French text indicates there is a ...on your part that the same treatment should be given to the Cuban workers who are fighting and struggling there as to the Grenadians who are still fighting.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: I cannot speak for the Grenadians. It is a problem they are facing; but, as a question of honor on our part, we cannot accept a solution for the Cuban personnel that does not imply a solution for the Grenadian fighters, as well. That is, we do not wish to be treated differently from the Grenadians, since, in spite of the differences we had over the events in Grenada, our present common struggle has made us brothers. Therefore, we cannot seek different solutions or different treatment. I believe that, whatever the solution may be -- what I have called the honorable solution, which would have to be discussed -- the same treatment that is given to us would also have to be given to the Grenadian fighters.

We do not think that we will win this battle militarily, but we are winning it morally. If the United States claims that it does not want any more senseless bloodshed, then a solution should be sought. If the U.S. urges the people to surrender, then there will be more senseless bloodshed by the United States -- not by those who are defending their lives and their honor.

RICARDO ALARCON: This press conference is now over.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF FIDEL CASTRO: Thank you.

(Source: Editora Política, 1983, La Habana, Cuba)
Comrades, Fellow Guyanese:

On Friday before last, the 14th of October, we in Guyana learnt that there was an internal rift in the Jewel Movement which forms the Government of Grenada. After a series of events, many of which remain unclear, after a series of rumours and contradictory reports, we learnt of the untimely and tragic death of the former Prime Minister of Grenada, Maurice Bishop, and a number of his Ministerial colleagues and close political allies. We were most saddened and deeply regretted these deaths especially that of Maurice Bishop.

In a public statement on Thursday last, I communicated Guyana's sadness and concern and expressed the hope that the Grenadian people would "seek to heal their wounds and, as a united nation, to determine their future destiny within Caricom and in the wider international community." It was my view that whatever were the causes of the tragedy, it was for the Grenadian people to settle their problems and to order their future as they saw fit. At the same time I dispatched a message of condolence to the late Maurice Bishop's mother, which ended with the words "it should be no small consolation for you to know that your son devoted his life to the cause of his country and people."

On Friday last, I received an invitation from the Hon. Mr. George Chambers, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago and the present Caricom Chairman inviting me to an emergency meeting of twelve Caricom Heads of Government to be held in Port-of-Spain on the evening of Saturday, October 22nd.

At great inconvenience, I accepted the invitation for I felt that the region of Caricom might have been able to assist the Grenadians in any solution which they themselves sought. At the adjournment of the first session, which lasted until 3:00 A.M. on Sunday, the Chairman Mr. Chambers, announced the consensus with which Guyana agreed. The most important aspect of this consensus - any resolution of the Grenadian situation

(a) should be wholly regional in nature
(b) should not violate international law and/or the United Nations Charter
(c) should have the restoration to normalcy in Grenada as its primary purpose
(d) should have no external intervention particularly extra-regional military intervention, and further
(e) that a Caricom fact-finding mission obviously acceptable to the Grenadian authorities should be appointed from amongst eminent Caricom citizens, and...
Later Sunday morning when the meeting resumed, some time after 10:00, certain participants insisted that there had not been a consensus earlier and by majority resolved that Grenada should be deemed to have been expelled from Caricom. The word deemed had to be used for the meeting was informal and could not under the Caricom Treaty be properly constituted since Grenada had not been invited in the first place.

Further, under the Caricom Treaty, as was recognized at the Summit at Ocho Rios in 1982 and Port-of-Spain in July, 1983 any major decision must be unanimous. Guyana opposed any expulsion, deemed or otherwise. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States group supported by the representatives of Barbados and Jamaica refused to accept the previous consensus especially in so far as it abjured outside intervention and it became clear that such outside intervention was contemplated and actually supported by all with the notable exceptions of Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, the Bahamas and Belize.

Today at 6:40 A.M. Guyana time, 5:40 A.M. Grenada time, United States troops landed on Grenada soil at the request of the OECS and Jamaica and Barbados to ensure the withdrawal of United States citizens on the island who in fact are not and have never been in danger. In any case how can these states which are external to Grenada legitimate an invasion or intervention by the United States government? The whole thing is contrary to international law and the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of the Inadmissibility of Intervention and interference in the Internal Affairs of States, subscribed to and supported by all Caricom countries who were members of the United Nations when it was agreed by the General Assembly of the U.N. in December, 1981.

Today in the House of Commons of Great Britain the Prime Minister Mrs. Margaret Thatcher and the Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe stated that the United Kingdom government was informed by the United States of the proposed invasion only late yesterday and had advised against it.

The United Nations Secretary-General has refused to comment on the situation in Grenada prior to the invasion because in his view which is obviously correct any comment would amount to interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. A spokesman for the White House has accepted the fact that there was no threat to the U.S. citizens in Grenada but what is more interesting is that we have a situation where an ally of Britain has without any justification whatsoever under the international law invaded one of Her Majesty's dominions.

Comrades, however unfortunate may be the events over the past twelve days in Grenada, and I concede they have been unfortunate, and would further concede that they have been tragic they cannot justify military intervention and aggression. The Government of Guyana condemns this invasion and seeks to have an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces. Today Grenada, tomorrow Guyana, and the day after tomorrow someone else.
At the time when the Contadora Group consisting of Venezuela, Panama, Colombia and Mexico takes a stand against outside interference in the internal affairs of Central America we in the Caribbean are witnessing such outside interference instigated and/or supported by a group of Caribbean countries, a group that has not thought its position through, has not recognized that there we have a case of the re-introduction of colonialism and imperialism into the Caribbean. There has come opposition to this latest act of aggression from countries like Canada, Sweden, France and the Dominican Republic, and the Caribbean Council of Churches has also expressed its disapproval and opposition to the action taken today.

Your government has consulted with the opposition and has good reason to believe that when Parliament meets very shortly - before the end of this week there will appear absolutely no difference between the government and the opposition on this most vital question. There will shortly be a meeting of the Security Council of which Guyana is a member and when our representative speaks we expect that he will speak knowing that regardless of our political and ideological differences in Guyana, there is unanimity among the parties represented in Parliament on the illegality and immorality of the invasion of Grenada.

Steps will be taken by my government to inform the Non-aligned Movement of which we are a member and to seek support of our proposition from the members of that group.

The Chairman of Caricom has already been communicated with and will receive a further communication. If we do not take a stand, our hard-earned independence is a mere notion, a chimera.

At this time, our hearts sympathy and our support go out to the Grenadian people who are being treated as less than mortals, thanks to the connivance of some groups within our region. And the big brother in our hemisphere.

I hope to speak to you again at a press conference tomorrow, Wednesday and again at a rally arranged to take place at Conference Centre at Sophia on Thursday evening.

There occurred to me "some never send to know for whom the bell tolls. It tolls for thee."
STATEMENT TO THE NATION BY THE
PRIME MINISTER OF JAMAICA, THE RT. HON. EDWARD SEAGA,
ON DEVELOPMENTS IN GRENADA
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1983

Yesterday I returned to Jamaica after a weekend of close contact with my Eastern Caribbean colleagues, particularly Prime Minister Adams of Barbados and Prime Minister Charles of Dominica who is Chairman of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States. I returned with a sober awareness of their deep anxieties and fears over the situation in Grenada and a solemn sense of our responsibility as a Caribbean people. We cannot be oblivious to the fact that if a whole government and leading citizens can be wiped out without strong action to back protest then there is no limit to the encouragement that this will give to madmen of either the right or the left.

Last night I saw the Governor General to advise him of my intention to commit the Bravo Company of the 2nd Battalion of the JDF to a military operation in Grenada for which his approval would be required by law in his capacity of Commander-In-Chief of the JDF. After fully briefing him on the situation, the Governor General gave his approval.

Earlier in the day, immediately after my return from Barbados, I summoned a meeting of Cabinet where I sought and obtained approval for Jamaican forces to participate in a multinational military operation against Grenada.

The Leader of the Opposition was advised by me this morning by letter.

The purpose of the military operation now underway in Grenada is to restore the country to normality with a minimum loss of lives, to free the people of Grenada from the terrorism and brutality which they have been suffering and to eliminate the perceived threat of hostility and aggression by Grenada to neighbouring Caribbean States caused by nations unfriendly to the cause of democracy which were at the seat of influence in the affairs of the island.

The Caribbean Security Force is comprised of eight countries: 6 members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) (Montserrat, Antigua/Barbuda, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Dominica) Barbados and Jamaica.

The Leader of the Caribbean Security Force is Colonel Ken Barnes of the Jamaica Defence Force who arrived in Barbados to participate over the weekend in planning the operation, subject to final decisions to be taken in Jamaica as to our own participation.

I now report to Parliament and the nation that Grenada was this morning invaded by United States Marines, backed by troops from a Caribbean Security Force of which Jamaican troops are a part. The latest information that I have regarding the situation on that island is that all major initial objectives have been secured. The two airfields, the two medical schools, the power station and the broadcasting station have been taken.
The only fighting in St. George's, the Capital of Grenada, is some sporadic shooting. Heavy fighting however, is taking place around Government House where the Governor General lives, and in the hills around Fort Frederick where the political prisoners are being held.

As far as casualties are concerned, the numbers revealed so far are low, but it is believed that all have not yet been reported. The figures as of midday were: 3 civilians dead, 12 Cubans killed and 22 captured. The Cuban fatalities resulted from the fact that Cubans who were supposed to be technicians turned out to be soldiers and were offering heavy fire to the invading forces.

It is reported that a number of Soviet technicians have also been held but it is not clear whether they were also involved in any exchange of gunfire.

What has been described as a vast quantity of Soviet arms was seized at the Point Salines airport where the Bravo Company of the JDF is in place. These include 47 Soviet Assault rifles.

I would remind Parliament of the sequence of events which have taken place in Grenada since the 13th of October. On that day, word was received that Mr. Maurice Bishop, the Prime Minister of Grenada, was being kept under house arrest at his official residence in St. Georges by a faction of his party, the New Jewel Movement, with whom he was in disagreement. However, it became clear as events unfolded that this was no ordinary internal power struggle but a well planned and orchestrated coup which was carried out with a savagery and brutality without precedent in the English-speaking Caribbean.

On Wednesday, October 19, after having been released by a large crowd of his supporters, Mr. Bishop, his Minister of Education, Miss Jacqueline Creft, his Foreign Minister, Mr. Unison Whiteman, his Minister of Housing, Mr. Vincent Noel, Leader of the Bank and General Workers Union, and Mr. Fitzroy Bain, another Trade Union leader, had been brutally executed by Cuban-trained military officers who had seized power. We also learned subsequently that the People's Revolutionary Army had fired on a crowd of demonstrators which included many women and children, and that several of these have not been accounted for and are presumed to have been killed. An eyewitness reports having seen a child attempting to jump to safety having his legs blown off.

The seeds of this tragic situation were sown five years ago when the corrupt government of Eric Gairy was overthrown by a coup led by Mr. Maurice Bishop. While there was no question that the Gairy administration had forfeited the respect of all decent citizens of the Caribbean, this government which was then in opposition, from the outset took the view that a dangerous precedent had been set which would inevitably have disastrous consequences. I urged at the time that recognition of the Bishop regime should be withheld until it secured a mandate from the electorate. This would make certain, I said then, that the principal of armed overthrow of a government is not accepted in the Commonwealth Caribbean, and would reinforce the electoral system as the only recognized basis of selecting a government. From the outset this administration viewed the establishment of a government by coup in Grenada in 1979 as having far-reaching implications for the future of the democratic process on which all the governments of this region are based.
We did not accept the mode of revolution as a means of changing governments, nor did we have sympathy for the ideology which Mr. Bishop espoused. But notwithstanding this, there are deep principles involved in the events that transpired in Grenada since the 13th of October which have caused the government to take a number of grave decisions with regard to our own position. At the root of these principles, is the inescapable fact that revolution breeds revolution because it makes no allowance to institutionalise opposition and to change administrations peacefully.

During the past week we witnessed in Grenada not only a revolution spawning its own destruction but a brutal military take-over of a civilian government.

It may be felt that these matters do not concern us; but most certainly they do. If a whole government can be wiped out overnight either by political or military extremists and the governments of the Caribbean remain silent and passive, then no government elected by the people can be safe from madmen of one type or another who would seek to replace a government of the people, elected by the people with one selected by a chosen few of whatever nature.

If we ignore the occurrence of brutal military take-overs or political overthrow of governments, we would immediately give heart to every subversive group within the region to engineer disorder and instability as a means of overthrow. No democratic system of government would have a chance of carrying out the programmes of development which it was elected to implement if in its midst was a group of subversives, anarchists and terrorists bent on destruction of the foundations of stability which underpin the whole system of democracy. The far-reaching consequences of such neglect on our part would be awesome, and would have the effect of creating an unsure and insecure future for all of us.

For the sake of the democratic system of government which we all agree to be the one which allows the maximum freedom of choice to a people and protests their right to elect a government of their choice, we cannot ignore the events which defeat these purposes wherever they occur in the English-speaking Caribbean.

In the States in the Eastern Caribbean, there is at this moment not only a strong revulsion against the recent atrocities in Grenada, which we share, but also overwhelming anxiety - indeed fear for their own security. This added urgency to the need to find a solution to the Grenada crisis.

The time has now come when the English-speaking Caribbean countries has made it unmistakably clear that we will not tolerate subversion and revolution, and that we will take the necessary action to deal with all such instances emphatically and decisively.

It is not sufficiently recognised that the character of today's Caribbean leadership has changed as a result of the events of the 1970s.

Today's Caribbean leadership is determined that instances of military and revolutionary take-overs must be dealt with in such a manner as will leave no room for doubt whatsoever as to the will of the majority of the English-speaking Caribbean.
It is in our interest that we should not encourage revolution and the introduction of totalitarian style government to displace democracy.

It is in our interest that we should not encourage the armed overthrow of governments.

It is in our interest that we should not encourage those who desire to seize power by illegal means to brutally liquidate a country's leadership and defenceless citizens.

It was therefore in our interest that we should join with our Caribbean colleagues - Barbados, Dominica, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts/Nevis and Montserrat - in taking the present action.

There is no question that events since the 13th of October mark a turning point in the history of the English-speaking Caribbean, and it is equally certain that the aftermath of these events will leave none of us untouched.

We have had to take action to defend our deepest values for the maintenance of our own self-respect in helping our sister nations in the Eastern Caribbean to preserve their peace and security.

It is intended that the liberation of the Grenadian people will be followed by a restoration of full democracy as a matter of urgency with the holding of elections. In the meantime, an interim administration will be invited to look after the affairs of the country.

The events in Grenada fall into two parts: The total breakdown of internal order as a result of the killing of the Prime Minister and almost the entire Cabinet, leaving a vacuum of authority which was filled by men of the most brutal type who proceeded to commit atrocities against people and even little children, leading to a large, and as yet undetermined number of deaths.

The external component of this tragedy is based on the perceived threat arising from the capacity of the leadership which seized power, to use the armed capabilities and military infrastructure of Grenada for acts of hostility against neighbouring states.

The size and sophistication of the Armed Force of Grenada can be measured by a comparison with those of Jamaica. Grenada, having only one-twentieth of the population of Jamaica, had mobilised an army that was one and a half times as large as the Jamaica Defence Force. Some of Grenada's neighbours have no army at all; others have armies of less than 200 men.

The new airstrip, in the final stages of completion by Cubans, added another capability which, in the hands of sane men would have offered no threat, but against the background of the insanity of the past 2 weeks would be a logical staging area for countries whose interests are similar, and who have ambitions for using as a centre for subversion, sabotage and infiltration within the area and against member states of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States.

Again, the powerful broadcasting station in Grenada, standing on its own, although capable of reaching from one end of the Caribbean to the other, far exceeding the power of any station in Jamaica would in itself not necessarily be a threat, but in the hands of extremists of a military or ideological nature, both of whom exist in Grenada, constitutes a potent weapon for subverting neighbouring states.

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While Maurice Bishop was alive there was some indication that these capabilities could and would be used in this subversive manner against neighbouring states, as there were complaints regarding training of a para-military and military nature taking place in Grenada among citizens of neighbouring countries known for their own subversive interests.

However, whatever may have been the threat, it was minimal in the hands of Maurice Bishop, who was a moderate in comparison with the military and political leaders of the regime which overthrew him.

A totally different picture emerges when this array of military and subversive capability came to be at the disposal of one of the most extremist groups of men to assume control of any country in recent times. Few countries can have claimed the experience of having its entire Cabinet wiped out in the manner in which that of Grenada was exterminated.

Who then can blame the Eastern Caribbean States for perceiving this combination of awesome-might brutal men, who apparently had no concept of where to stop in taking human life, as a prelude to hostile action being taken, beyond their own borders of those in power in Grenada?

These considerations are set out in a document presented by the authority of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, with an accompanying letter as the basis of the invitation to friendly governments to come to their aid in restoring normality to Grenada and in removing the perceived threat to peace and security in their region.

1. The authority of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) met at Bridgetown, Barbados, on Friday, 21st October, 1983, to consider and evaluate the situation in Grenada arising out of the overthrow of the government led by Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, and the subsequent killing of the Prime Minister together with some of his colleagues and a number of other citizens.

2. The authority is aware that the overthrow of the Bishop administration took place with the knowledge and connivance of forces unfriendly to the OECS, leading to the establishment of the present military regime.

3. The meeting took note of the current anarchical conditions, the serious violations of human rights and bloodshed that have occurred, and the consequent unprecedented threat to the peace and security of the region created by the vacuum of authority in Grenada.

4. The authority was deeply concerned that military forces and supplies are likely to be shortly introduced to consolidate the position of the regime and that the country can be used as a staging post for acts of aggression against its members.
5. The authority further noted that the capability of the Grenada Armed Forces is already at a level of sophistication and size far beyond the internal needs of that country. Furthermore the member states of the OECS have no means of defence against such forces.

6. The member governments of the Organisation hold the strong view that such a situation would further undermine political, social and economic stability, and would have extremely dangerous consequences for the preservation of peace and security in the OECS sub-region as a whole.

7. The authority noted that the present regime in Grenada has demonstrated by its brutality and ruthlessness that it will stop at nothing to achieve its ends and to secure its power.

8. Under the authority of article 8 of the Treaty establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, the authority proposes therefore to take action for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security against external aggression by requesting assistance from friendly countries to provide transport, logistics support and additional military personnel to assist the efforts of the OECS to stabilize this most grave situation within the Eastern Caribbean.

9. The authority of the OECS wishes to establish a peace keeping force with the assistance of friendly neighbouring states to restore on Grenada conditions of tranquillity and order so as to prevent further loss of life and abuses of human rights, pending the restoration of constitutional government.

The letter itself reads as follows:

Dear Prime Minister:

The Chairman of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States presents her compliments to the Rt. Honourable Edward Seaga, Prime Minister of Jamaica and has the honour to transmit herewith a request for assistance under Article 8 of the Treaty establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States.

The Chairman of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States avails herself of this opportunity to renew the assurances of her highest consideration.

Sincerely,

(Sgd.) Eugenia Charles
Chairman
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States

23rd October, 1983
It was on this basis that the government of Jamaica decided to engage its Defence Force in a multinational military action to carry out a preemptive strike to remove the threat to peace and security in the area and at the same time to restore normality to the island of Grenada.

The Bravo Company of the 2nd Battalion of the JDF departed for Grenada and is presently stationed at Point Saline, the Cuban built airport in Grenada, which was captured this morning and must be kept secure.

Contact with men of Bravo Company indicates that they are in high spirits and have suffered no casualties so far.

Let it be clearly understood that this bold and historic action which a number of Caribbean countries have jointly taken (while others have stood aside) cannot be for the purpose of changing an Austin for a Gairy.

In the same way we have proclaimed by this action, jointly and severally, that assassination and revolutionary overthrow of constitutional governments have met their match in the determination of the new character of Caribbean leaders - whether through the political system of the electoral process as was the case in 1980 and 1981, or by the military action carried out today - so too much the Gafrs meet their match by a new resolve of the Grenadian people.

We look forward to a first decree from the interim government placing a ban on the Gafrs and the Austins and what they represent, from participating in the constitutional or electoral process.

The people of Grenada can be assured that this action in which we have joined today is intended to free them from being pawns in a power play which had converted their lovely spice island to a fearsome camp. From this action we hope they will derive a new freedom and a new opportunity to build a new future.

As Caribbean brothers willing and able to assist each other, we must now ensure that the future can be one of solid cooperation in which Grenada will no longer be the odd man out, but be once again welcomed into the family of Caribbean nations.

In closing, I pay tribute to the valiant men of the Armed Forces of the United States who led the thrust, together with our own brave soldiers drawn from the ranks of the Defence Forces of 8 Caribbean countries.

There are no wars without grief, without death, without injury; but we pray God today that He will give protection to those who fight so that they may return safely to their families.
STATEMENT BY THE HONOURABLE PRIME MINISTER GEORGE CHAMBERS TO THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARLIAMENT OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
ON OCTOBER 26, 1983 ON THE GRENA DA CRISIS

It is incumbent on the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago to direct its
attention to the tragic circumstances which have visited Grenada over the last
few days. I should like, therefore, to outline to this Honourable House, to the
people of Trinidad and Tobago and to the wider Regional and International Com-
munity, the position of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago on these unprece-
dented and ominous developments.

On Friday, 14th October, 1983 reports reached the Government of Trinidad
and Tobago that the Prime Minister of Grenada, Maurice Bishop, had been placed
under house arrest. Subsequently, further reports indicated that Deputy Prime
Minister Bernard Coard had resigned from the Government in order, it was said,
to dispel rumours that he was implicated in a plot to assassinate Mr. Bishop.

By Wednesday, October 19th, news was received that Prime Minister Bishop,
together with some members of his Cabinet, two prominent Union Leaders and
several Civilians had been shot and killed by the Military in Grenada. The en-
suing events, as reported, led to the imposition of Military Rule in Grenada, and
the establishment of a Revolutionary Military Council. The Military Council had
imposed, among other things, a twenty-four hour curfew over a four-day period.

The Cabinet of Trinidad and Tobago considered these developments the
following day, that is to say Thursday, October 20th, 1983. Immediately after
the Cabinet Meeting, I convened a Press Conference at which I expressed the feel-
ing of shock and dismay of the Cabinet at the news of the execution of the former
Prime Minister of Grenada and several of his Ministers. I indicated that this
Government viewed with horror the importation of such executions into the English-
Speaking Caribbean and that under no circumstances whatever could the Government
and People of Trinidad and Tobago countenance the execution of public figures in
the settlement of political disputes. I also announced that in the circumstances
the Government had taken the following decisions with immediate effect and until
further notice.

- Trinidad and Tobago would not participate in any CARICOM
  Meetings whatsoever in which Grenada would be present.

- No Grenada Citizens or Nationals would be allowed entry
  into Trinidad and Tobago without a Visa.

- No exports from Grenada into Trinidad would be afforded
  CARICOM treatment and that no vessels registered in
  Grenada would be allowed the facilities of the CARICOM
  Jetty in Trinidad.

Further, I made it quite clear that the Government would take such steps
as were necessary to ensure the safety of Trinidad and Tobago Nationals in Grenada.

I emphasised that these decisions of the Government were without prejudice
to any decisions which might be taken by CARICOM Heads of Government at an emer-
gency meeting which was scheduled to take place in Port of Spain over the weekend
of Saturday, 22nd and Sunday, 23rd October, 1983. The Hosting of this Meeting by the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago was proposed by the Prime Minister of St. Lucia and after appropriate consultations.

The Emergency Meeting took place in Port-of-Spain on Saturday, 22nd and Sunday 23rd October, 1983 and was attended by:

The Deputy Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda.
The Prime Minister of the Bahamas.
The Foreign Minister of Barbados.
The Prime Minister of Belize.
The Prime Minister of Dominica.
The President of Guyana.
The Prime Minister of Jamaica.
The Chief Minister of Montserrat.
The Prime Minister of St. Lucia.
The Prime Minister of St. Christopher and Nevis.
The Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
The Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago.

Proposals were advanced to the Meeting that were consistent with the established Foreign Policy of Trinidad and Tobago based on the principles of the United Nations Charter to which we fully subscribe. The fundamental elements of this policy are non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and the avoidance of the use of force in the conduct of International Relations and in the settlement of disputes.

These proposals were:

(1) No involvement of any External Elements in the Resolution of the Grenada Situation.

(11) The Resolution of the Grenada Situation should be Wholly Regional, that is to say, CARICOM in Nature.


(IV) Any Proposed Solution should have as its Primary Purpose the Restoration of Normalcy in Grenada.

Subject to a minor reservation by one Prime Minister, which as Chairman I was confident would have been resolved, there was agreement in principle on the proposals advanced.

In respect of specific proposals relating to the restoration of normalcy in Grenada, the meeting considered whether the Governor-General, as the Legal Representative of the Queen, should be used as a point of contact in Grenada. We decided that through contact with the Governor-General we would seek to accomplish the following:
(a) The Immediate Establishment of a Broad-Based Civilian Government of National Reconciliation whose Composition was Acceptable to the Governor-General. The Primary Function of that Government would be the putting into place of Arrangements for the Holding of Elections at the earliest possible date.

(b) Acceptance of a fact-finding Mission comprising Eminent Nationals of CARICOM States.

(c) The putting into place of arrangements to ensure the Safety of Nationals of other Countries in Grenada and/or their evacuation where desired.

(d) The acceptance of the Deployment in Grenada of a Peace Keeping Force comprising contingents contributed by CARICOM Countries.

These proposals and objectives, in fact, represented the position of Trinidad and Tobago.

As Chairman, I intimated to the meeting that I had reason to believe that the persons exercising authority in Grenada would be willing to treat on the basis of these proposals and objectives. My judgement derived from consultations I had held with the President of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago who is in London and who, at my request, had been in contact with the Governor-General of Grenada. In addition, I spoke with the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth.

By 3:06 A.M. on Sunday when the adjournment was taken it was apparent that a consensus had emerged in support of the proposals and objectives, so much so that Heads of Delegations including some of the OECS had suggested names of eminent persons who would comprise the fact-finding mission to Grenada. It had also been agreed that I, as Chairman of the Meeting, would be entrusted with pursuing the initiatives. At that point it was agreed that the number, the composition and the terms of reference of that fact-finding team would be decided at the resumption of the meeting later that morning.

The single consideration standing in the way of complete agreement was what action members would take in the event that the Regime in Grenada refused to treat on the basis of the proposals. On this one point there was a division of views. Some members held that there should be instant resort to force, including extra CARICOM assistance in connection therewith, if required. Others, among them Trinidad and Tobago, maintained the position that force be it Regional or Extra Regional, should not be the first resort in respect of a Sister CARICOM State.

As Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, I indicated that I would wish in the circumstances to take the matter to Parliament before agreeing to the use of Trinidad and Tobago Forces in hostilities outside of Trinidad and Tobago.

When the Meeting reconvened later that morning, one of my colleagues from the OECS immediately informed us that a leading personality of a CARICOM Country had agreed to serve on the fact-finding mission. Whatever transpired between the adjournment and the resumption, which incidentally was one hour later than the
appointed time, is not within my knowledge. But certain Heads for the first time stated that there was no consensus on the proposals and that in any event they were of the opinion that no further discussions should continue along those lines. Instead, they wished to direct their attention to two papers which had earlier been circulated, one by the Prime Minister of Jamaica and the other by the OECS Members present.

The Jamaica Paper, which was entitled, "The Protocol of Port-of-Spain," proposed far-reaching amendments to the decision-making mechanisms contained in the Treaty of Chaguaramas, the CARICOM Agreement. The OECS Paper proposed sanctions to be imposed on Grenada.

A majority of members took the political decisions to suspend Grenada from CARICOM and to support the sanctions on Grenada. The sanctions proposed were as follows:

1. No Official Contact with the Existing Regime.
2. The Regime would not be permitted to participate in the deliberations and business of the Organisation.
3. Representatives of the Regime would not be permitted to participate in or Chair Caucuses of Groupings Pertaining to Meetings of International Agencies and would not be permitted to speak on behalf of the OECS in International Agencies.
4. The Regime would not be allowed to benefit from the Trade, Economic and Functional Co-operation Arrangements of the Organisations.
5. No New Issues of Currency will be made to the Regime under the East Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) Arrangements.
6. The OECS Governments will cease all Sea and Air Communication Links with Grenada.

At the conclusion of the Meeting I proceeded to hold a Press Conference on the Meeting in my capacity as Chairman. Immediately thereafter, I spoke to the Press in my capacity as Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago. After the Press Conference I had discussions with the President of Guyana and the Prime Minister of Belize who together with the Prime Minister of Bahamas and myself were not in favour of Military Intervention as a first resort. On Monday I spoke again to the President of Guyana and to the Prime Minister of Bahamas. I also attempted to reach the Prime Minister of Belize but he was airborne at the time. We continue to be in touch on the matter.

I would like to inform this Honourable House that in relation to my earlier statement that the Government of Trinidad and Tobago would take such steps as are necessary to ensure the safety of Trinidad and Tobago Nationals. The Ministry of External Affairs had established a mechanism for receiving information on Trinidad and Tobago Nationals who wished to leave Grenada. As of the evening of Tuesday, 25th October, it had ascertained that there were 136 Trinidad and Tobago Nationals who wished to be repatriated.

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We had also established contact with the Office of the Governor-General of Grenada with a view to working out arrangements for repatriation. It was decided that a BWIA Aircraft would be despatched to Grenada to transport our Nationals.

New developments, however, in Grenada have precluded the implementation of these arrangements.

It is now public knowledge that Military Forces have landed in Grenada and are currently engaged in hostilities there.

I would like to state that the first Official Notification I, as Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago and current Chairman of CARICOM, received of the Landing of Forces in Grenada came from the United States Embassy in Port-of-Spain through the Minister of External Affairs several hours after the actual landing. I wish to state further that to date I have received no notification from any CARICOM Member Country of any intention to request assistance from the Government of the United States to intervene Militarily in Grenada nor have I been informed by any CARICOM Member Country that such a request had in fact been made. At an emergency meeting of Cabinet yesterday the entire situation as was then known was reviewed.

I later called in the United States Ambassador, the British High Commissioner, the Venezuelan Ambassador, the High Commissioner of Canada and the Acting High Commissioner of India, to discuss the developments in Grenada and to appraise them of the position of the Trinidad and Tobago Government in the continuing crisis. I also invited and met with the Archbishop of Port of Spain and Bishop of Trinidad and Tobago at Whitehall for discussions on the Crisis. Earlier today, I met the Colombian Ambassador at his request, and I have arranged a meeting with the Nigerian High Commissioner. Other Diplomatic Representatives will be called in as necessary.

The Government of Trinidad and Tobago maintains its original position on this matter and continues to hold firmly to the view that:

1. It is regrettable that a solution involving the non-use of Force, proposed during the Emergency Meeting of the Heads of Governments, was not allowed to be pursued.

2. It is regrettable that a solution of a purely CARICOM nature was not agreed upon and was not allowed to be pursued.

3. It is regrettable that Measures Involving the use of Force as a First Resort have been embarked upon.

4. It is regrettable that Military Intervention of this Nature has been imported into the Commonwealth Caribbean.

In the light of the present situation and in pursuance of our original initiatives, we shall seek:

(1) The earliest possible Withdrawal of Combat Forces in Grenada.
(II) Through appropriate channels, the earliest establishment there of a CARICOM-Peace-Keeping Presence in which we are prepared to participate. In this regard we wish to state that in our view there is a clear distinction between the Role of an Occupation Force and that of a Peace-Keeping Force.

(III) The establishment of Broad-Based Civilian Government. The Primary Function of the Civilian Government would be the earliest putting into place of arrangements for the holding of Free and Fair Elections.

(IV) The establishment of a Fact-Finding Mission comprising Eminent Nationals of CARICOM States.

At present the Security Council of the United Nations, the Permanent Council of the OAS and the United Kingdom Parliament are all meeting on this matter.

The Government of Trinidad and Tobago is deeply conscious of the implications of all these developments for Trinidad and Tobago and for the Caribbean as a whole. Whatever the circumstances and however justifiable it may appear in the eyes of others, the commitment of our Armed Forces in the situation that I have described and which in the view of many, is tantamount to War, cannot be made on the basis of emotion or editorial hyperbole. Such a commitment requires, in my view, reference to the Parliament of the Sovereign People of Trinidad and Tobago. Moreover, in this instance it involves a Sister CARICOM Country which has a large and significant community of its Nationals in Trinidad and Tobago.

Last year the Heads of Government of CARICOM at their meeting in Ocho Rios took specific decisions against the use of force in the Resolution of Disputes. More recently, in July of this year at the Fourth Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM Countries in Port-of-Spain, they reiterated this commitment to the non-use of force. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago, as a party to these decisions could not now depart from these agreed principles, particularly without resort in the first instance to efforts at a peaceful resolution of the problem.

The Government of Trinidad and Tobago deeply sympathises with the people of Grenada, in what is obviously a troubled time not only for them but also for the Caribbean Region and stands ready to assist in resolution of the crisis in accordance with its stated principles.

Finally, let me make it clear that it is our intention to treat with this issue on a non-partisan basis and we invite our friends opposite to treat the matter likewise so that the Country, the Region and the International Community will be in no doubt whatsoever as to the attitude of this Honourable House on matters of National, Regional and International moment.
Mr. Chairman, Trinidad and Tobago remains unequivocal in its commitment to the Regional Integration Movement in the Caribbean. Nevertheless, the recent events in Grenada and the implications of these events, have left deep wounds within the Region which though not fatal will take a long time to heal.

Mr. President, it is apposite to make the position of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago extremely clear on what has transpired in one of our Sister Caribbean States, Grenada. When news of the tragic events in Grenada came to our attention the response of our Government was swift, clear and unequivocal. The words of our Prime Minister adequately captured the mood of the Government. I quote: "As the longest serving democratically elected Government in CARICOM we find it extremely difficult to countenance political murders, and above all we view with horror the importation of such executions in the English-Speaking Caribbean. Under no circumstances whatsoever can we countenance the execution of public figures in the settlement of political disputes."

Mr. President, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago stands second to none in its espousal of democracy. Its adherence to democratic traditions is well-known thus leading the former Prime Minister to describe his country as the Athens of the Caribbean.

The fundamental rights and freedoms embedded in our constitution are no paper rights. Life has been continuously breathed into these rights and freedoms enshrined in our constitution and we have adhered to our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and the O.A.S. Free and fair elections and respect for Human Rights form an integral part of the political culture of Trinidad and Tobago. It is in this context that the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago had entered into dialogue with Mr. Bishop at the CARICOM Heads of Government Conference in Ocho Rios, Jamaica, in November 1982, to encourage him to permit a Caribbean Team to enter to see the condition of political prisoners. It was this prodding that led to the subsequent release of some fifty political prisoners. The prodding also sought to persuade Mr. Bishop to hasten the completion of a constitution which would provide for the entrenchment of democratic ideals, including free and fair elections.

It was Trinidad and Tobago who acted in such a manner at the last Heads of Government Conference in Port-of-Spain last July, to ensure that some sort of dialogue be carried on with Mr. Bishop and that he be not confined to the nether regions. But internal events in Grenada were advancing too rapidly. The rest is History.

The Government of Trinidad and Tobago did not participate in the Military Intervention in Grenada. We did not participate because our Policy of Non-Interference and Non-Interference in the Affairs of States did not permit us to do so. We did not participate because of our unswerving adherence to the principle of the Non-Use of Force in the settlement of disputes. We did not participate because of our respect for the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of States. We did not participate because these hallowed principles are enshrined in the
United Nations Charter and the Charter of our Regional Organization, the O.A.S., and we have the most profound respect for these Charters which we view as the protector of States, especially small States.

Although we did not participate, we condemn no one who participated although Trinidad and Tobago regrets such participation. At this stage the well-being of the people of Grenada is uppermost in the minds of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago and for this reason we would support and encourage any steps that uphold the Sovereignty of the Grenadian People and would lead as soon as possible to their determining for themselves the system of Government under which they would choose to live in free and fair elections. In short, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago supports and is willing to join in all constructive efforts that would hasten the return to normalcy in Grenada. We believe that this return to normalcy would be assisted by the withdrawal of foreign troops as soon as possible.

Likewise, Mr. Chairman, with regard to the situation in Central America, Trinidad and Tobago wishes to commend the efforts of the Contadora Group. We implore those States actively involved in the conflict to continue to co-operate fully with the Contadora Initiative. Further, we appeal to all States to desist from seeking to impose any settlement in the region by use of force, to exercise due respect for the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of all individual States, and to use their influence to promote economic and social justice in Central America.

Trinidad and Tobago has long upheld the principle that all independent Caribbean States must be eligible for admission to the Organization of American States. Furthermore, that these States should be admitted to the Regional and Economic Institutions of the Organization of American States, if they so desire. Trinidad and Tobago will continue to co-operate fully with all Member States for the achievement of these objectives.

My Delegation views with satisfaction the report that the Permanent Council has made some progress in fulfilment of the Mandate from the General Assembly contained in Resolution AG/RES. 541 of 1981 and AG/RES. 620 of 1982, charging the Council with the task of "undertaking a thorough study of the subject 'consideration of Article 8 of the Charter of the Organization of American States in the context of the progressive development of the Organization of American States'."

Mr. Chairman, my Delegation urges the Permanent Council diligently to continue its work on Article 8 and to make every effort to present its results and recommendations to the Assembly at its Fourteenth Regular Session.

In this Bi-Centennial Year of the birth of the Liberator, our countries have paid deserving tribute to his memory, and to his accomplishments.

But, as we gather together, in one of the most momentous and difficult periods in the history, not only our Organization but of the entire Americas, it may be well for us to recall that, as he lay dying in December 1830, the thoughts of the great Liberator were concentrated on - reconciliation and peace, both within his own native land and within the Americas as a whole.
I appeal, Mr. Chairman, to this Assembly to adopt, as watchwords for the
Sessions that lie ahead, these two ideals - Reconciliation and Peace - so that
all of our deliberations may be influenced by the urgent need to restore to our
Organization the spirit of solidarity and good neighbourliness required by the
principles upon which our Charter is founded.

Mr. Chairman, in the beautiful gardens that surround this Hall in which
we are meeting, there are several statues of eminent statesmen of the Americas.
On the plinth upon which one such statue is erected are inscribed these words:

"Let Each American Nation Vie
With The Other In The Practice
Of The Policy Of The Good Neighbour.
Peace Must Be Our Passion".

With these words of the United States Statesman, Cordell Hull, I am sure
that all of us here today can heartily agree.

"Peace Must Be Our Passion"
Following is a statement issued by the seven-member Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) on the military and political situation in Grenada.

The member governments of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean states met at Bridgetown, Barbados, on Friday 24th October 1983 to consider and evaluate the situation in Grenada arising out of the overthrow of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and the subsequent killing of the Foreign Minister together with some of his Cabinet colleagues and a number of other citizens.

The member states were deeply concerned that this situation would continue to worsen, that there would be further loss of life, personal injury and a general deterioration of public order as the military group in control attempted to secure its position.

Member governments considered that the subsequent imposition of a draconian 96-hour curfew by the military group in control was intended to allow them to further suppress the population of Grenada which had shown by numerous demonstrations their hostility towards this group.

Member governments are also greatly concerned that the expensive military buildup in Grenada over the last few years had created a situation of disproportionate military strength between Grenada and other OECS countries.

This military might in the hands of the present group causes a serious threat to the security of the OECS countries and other neighbouring states. Member governments considered it of the utmost urgency that immediate steps should be taken to remove this threat.

Under the provisions of Article 8 of the treaty establishing the OECS concerning defense and security in the sub-region member governments of the organisation therefore decided to take appropriate action.

Bearing in mind the relative lack of military resources in the possession of the other OECS countries the member governments have sought assistance for this purpose from friendly countries within the region and subsequently from outside. Three governments have responded to the OECS member governments' request to form a multinational force for the purpose of undertaking a pre-emptive defensive strike in order to remove this dangerous threat to the peace and security of their sub-region and to establish a situation of normality in Grenada.

These governments are Barbados, Jamaica and the United States of America. Barbados and Jamaica are members of CARICOM and Barbados is linked to some of the OECS member governments in a sub-regional security agreement.
It is the intention of the member governments of the OECS that once the threat has been removed they would invite the Governor General of Grenada to assume executive authority of the country under the provisions of the Grenada Constitution of 1973 and to appoint a broad-based interim government to administer the country pending the holding of general elections.

It has been agreed that while the arrangements are being put in place the presence of former Prime Minister Eric Gairy and other undesirable political elements would complicate the situation and that they would therefore not be welcomed in Grenada.

Member governments of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States wish to solicit the diplomatic support of all friendly countries for this initiative.
The full extent of the rift in Anglo-American relations over the invasion of Grenada was made publicly plain by the Government yesterday, when Mrs. Margaret Thatcher declared that the West could not just march into other countries when things happened in them which they did not like and Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign Secretary, said the United States action could not be justified.

In what amounted to a change of tone in the Government's response to the invasion, which it had been reluctant to condemn outright last week, the Prime Minister told an estimated audience of 25 million listeners on the BBC World Service: "If you are going to pronounce a new law that wherever Communism reigns against the will of the people... the United States shall enter, then we are going to have really terrible wars in the world."

Mrs. Thatcher said she was delighted that the people of Grenada were free and that the people of the Eastern Caribbean could sleep more soundly in their beds. But, she went on: "Does that mean you are entitled to go into a whole list of other countries? I think the answer is (no)."

The Prime Minister was speaking after the Foreign Secretary had confirmed that the Government had complained to the American Government about the lack of frankness over its invasion plans. The United States had not given Britain "an opportunity of consultation in those last critical stages of the kind we would have wished."

Sir Geoffrey said on London Weekend Television's Weekend World that the invasion was not justified on the grounds of danger to American citizens or of the Cuban-Soviet presence. He said that Cubans or Russians could be discovered in many other parts of the world but if they were in those countries as a result of an invitation, however misguided, of the governments concerned that did not provide a justification for invasion.

The Government's stronger line on the American action came on the eve of today's Commons debate on the deployment of cruise missiles and amid growing evidence of public mistrust, in the aftermath of the Grenada invasion, of the American guarantee of joint US-British control over the firing of the missiles.

A MORI poll in The Sunday Times yesterday showed that of more than 1,000 voters interviewed 73 percent thought America would fire the missiles even if the British Government objected and a Harris poll for Weekend World indicated that 87 percent of the electorate favoured the dual key mechanism of control, a view which will be put in today's debate by the Opposition and is shared by some Conservative MPs.
Mr. Norman St John-Stevas, the former Tory Cabinet Minister, said yesterday that the invasion "had immensely strengthened the lobby for the dual key."

Mrs. Thatcher, who made clear in the live phone-in programme her desire to minimize the damage the invasion has caused in relations, said the situations regarding cruise and the Grenada invasion were totally different.

One concerned an independent small island in the American sphere, over which the Americans had been under no obligation to consult, and the other was about American nuclear weapons on British soil over which there had been an agreement in writing between the two countries over many years.

Mr. Michael Heseltine, the Secretary of State for Defense, will use the same argument in resisting the calls for the dual key today.

But Mrs. Thatcher displayed no reticence in showing her disapproval of the American invasion and made clear her reluctance to send in British troops as part of a security force. She said that Western countries did not use force" to walk into other people's countries."?

"You have to be absolutely certain if you do that there is no choice, no other way." She hated Communism. There were many peoples who would love to be free of it. "That does not mean we can just walk into them and say: 'Now we are free.'"

She said the reason the Americans went in was regional security. Now everybody had to try to ensure that democracy was restored and hope earnestly that the people of Grenada, who had been given a second chance for democracy, chose and sustained the democratic path.

She made it clear that Britain would be sympathetic to calls for help "when the United States has cleared the island of the present resistance." It was important that all parts of the resistance were cleared up before a Commonwealth force went in.

If there was to be a multinational force, Mrs. Thatcher said, it must have clear terms of reference, a clear command structure and a time limit on the duration of its stay.

Perhaps Mrs. Thatcher's most remarkable statement came when she was asked whether the Government would take action to prevent an invasion by America of Nicaragua. She said: "Sticking my neck out a long way, and my reputation, I do not believe the United States will invade Nicaragua."

The fact they had gone into Grenada did not make it any more likely that they would go into Nicaragua.
The following is the final communique issued after the 1983 meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOGM):

Commonwealth heads of government met in New Delhi from 23 to 29 November 1983. Of the 42 countries which attended the meeting 33 were represented by their presidents or prime ministers. The prime minister of India, Shrimati Indira Gandhi, was in the chair.

Heads of government sent a message of felicitation to her Majesty The Queen as Head of the Commonwealth. They welcomed with great pleasure the opportunity of meeting in New Delhi and expressed their deep appreciation of the excellent arrangements made for the meeting by the government of India and gratitude for the generous hospitality extended to them.

Heads of government warmly welcomed Antigua and Barbuda and St. Christopher and Nevis who had become members of the association since their last meeting, and extended similar greetings to the republic of Maldives which had become a special member.

Heads of government reviewed a number of important current international issues. They were encouraged to find much common ground between them. In view of the overriding importance of issues relating to security, disarmament and the maintenance of peace, as well as the increasing tendency towards interference and intervention by political and economic means in the internal affairs of other states, they have in their Goa declaration expressed their grave concern about them. Their views on a number of other problems and situations are set out below....

GRENADA

Commonwealth leaders discussed recent events in Grenada which have caused such deep disquiet among them and in the wider international community, and on which most of them had already expressed their views at the United Nations. They reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and called for the strict observance of these principles. They recorded their profound regret over the tragic loss of life in Grenada.

Heads of government agreed, however, that the emphasis should now be on reconstruction, not recrimination. They welcomed the establishment of an interim civilian administration in Grenada. They looked forward to its functioning free of external interference, pressure or the presence of foreign military forces and noted its intention to hold, as early as possible, elections which would be seen by the International Community to be free and fair. On this basis, and given the readiness of the countries of the Caribbean community to assist in the maintenance of law and order in Grenada if so requested by the Interim Administration. Commonwealth leaders confirmed their readiness to give sympathetic consideration to requests for assistance from the island state. In doing so, they stressed the importance they attached to an early return of Commonwealth countries of the Caribbean to the spirit of fraternity and co-operation that had been so characteristic of the region.
Time and again in their discussions, commonwealth leaders were recalled to special needs of small states, not only in the Caribbean but elsewhere in the commonwealth. They recognised that the commonwealth itself had given some attention to these needs in the context of economic development but felt that the matter deserved consideration on a wider basis, including that of national security. Recalling in particular dangers faced in the past by small commonwealth countries, they requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study, drawing as necessary on the resources and experience of commonwealth countries, of the special needs of such states consonant with the right to sovereignty and territorial integrity that they shared with all nations.
INTERVIEW WITH JEAN-LUC PEPIN, EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER OF CANADA
(Source: Trinidad Express 21 January, 1984)

During his recent visit to Trinidad and Tobago for trade discussions with the government, Canadian External Affairs Minister, Jean-Luc Pepin gave an exclusive interview to Dr. Ramesh Deosaran, lecturer in social psychology at UWI, St. Augustine, on the Grenada crisis. Mr. Pepin criticized the US actions, discussed Canada's lack of attention to Caribbean security, and expressed a hope for reconciliation.

Deosaran: Mr. Pepin, is your presence in the Caribbean an attempt by Canada to maintain the spirit of brotherhood which has lasted so long between the Commonwealth Caribbean and Canada and which, from some appearances, is now strained because of the position of the United States (US), favoured by some Caribbean states, over the Grenada crisis?

Pepin: Well, first of all let me raise some points over this issue. There was not enough consultation before the US took action; some people would tell you that had there been enough consultation among all the parties a peaceful way might have been found.

It is vital to me that countries have an obligation to exhaust all avenues for peaceful solution. We in Canada had been told just the night before of the joint US-OECS action in Grenada, leaving us with no possibility of calling a meeting of the concerned parties.

It is also difficult for us to believe that you had to have a full-scale invasion, or rescue as the Americans call it. Any group of countries planning an invasion must think of the consequences. For example, any revolutionary group, X, Y, or Z, could take over Anguilla; or even South Africa could undertake an invasion with justification... so we must think of the consequences.

Then there is the talk of saving democracy which is a difficult one to understand. Look at Nigeria where the military has taken over an elected government. Would the Americans now go to Nigeria to save democracy?

But of course, if you will allow me, we are not fighting a war of ideas on this subject. We have our views, we are not infallible, and whosoever disagrees, well, let them suit themselves. Right now, I think we must still try to see how the whole situation can be resolved.

Deosaran: The Trinidad and Tobago Government rejected force as a first step in handling the Grenada situation. Is this the view of Canada, and at what point would you have actually recommended force, if this was desirable at all?

Pepin: Well, as the United Nations (UN) charter commands, you must exhaust all avenues of peaceful settlement. Were they exhausted in this Grenada issue? Well, you have to be a strong believer to think so. We don't think so. We were just consulted the night before.
Now you are a thinking man, and you have a situation in the Caribbean where all countries are in favour of ideological diversity or pluralism. Yet some of the Caribbean leaders I have met will tell you "Yes, we are in favour of ideological pluralism but there are limits to that when a country like Grenada imports into the region ideas of violence in the conduct of policy."

The next question from you and me is, well, who is going to decide the limits? Is it Ms. Charles, Mr. Reagan? It is terribly complicated. This is not like playing baseball.

Deosaran: Don't you think that there should be some caution in current consultations with the different governments in the Caribbean in that the views of some of these governments may not necessarily reflect those of the majority of people they govern? Now I agree that sometimes principles should not bow to majority pressures; but in this case, what is the implication if there are discrepancies?

Pepin: That is why we in Canada are not fanatic about the subject. I come here and talk to people and try to see about now, what do we do about the situation now. The debate we have among ourselves in Canada is when is now, since there are so many documents and reports for us to study.

Now you are a thinking man, I repeat. I have just had a debate over whether Bishop was turning to the left or to the right. It is amazing how deep one's reasoning could get in matters of this sort.

Deosaran: Do you think that members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) have now moved away from Canada because of Canada's position over the joint US-OECS action in Grenada?

Pepin: I don't think so, and this is something I want to emphasize. Canada has a rather romantic view that all these problems, the Grenada problem, the Central American problem, are all socio-economic problems. The Americans will smile to that and say "How nice," because for them there are socio-economic problems and there are security problems.

Canada has indulged in the luxury of neglecting the issue of security in the Caribbean. In this area of security, we are lost. We do a little bit with police training, military and coastguard training... but really, this is not the security of the Caribbean region.

So when it comes to the matter of Caribbean security, as in the case of Grenada, Mrs. Charles, Mr. Compton and the others think that their protection lies in the hands of the United States of America.

Deosaran: Isn't this situation linked to the fact that Canada is outside the arms race, especially the nuclear build-up?

Pepin: No, I think this has always been the case, ever since Britain ceased being at the zenith of her imperialistic powers. If she was still, that would have been her job.

Deosaran: So all in all, there was really no good reason for the OECS to call on Canada to deal with the Grenada issue?
Pepin: The US and the OECS knew what Canada was going to say, Canada was going to say, let's have a big regional conference on the subject among all the parties.

Deosaran: Wouldn't that perhaps have been too late?

Pepin: The OECS thought it was too urgent to have Canada in and call a conference and so they went ahead and called in the Americans, or the Americans went to see them...who knows?

So they got together and found that they had a common interest to invade now, and they invaded now.

So Mrs. Charles and Mr. Compton and all the others now say to Canada, well we are sorry we couldn't consult with you, and that we didn't have your Prime Minister's phone number...let's be friends as in the past; we still look upon Canada as of beneficial influence as a friendly people, you are generous, you are pleasant, you are cute, so please come back with us, let's behave as if nothing had happened.

Deosaran: There is a growing fear, justifiably or not, over the 'spread of Russian and even socialist' influence in the Caribbean. What is your government's view on this?

Pepin: I am not an expert on that. I am symbolic of Canada when I say that I don't know about these things because we don't look at it that way. I am not saying this through any sense of superiority. Maybe we should know, maybe we should take part in the security of the Caribbean region, but we have not really addressed that question yet.

Deosaran: In terms of international security, do you think that your Prime Minister, Mr. Trudeau, has been successful in his recent consultations with some world leaders on the need for more severe and expeditious controls over nuclear arms?

Pepin: Well, there are two parts to Mr. Trudeau's mission. The first one is a political message which says, hey look, there is danger ahead, so it is time that the politicians take their responsibilities and stop leaving it all up to the diplomats and the specialists on armament. This is a job for politicians.

The second message is the range of consensus obtained on related matters. It is also interesting that Chinese who first said that they would not meet the Prime Minister are now coming back saying that they will.
THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THE CRISIS IN GRENADA
(Source: New York Times - 26 October)

The Government issued the following statement:

"The French Government had not been informed of the latest events on Grenada: it cannot, therefore, judge the reasons for such a surprising action in relation to international law. But it insists on recalling the constant position of France in affirming the principle of nonintervention.

No state or group of states has the right to intervene militarily on the territory of another state without having been expressly invited by the legitimate authorities of the latter or without having the Security Council formally and explicitly authorize it.

Grenada is linked to the European Community by the Lomé Convention. France regards this country with esteem and friendship. The Grenadian people must recover without delay the right to determine its destiny in independence and sovereignty."

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An armed intervention against Grenada, a sovereign independent state, was perpetrated on October 25. American troops landed on the island with the support of United States combat ships. The intrusion was effected under the false pretext of ensuring the safety of American citizens in Grenada although it is well known - and this was directly stated by the Grenadian authorities - that nothing threatens them. At the same time Washington contends that its actions are supposedly motivated by concern for "human rights."

What can be more cynical and hypocritical than such statements when, under the pretext of concern for "human rights", an attempt is being made to drown in blood the right of a whole people to free and sovereign existence!

What is happening in reality is outright armed aggression against a peace-loving people of a small country that is not threatening anyone with anything. The aim of this is to overthrow the social system existing there. This is an attempt to impose on the Grenadian people by means of force a system suitable to Washington, to intimidate the other freedom-loving peoples of Latin America and not only them.

By its actions in respect of Grenada, the Government of the United States of America demonstrates its full disregard for the generally accepted norms of international law and tramples into dirt the lofty principles of the United Nations Charter.

This is direct evidence of the fact that, for the sake of attaining its aims of conquest, Washington does not intend to respect the right of peoples to independent development, and is openly and brazenly challenging the will of the peoples and world public opinion.

The bandit attack on Grenada shows with total clarity the danger posed to the cause of peace and the freedom of peoples by the course pursued in international affairs by the present American Administration.

Tass is authorized to state that the Soviet Union firmly condemns the United States aggression against Grenada and stigmatizes it as a crime against peace and humanity. It is the duty of all states and peoples firmly to come out against Washington's arbitrariness and lawlessness, in defense of the Grenadian people.

The aggression against the people of Grenada must be stopped, the occupationists must immediately clear out from that independent state.
Mr. Clay, Mr. Speaker, on Friday, November 4, 14 Members of the House of Representatives embarked on a fact-finding mission to Grenada on behalf of the United States and our citizens. My distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Stokes was a member of that delegation. Upon his return from Grenada, Congressman Stokes published his diary of the mission in the Cleveland Plain Dealer.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to insert a copy of that diary in the RECORD at this time.

The diary follows: (From the Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 13, 1983).

A GRENADA DIARY (By Congressman Louis Stokes).

We arrived in Grenada at about 1:45 P.M. Friday, Nov. 4, at Point Salines, the primary site of the invasion by U.S. troops.

This was the airport and runway President Reagan said was being constructed for military purposes, as a possible staging area for Cubans and Soviets. We were briefed by Maj. Gen. Trobaugh, who commanded the 82d Airborne troops who landed at Point Salines.

Trobaugh explained that at 5 a.m. the day of the invasion eight helicopters containing 82d Airborne troops came into the airport under heavy gunfire from an antiaircraft gun that was adjacent to the Cuban barracks. He said all eight helicopters were hit by antiaircraft fire from this gunner, but none of the troops were hit.

These troops proceeded to clear the airfield, which had barbed wire strung at intervals of every 100 feet around barrels on each side of the runaway. He credited the Cuban forces with being well trained and tough.

My first question to him was whether the maps he had been given were adequate. There had been reports in the U.S. media that GIs arrived utilizing tourist maps, which had not been adequate.

Trobaugh said they had three maps—an aerial map, a grip map and a tourist map that had been prepared by the British. He said the maps given him were adequate but that he just did not have enough to give to all of his men.

I then asked him about the advance intelligence information he had been given. He said that what his troops had encountered was roughly what had been expected through intelligence sources, and that while he would have preferred to have had more intelligence, it was adequate.

I was concerned about the purpose of the invasion as it related to the U.S. medical students at True Blue and Grand Anse campuses.
"After you had secured the students who were located at True Blue campus, what did you do with reference to the students who were on the campus at Grant Anse?"

He replied that they had gone to the campus at Grant Anse to liberate the students.

"How many days elapsed between the time of the invasion and the time you went up to release the students at Grand Anse campus?"

He said they went there on the third day after the invasion.

I wanted to know why an invasion of another country for the purpose of evacuating U.S. medical students had resulted in a three-day delay in evacuating one group of students. The explanation was that they were in touch with the students up at the second campus and instructions had been given to them to put mattresses up by their windows and that the conditions did not necessitate any rush to get to that campus.

Following the briefing, we visited the Cuban compound and prisoner-of-war camp. As we approached the compounds, the prisoners milled around and looked at us, and we looked at them without any comment from either side.

We traveled to the warehouse containing the weapons cache found on the island. I think everyone in the delegation was impressed by the extraordinary amount of ammunition stored there. We were told it totaled more than 5 million rounds of ammunition. Most of the ammunition carried either Soviet or Cuban markings.

The situation lent itself to all types of conjecture: Was the ammunition to be used for the defense of Grenada, or was it to be used by Cubans for distribution elsewhere, or was it to be utilized by Grenadians for the invasion of other islands in the Caribbean?

We received no testimony from anyone that clarified this issue.

Upon leaving the site of the weapons cache, we were taken by bus to the Calabash Hotel.

As soon as we were assigned rooms, we were advised that our next meeting would be with the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States commander, a Jamaican in charge of the multinational forces on Grenada. We learned from him that the multinational peace-keeping force he heads in Grenada is composed of soldiers or police provided to the force from the various islands that comprise the OECS. He made it clear that in most cases these people were not well trained or well equipped. Their function on Grenada is limited in terms of being able to provide security. For those reasons, he felt it was going to be necessary to keep U.S. forces in Grenada for an extensive period of time.

He asserted strongly that both a military and an economic presence was necessary from the United States if we intended to provide the security needed until the Grenadians can provide security for their island.
He agreed that U.S. troops should probably be removed when free elections are held in Grenada.

Our next meeting was with Eric Pierre and representatives of the Grenada Trade Union Movement. He spoke of what it was like to live under Maurice Bishop's rule. His grievance with Bishop was mainly over human rights violations and that freedom of speech was not always protected. He told of how thousands of Grenadians had come out to free Bishop—as many as 20,000. He told of how the people were shouting "Communism, no, Coard, no. We want elections!"

He placed the estimate of the dead during the assassination of Bishop in the neighborhood of 200. He was the first Grenadian to make it clear that he believed that U.S. intervention in Grenada was not an invasion, but "a mission of rescue for which your country shall have our everlasting gratitude."

Bishop had visited the United States in June and had tried to meet with President Reagan and other high-level government officials. It appeared that he was trying to make some overtures to the United States. According to Pierre, Bishop's visit to the United States was met with mixed emotions by Grenadians. He said it seemed Bishop had toned down some of his rhetoric against Reagan and he believed Bishop might have been trying to move toward the United States.

He said this may have hurt him with the People's Revolutionary Council, which was then beginning to turn to Bernard Coard.

I was awakened at about 4 a.m. the next day by what sounded like gunshots. I looked out and saw what appeared to be the brightness of day. Actually it was the glow created from flares. About 15 feet from my window was a U.S. soldier with rifle in hand who stood there for about 10 minutes. I continued to watch and he backed up to a position of about three feet from my window.

I continued to hear what sounded like shots. At this point, I wondered if I should get down on the floor. A few minutes later, the soldier walked away from my window and disappeared into the darkness that was settling over the area. Finally I went to sleep again.

The next morning, I learned that the flares had been sent up in response to the noise made when some coconuts had fallen on the ground.

Saturday, Nov. 5, we met with Gov. Gen. Sir Paul Scoon. He welcomed us and spoke of how happy they were to have Americans in Grenada.

He spoke of Grenada as having been very tense from the time the people knew Bishop was under arrest. After Bishop's assassination, he considered himself the only legal authority on the island. He spoke of the deteriorating conditions that came after the bodies of Bishop and eight others could not be found. He said he contacted the United States and the OECS and requested help. He told us about the controversial airport and the runway Reagan had said was for military purposes. Scoon said it was "essentially a commercial airport."

In fact, everyone whom we talked with on Grenada refuted Reagan's contention. All the evidence we received indicated that the runway was comparable to runways in other Caribbean countries.
It seemed ironic that we were the ones who had turned it into a military airport. Scoon was not able to give us a precise timetable for elections. He indicated that it could be six, eight or nine months. His preference was that they be held within a year.

Next we visited the Ft. Frederick mental hospital, which had been bombed by the U.S. Air Force.

This was a depressing experience. Many of the mental patients were yelling and screaming at us from behind the cell bars. Many screamed out, "America's new Vietnam." As we toured the rubble where our military personnel are doing some restoration work, we learned that the hospital had been hit three times within the hour and that 17 mental patients had been killed and more than 30 injured.

Everyone whom we talked with there, including our own military personnel, expressed the hope that America would build a new mental hospital.

We were bused to Point Salines where we were taken in helicopters to the island of Carriacou, part of Grenada. After military briefings, the congressmen sought out constituents to have lunch with. There were no Clevelanders present, but I lunched with Sgt.I.C. Michael Oesch, Mansfield; Cpl. Gene Stoller, Carrollton; and Pvt. Bob Schultz, Chardon.

Besides our search operation for members of the People's Revolutionary Army, I found out military personnel were trying to restore medical care to the populace. This was in lieu of the medical clinic the Cubans had set up. The Cuban doctors had been evacuated. Their absence leaves one Grenadian doctor and two Grenadian dentists, one of whom we were advised travels most of the time.

Later that day we met with U.S. nationals, along with some of the medical school personnel, including Dr. Peter Bourne, vice chancellor of the medical school, and some of the medical students who were still on the island. Bourne said Hudson Austin had called him immediately after Bishop's assassination. Bourne said Austin advised him that the medical students would be safe; that they had no intention of having trouble with the United States; and that if the students would prefer to be evacuated, he would assist in getting them out.

He indicated to Bourne that he wanted to meet with our diplomatic officials in order to give them the same assurance and to work with them in terms of evacuating any students.

Bourne said he had expressed to Austin the fact that they did not have enough food and water at the True Blue campus and he told us that within two hours Austin's security people got water to the campus. Bourne said the students were never in any actual danger and never even saw a soldier.

I asked all present if they could give me the name of any American they were aware of who at any time was harmed, injured or treated as a hostage. No one could name a single person. It was interesting that this entire group was unanimous in their opinion that the Americans should have intervened.

Sunday, Nov. 6, our first meeting was with representatives of the private sector, including Chamber of Commerce, cultural and social leaders. They were
unanimous in their praise of the United States for its intervention and urged our continued military presence for as long as a year or more.

Following this, we met with Alister Hughes, a prominent journalist and former political prisoner in Grenada. He was the last known person to speak to Bishop. He estimated the crowd that freed Bishop from house arrest at 10,000 to 15,000.

Hughes told of the enormous popularity of Bishop with Grenadians. He stated that if Bishop had conducted elections he could have won. He admonished the delegation, "Don't smother us with U.S. dollar bills—we don't want to become another St. Thomas."

Our next meeting was with two former members of the Bishop cabinet—George Louison, Minister of Agriculture, and Attn. Gen. Kendrick Radix. Both were imprisoned by Austin after Bishop's arrest. Both were educated in England. They informed us that Coard was chairman of the Central Committee and had ordered the execution. They said they knew who the execution squad members were.

During our conversation with them, Radix lectured our delegation about U.S. intervention on a poor, underdeveloped nation that had been subject to a history of colonial exploitation. He said the intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation violated the U.N. charter and international law.

He stated that the United States would have resisted and condemned intervention had some foreign nation intervened in our Civil War. He chided the United States for its exploitation of the civil rights of black people and the slaying of Martin Luther King Jr. and thousands of others who professed to love liberty.

Someone from the delegation interrupted to remind Radix that he had been a political prisoner until the invasion. His reply was, "I would prefer to have died rather than to have had the United States violate the sovereign territorial integrity of our country."

He said the medical school and the safety of the U.S. citizens was never under threat. Radix and Louison said Grenada had been under threat of U.S. invasion for 4 to 4 1/2 years. In referring to the cache of arms and ammunition, Radix said, "It was our legal right to prepare ourselves against the United States in the event of an invasion." Both called for the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Radix described an experience he had with U.S. military forces on his release from the Cuban embassy where he had been given refuge. He said he was menaced and threatened and that guns had been placed at his head. "I was not even treated in that way by the Revolutionary Council."

Monday, Nov. 7, we met with our embassy officials, who had participated in negotiations with the People's Revolutionary Council after Bishop's death. Official Ken Kurze who verified that Bourne had contacted them at Austin's urging and set up the first of several diplomatic meetings. He said Maj. Cornwall of the revolutionary council gave them assurances of the students' safety.
Kurze said he and other embassy officials met with Cornwall over the next four days. During that time they were given access to the students. In addition, Cornwall, representing Austin, had been in touch with diplomatic personnel from the British High Commission and the Canadian and Venezuelan embassies to assure the entire diplomatic community that they were in control of Grenada and that there was no danger to the international community there.

There is no doubt that these types of diplomatic negotiations were going on and in process at the time of the invasion. Several of our consular officials involved in the discussions were caught on Grenada at the time of the invasion and could not get out as a result of our forces.

These officials, while not denying the assurances given them, indicated that they believed the situation was deteriorating and, as a consequence, felt that there was a possibility that the students' safety could have been at risk. They do concede that none was imperiled before the invasion.

After I established that these consular officials were in touch with embassy officials in Washington, I asked if they recommended to Washington that an invasion was necessary. They said they did not.

It was also interesting that these officials conceded that over the entire four-day period, they had never put together any evacuation plans.

Our last meeting of the day was with the heads of the OECS states. This delegation was headed by M. Eugenia Charles, Prime Minister of Dominica. She praised the United States for its intervention, which came about as a result of their request to Reagan. They gave us extensive briefings on Grenada's history in relation to the OECS and on the threats posed to their countries as a result of the threat or fear of the spread of communism.

During the entire 2 1/2 hour meeting, no mention was made of either the safety of U.S. students or Americans who were on Grenada.

The bottom line appeared to be the threat they perceived to each of their states after Bishop's death. They characterized Bishop as a moderating force with whom they had been willing to work. They were afraid of Coard, who, they said, had co-authored a book describing his plan to attack and take over the other islands. They met and within 20 minutes decided they had to invade Grenada. They based the legality of their action upon their assertion that Grenada, at that point, had no government.

After this meeting, we returned to the airport where it was "wheels up" for Andrews Air Force Base near Washington.

As I assess the invasion, I would have to admit we won this one. Maybe the United States needed the victory.

Somehow I can't rejoice over our military victory over this little island eight miles wide and 16 miles long populated by 110,000 people (about a fifth the population of my congressional district).

As I looked at this beautiful little island, discovered by Columbus in 1498, inhabited by a population of African descent, invaded and conquered by the French
and English and colonized for more than 400 years. I wished we had reached out
to Bishop when he reached out to us. Maybe then, we might have saved his life,
averted a revolution and avoided an invasion of questionable necessity.

NEW HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS DILEMMA IN GRENADA - Hon. Louis Stokes, of Ohio in the
House of Representatives, Wednesday, November 6, 1983.

Mr. Stokes, Mr. Speaker, as one of the members of the U.S. congressional
dlegation which has just returned from a fact-finding mission to Grenada, there
are some troubling aspects of our continued presence in that nation. In the
briefings which our delegation received from American military personnel we were
informed of what is referred to as a mopping up process. In this so called pro-
cess, Grenadians are being detained, interrogated, and subject to illegal search
and seizure.

Our Government has contended that our invasion of this country was for the
purpose of rescuing the medical students at the True Blue and Grand Anse campuses
who were in danger. The invasion occurred on October 25, 1983, and American
troops are still occupying this island. I am distressed to learn some of the
actions of our Government pursuant to the orders of Governor General, Sir Paul
Scoon. If Sir Paul Scoon, under the color of law, and the bayonets of American
soldiers is now violating the human and civil rights of Grenadians, Americans
should be asking some very hard questions of this administration.

Mr. Speaker, I would like, at this time, to share two newspaper articles
which appeared in the Los Angeles Times and the Cleveland Plain Dealer on the
situation in Grenada. I ask that the articles be included in the RECORD. (From
the Los Angeles Times, Nov. 13, 1983).

CRITICS OF AMERICAN INVASION DETAINED--U.S. TROOPS ACT ON REQUEST OF GRENADA'S
GOVERNOR GENERAL (By Rone Tempest).

St. George's Grenada.--At the request of Sir Paul Scoon, Grenada's govern-
lor general, American officers detained an outspoken critic of the U.S. invasion,
interrogating and holding him overnight, the commander of U.S. forces on the
island said Saturday.

Kendrick Radix was interrogated for several hours Friday evening and was
placed overnight in a makeshift cell, constructed from a wooden packing crate,
at the American-run prisoner-of-war camp near the Point Salines Airport, before
his release Saturday morning.

Radix was ambassador to the United States and United Nations in the govern-
ment of Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, whose assassination helped trig-
ger the U.S. led invasion. He, along with Bishop, was also a founding member
of the Marxist-oriented New Jewel Movement, which ruled this Caribbean nation
since 1979.

SPREADING BAD WILL

The official U.S. explanation for Radix's detention is that he "had been
cited by some people in the local populace as an instigator in spreading bad
will among the people," Army Capt. George Wright said.

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Maj. Gen. Jack Farris, commander of U.S. forces on the island, said it was "the governor general himself who asked that Radix be picked up."

At the same time that Radix was being interrogated, several dozen "internationalists"—foreign workers who came to Grenada to aid its Marxist government—were told to leave the island within 48 hours.

Among those ordered out was Michelle Gibbs, 37, an American teacher and artist from Detroit. Gibbs, a graduate of USC and Brown University, came to Grenada in 1980.

Also ordered out was Dr. Regina Fuchs, a West German physician at the Amfree Medical Clinic in St. George's, which averages 50 patients a day. A Swedish doctor who worked in the same clinic left earlier.

Both were on a computer printout list of persona non grata distributed by the combined Caribbean police forces on the island. U.S. mission spokesman James Dandridge said the list was developed, apparently by U.S. intelligence sources, to rid Grenada of "those people who present a threat to the country."

Packing her things at her small St. George's apartment, Gibbs was visibly upset by the order.

"This was my home," she said. "You think they've done the worst thing they can do, and then they do something else."

"I guess one of their first priorities is to clear away the debris," she added, "—not just the shot-down helicopters and the rubble, but those who remind the people of the previous four years;"

Radix, who led an Oct. 15 demonstration protesting the house arrest of Bishop by elements of the government attempting to overthrow the prime minister, spoke to a visiting congressional delegation last weekend at the request of Rep. Thomas S. Foley (D. Wash.). He told the 14 congressmen that he opposed the U.S.-Caribbean invasion even though it probably saved his life.

"I may have died, but in the final consequence what is the matter of it?" Radix said. "The vulgar force of the U.S. military-industrial complex was still used. My position has been to deplore in the strongest terms possible the U.S. intervention into the internal affairs of this country."

At the time, Radix admitted that the U.S. invasion had been "well received" by many Grenadians, but he said that was because the citizens were "in a state of trauma" after the killing of Bishop. "Had you come from Mars, you would have been welcomed with open arms," he said.

In an interview Saturday, Radix said he was detained Friday afternoon by an American officer in civilian clothing who took him to a St. George's office building for questioning.

"I was in a little shop to buy cigarettes when a man who said he was a member of the U.S. armed forces asked me to come with him," Radix said. "For two hours, they asked me about my whereabouts between Oct. 12 and Oct. 26. They asked me if I knew anything about Cubans still fighting."
"In an arrogant fashion, a young officer informed me that I had been going around agitating people. The only thing I had done was, at my mother's request, to go down and buy some fresh fish. Some people asked me how I was and told me they were glad to see me."

FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW

Radix said he told the American officer that "U.S. armed forces should withdraw the state of belligerency having ceased."

In the late evening, Radix said, he was taken in an American jeep to the Point Salines prisoner-of-war facility. He said he was processed, given a number and a plastic prisoner's bracelet and placed in one of the wooden packing crates that serve as cells at the makeshift prison camp.

Released the following morning without explanation, Radix said, "All I want now is to take a vacation."

Col. Ken Barnes, the Jamaican leader of the combined Caribbean forces, said the troops are holding approximately 300 prisoners of war. They include former member of Grenada's People's Revolutionary Army and militia, as well as Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard and Gen. Hudson Austin, the leader of the coup that led to Bishop's assassination Oct. 19.

PUBLIC MEETINGS BANNED

Last week, Governor General Scoon imposed tough restrictions on the island, including a ban on public meetings. He also ordered arrests without warrants.

Meanwhile, U.S. mission spokesman Dandridge released casualty figures for Grenadians killed in the U.S. invasion, saying that 21 were killed and 280 wounded on the island. Dandridge said 18 of the 21 Grenadian dead were mental patients killed when a U.S. Navy jet mistakenly bombed a mental hospital near Ft. Frederick.

Dandridge also announced that the bodies of 42 people presumed to be Cubans killed in fighting with U.S. troops were flown to Havana on Saturday for identification and burial.

(From the Plain Dealer, Nov. 13, 1983).

TWENTY-ONE GRENADIANS KILLED IN INVASION

St. George's, Grenada.--U.S. led forces killed 21 Grenadian civilians and wounded 280 during the invasion of the Caribbean nation, but they killed no Grenadian soldiers, U.S. authorities said yesterday.

Maj. Gen. Jack Farris, who commands the 2,300 U.S. combat troops on Grenada, said 18 civilians perished when U.S. planes accidentally bombed a mental hospital. Three other Grenadian civilians died of battle wounds, Farris said.

The tally showed 18 Americans killed and 113 wounded, and 42 Cubans killed and 57 wounded.
Officials said they detained and questioned Kendrick Radix overnight and released him yesterday. Radix is a former aide of slain Prime Minister Maurice Bishop.

U.S. Army Maj. George Wright said Radix, picked up on orders of Grenadian Gov. Gen. Paul Scoon, had been "cited by some people of the local populace as an instigator in spreading bad will among the people" in public places.

Radix called his 20-hour detention, spent in a 10-foot-square wooden box at a makeshift prison, standard procedure for occupying forces.

He displayed a green card identifying him as someone who had been questioned by U.S. forces. The card said the individual named should "refrain from participating in anti-government activities."

"It's my freedom of speech, that is what it comes down to," he said:

During an interview with Rep. Louis Stokes, Radix who had been imprisoned by coup leaders, criticized the United States for invading an underdeveloped nation that had been subject to a history of colonial exploitation. He said the intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation violated the United Nations Charter and international law.

(Radix said that on his release from the Cuban embassy, where he had been given refuge, he was menaced and threatened by U.S. military forces, and that guns had been placed at his head.)

U.S. and Caribbean troops, working from a list of names, continued stopping cars in an effort to find individuals for questioning. U.S. spokesman James Dandridge said the list was of those who "constitute a threat to the country," and included former Grenadian soldiers, members of the former government and two Americans—one wanted in the United States for gun-running and another involved in some operations in the country.

U.S. officials have said 233 Grenadians remain in detention but they have not said how many have been picked up for questioning and released.

DELLUMS SAYS GRENADA INSPECTION TRIP
REINFORCES HIS OPPOSITION TO U.S. INVASION
SAYS IT RAISES THESE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS:

1. What were the real objectives for this invasion?

2. Were other, peaceful alternatives ever considered or proposed and, if so, what were they — and why were they rejected?

3. What are the larger implications — diplomatically, militarily, and politically — as a consequence of the overwhelming use of military force?

4. Is this militarization of American foreign policy an indication that, for this administration, the military option is the preferred solution in resolving international disputes?
Washington, D.C. -- Rep. Ronald V. Dellums today said that his eye-witness inspection of the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Grenada has further confirmed his initial opposition to the invasion.

In reflecting upon the invasion and its consequence, both short-term and long-term, Dellums said:

"I do not subscribe to the politics of violence and force, especially where constructive, peaceful alternatives are available. As an American citizen, I was appalled by the U.S. invasion of Grenada, which I considered an undeclared act of war in violations of the Constitution, the U.N. and O.A.S. charters.

When the Speaker asked me to be part of his delegation I agreed to go, with a commitment to investigate all aspects of the situation, not just those that might reinforce my initial assessment - to question, to listen, to study, and to report back to him before speaking out publicly. I have abided by his request - and now I am speaking out.

As a result of this inspection trip, not only has my initial assessment of the situation been confirmed, but I have found many new reasons to expand the scope of the questions that must be raised, and to insist on further Congressional inquiries, because of our responsibilities under the Constitution.

In my judgement the Congressional inquiry into the invasion of Grenada has only begun. As a result of this trip I am more convinced than before I left that the real answers to the motivations underlying this invasion are to be found here in Washington.

Among the more important questions still unanswered these four deserve full investigation: 1. What were the real objectives - as opposed to the President's publicly stated rationales - for this invasion? 2. Were other, peaceful alternatives ever considered or proposed and, if so, what were they - and why were they rejected? 3. What are the larger implications - diplomatically, militarily and politically - as a consequence of this overwhelming use of military force? 4. Is this militarization of American foreign policy an indication that, for this Administration, the military option is the preferred solution in resolving international disputes?

I am in agreement with House Majority Whip Thomas Foley that U.S. military forces might well have been sent to Grenada even if the American students were not there. Further, in a 2-1/2 hour meeting with the Prime Ministers from the Eastern Caribbean states, the question of the students' safety was never once raised by them. However, there were repeated statements by them about the dangers of any Leftist or Marxist government or movement in the region - combined with their repeated wishes that the region might have more leaders in the region who reflect their 'moderate' views.

My own investigation of the situation is incomplete at this time, but I can say the following with virtual certainty. First, the safety of the students was never a primary concern of the policymakers or the commanders of the U.S. forces in their planning for this mission. At best, they were a secondary or ancillary goal of the invasion.
Second, the role of the U.S. forces on the island daily grows more precarious, and they should be replaced immediately by forces from the Caribbean states or the Commonwealth nations. Every day that the U.S. forces remain on the island alters their role. They are now being perceived— and in some instances acting—as an occupying rather than as a peace-keeping force, even to the extent of tracing down alleged subversives and determining what books and other reading materials are considered subversive. This is not the proper role of the American military in a free society—either at home or abroad.

On a broader scale, I am deeply concerned that this ready recourse to military action as a substitute for constructive diplomatic negotiation may be the forerunner of more—and worse—to come. Will there be other islands—and other countries—in the region and around the world where this Administration will now seek to impose its political will by brute force, in the name of a continuing and ever-escalating anti-Communist crusade? If this is the beginning—where will it end—with an all-out confrontation against the Soviet Union?

Is this to be the fate of other Third World nations seeking to find their own way in a turbulent world in which the nuclear superpower confrontation overrides all other considerations in offers of American aid? For example, the Grenadian people were being directly assisted by the Cubans in the areas of health care, basic literacy and education, and public works projects designed to increase the quality of their lives. Is the U.S. government now willing to step into the void created by their forced departure, to continue these assistance programs?

We as Americans have much to question in the months ahead. Grenada is part of a much larger construct that will determine our future as a nation. Will we remain dedicated to the ideals that inspired and created our own revolution—or are we now to be the Colossus of counter-revolution—stifling the hopes, dreams and aspirations of those who yearn to be free—free to choose as well as to live?

Dellums also indicated that he had been deeply concerned about this Administration's attitudes and policies toward Grenada even since the Pentagon conducted "Operation Ocean Venture" from August to October of 1981—a military exercise that included the invasion of a fictitious island chain in the Caribbean called "Amber and the Amberdines."

In April of 1982 he conducted an extensive investigation of the airport facilities under construction on Grenada, and reported back to the House Armed Services Committee that the Administration's claims concerning the military utilization of the airport were unfounded, and that the modern airport facilities needed there were part of a large-scale effort to increase civilian tourism.

In June of 1983 Dellums also acted as co-host, with Rep. Mel Price, Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, in sponsoring a forum for Prime Minister Bishop and the Members of the Armed Services Committee, and had sat in on a meeting with Bishop and Speaker O'Neill. These actions were part of an ongoing effort on Dellums' part to reduce international tensions in the Caribbean region through the expansion of negotiations.
REPORT TO THE CONGRESSIONAL MILITARY REFORM CAUCUS

Subject: The Grenada Operation

From: William S. Lind, Military Reform Institute

Date: April 5, 1984

Military reformers stress the importance of learning from combat experience. Even the best tests of weapons or units are less valuable than lessons drawn from combat.

Can any lessons be drawn from last year’s combat on Grenada? Even a quick look suggests there may be some valuable, if perhaps disturbing, lessons. The United States required seven battalions of troops, plus elements of two other battalions, to defeat fewer than 700 Cubans and a Grenadian army that hardly fought at all. Only about 200 of the Cubans were troops; the remainder were construction workers with some militia training. The overwhelmingly superior U.S. force took three days to defeat the Cuban defense and about another five days to secure the entire island. By way of contrast, the British defeated more than 11,000 Argentines with just eight infantry battalions in the Falklands.

This report looks at five aspects of the Grenada operation, each of which has implications for future defense policy: overall planning; performance of elite units, of Army units, and of Marine Corps units; and helicopter survivability. As the Members of the Caucus know, it is difficult to determine exactly what happened in any military operation, and I readily acknowledge that some of the information in this report—all of which has been obtained on an unclassified basis—may be in error on some details. But I believe the report presents an accurate overall picture of the operation.

The report deals only with the above-mentioned aspects of the operation. It does not present a chronology of events. Nor does it make any judgment as to whether the operation was politically or strategically necessary, justified or successful.

1. PLANNING

Deficiencies in planning seem to have been part of the reason the Cubans did so well, relative to the odds against them. The plan did not reflect an attempt at a coup de main, in which overwhelming force is used to seize all the critical junctures in an enemy’s system at the outset. Instead, a few small teams of specialized forces were sent against a few of these junctures, while most of our forces were put into two airfields on the island’s peripheries. As a result, the opponent was able to form and maintain a fairly effective defense.

Interestingly, one early plan for the invasion, reportedly developed by Atlantic Fleet headquarters, would have produced something much closer to a coup de main. That plan called for the use of only Navy and Marine Corps units, and proposed that the main effort be a landing at Grand Anse.
beach followed by a quick move across the peninsula to cut Salines airfield off from the capital of St. George’s. This would have isolated the Cubans from the rest of the island and made any defense on their part meaningless. This plan was overruled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who demanded that all four services be involved—just as in the Iran rescue mission. The Army was anxious to give its Rangers a piece of the action to justify its request for a third Ranger battalion and a Ranger regimental headquarters, while the overall command for specialized, commando-type forces wanted a chance to show what its units could do. So in what seems to have become the standard JCS approach to military operations, one that turns them into a pie-dividing contest among all the services, we ended up with a plan that allowed the enemy to put on a reasonably good show.

II. PERFORMANCE OF ELITE UNITS

The desire of the specialized forces' command to show off its forces—which include such units as Delta Force, some SEALs (the Navy's commandos) and in some circumstances the Rangers—proved ironic, since their performance did not in most cases justify their claims to be the nation's military elite. Their problems in no way stemmed from lack of courage; like all the American forces in the operation, they showed great bravery. They did, however, fail in much of what they attempted.

The command's SEALs undertook three, possibly four missions, only one of which was a success: the rescue of the Governor General, Paul Scoon. Press reports that the Governor General and the SEALs were besieged in the Governor's residence under heavy fire were not correct; they detected enemy forces in their neighborhood but came under little or no fire. A second SEAL mission failed in the ocean with tragic loss of life. Poor weather forecasting seems to have been the primary reason for this failure, although some questionable techniques employed by the SEALs may also have contributed. The third mission, to knock Radio Grenada off the air, also failed. The SEALs got into the compound where the radio was located but attacked the wrong building.

Delta Force, which is considered America's crack anti-terrorist outfit, failed in a way that raises some serious questions. Delta Force personnel were brought in to take Richmond Hill prison. They attempted to do the job by landing near the prison, by helicopter, in daylight. Hostile forces in or near the prison took the helicopter under fire and drove it off, inflicting casualties on our troops. Delta then repeated exactly the same tactic with another helicopter the next day! The result was predictable: they were again driven off, with casualties, this time by a force of just three Grenadian prison guards. Subsequently, the prison was taken by some newsmen who walked through the front door and discovered that the guards had decamped.

The Army's Rangers performed the difficult mission of rescuing the American medical students very well, for which they deserve our gratitude. Their success was the one major achievement in the overall special operations portion of the Grenada intervention.
III. PERFORMANCE OF ARMY UNITS

The Army was responsible for engaging and defeating the Cuban force positioned between Salines airfield and the Grenadian capital of St. George's. Although they did defeat the Cubans, it took them three days to do so despite heavy numerical odds in their favor. The Cubans were reportedly able to contest the initiative into the second day of the operation. The extreme slowness of the Army's advance disturbed a number of observers. Reportedly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Vessey, was so disturbed that he called the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division and said, 'We have two companies of Marines running all over the island and thousands of Army troops doing nothing. What the hell is going on?'

Why did the Army move so slowly? Several factors seem to have contributed to the problem. The 82nd Airborne Division was brought into the planning very late, which created a degree of uncertainty and confusion. Second, the 82nd seems to have followed the traditional American practice of building up a substantial force and logistics base before moving out. This practice, which tends to result in yielding the initiative to the opponent and missing important opportunities, should be reviewed in light of the Army's adoption of a doctrine of maneuver warfare.

Third, the Army command on the scene seems to have had some difficulty adjusting to the situation as it unfolded, leading it, among other things, to believe it was opposed by as many as two battalions of Cubans. As noted earlier, there were fewer than 700 Cubans on the island. The overestimation of enemy strength seems to have led to great cautiousness by the Army units then engaged, and also to requests for assistance. These in turn resulted in moving two companies of Marines from the northern part of the island into the south, on the far side of St. George's.

The fourth and perhaps most important cause of the Army's slowness was that both the Rangers, in their initial battle on and near the airfield, and later, the units from the 82nd Airborne, seem to have used a frontal, linear approach to the Cuban defense. At least one small Ranger unit appears to have been very imaginative and fluid in the way it dealt with individual Cuban positions, and other small units may have shown similar qualities. But the totality of the Cuban defense was taken on frontally.

The Army's doctrine of maneuver warfare would appear to have called instead for an attack using infiltration tactics, in which our forces would have filtered through and around the Cubans, collapsing their whole defense from the rear. Reportedly, the terrain and the positioning of the Cuban defenses make such an attack possible. But instead, both the Rangers and the 82nd seem to have taken pride in attacking and destroying each and every Cuban position—a very slow process. This more than anything else seems to have enabled the Cubans to fight as long as they did.

Two other aspects of the 82nd Airborne's performance deserve comment. First, the division seems to have done an excellent job of avoiding
Grenadian civilian casualties and damage to civilian property in the battle with the Cubans. This was highly important, since we had come to free a people from oppression, not to do it injury.

Second, some units of the division seem to have experienced a breakdown of discipline. Some eyewitnesses report looting of Grenadian property. Some discipline problems can be seen in films of the action, which picture troops wearing machine gun ammunition as bandoliers. This is not just a cosmetic issue: carrying the ammunition this way gets it dirty and can bend the links, both of which can cause the gun to jam. How far the discipline problems went and what specific units they affected are not known to this author.

The failure of a number of the special operations, the Army's frontal, linear approach to the Cuban defense and the reported discipline breakdowns all raise the question of what underlying problems may exist in these units.

In my view, two may be significant. First, the training given to all these units may be too rigid. It may be geared toward perfection of every detail within the framework of a set plan in which everything is predictable. In contrast, most combat is characterized by uncertainty, surprise and rapid change. Training must center on free-play exercises, and commanders and trainers must strive to inject the unexpected into each training situation. Units whose training is rigid tend to perform in a less than satisfactory manner when faced with the uncertainty and change of combat.

Second, these units may be affected by the "cowboy syndrome." The "cowboys" are people who believe machismo is what defines a competent soldier. The "snake eater" image of some of our specialized forces and the elite image of the paratroopers tend to make these units magnets for "cowboys." In combat, the "cowboy" tends to fight the enemy even when he can go around him—as some of our forces seem to have done on Grenada—and also to "come unglued" when faced with the unexpected. In my view, the "cowboy" is the wrong type of person to put into specialized or elite units.

IV. PERFORMANCE OF MARINE UNITS

Although the Marine units on Grenada never met much opposition, they did face a number of confusing and urgent situations, which they seem to have handled well. Reflecting their parent 2nd Marine Division's emphasis on maneuver warfare, they did not attempt to follow a rigid plan but rather adapted swiftly to circumstances as they changed. The speed with which the Marines acted and moved was decisive in one interesting case. The Grenadians had about one platoon of troops defending St. George's, which ultimately did not fight. Part of the reason it did not was explained by a senior Grenadian officer after his capture. He said the Marines appeared so swiftly where they were not expected that the Grenadian Army's high command in the capital was convinced resistance was hopeless. That is, of course, the best possible outcome in maneuver warfare.
A note of caution is needed here. The Marines’ good performance on Grenada should not be seen as a statement on the overall condition of the Marine Corps. The Marines’ maneuver warfare effort is centered in the 2nd Marine division, and maneuver warfare ideas and training are seldom found outside that division. In addition, the commander of the battalion sent into Grenada is an uncommonly fine tactician.

V. HELICOPTER SURVIVABILITY

The final area studied, helicopter operations, raises some questions about the billions of dollars we are investing in helicopters. Out of approximately 100 U.S. helicopters used on Grenada, nine were destroyed and a number of others were damaged. These numbers include helicopters involved in accidents, but accidents are also a cause of losses in war and must be considered. A loss rate of 9% in three days against an opponent with no anti-aircraft missiles, only guns (which can be highly effective), is not easy to pass over. What does it suggest our helicopter losses would be, for example, in a war in Europe?

One aspect of operations on Grenada makes the helicopter losses especially interesting. When the services give briefings to justify their heavy investment in helicopters, a line is usually drawn on a map. Our forces are on one side of the line, the enemy on the other. The helicopters can stay over friendly lines while transporting troops or shooting missiles at enemy tanks. But in most real combat, there is no neat line. Friendly and enemy forces are mixed together, often to a considerable depth. Helicopters cannot avoid flying over enemy units, who naturally shoot at them. This seems to have been what happened on Grenada.

CONCLUSION

Combat lessons are worth more than their weight in gold, because they are bought not with gold but with blood. By learning as much we can from the combat on Grenada, we may be able to save lives in the future and also improve our chances for victory. The Military Reform Caucus may be able to perform a significant service for our military personnel and for the country if it can spur the Defense Department to learn everything possible from the Grenada operation. Problems not corrected now will almost certainly arise again in future operations, with potentially high costs to national interests and in casualties.
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (ARTICLES 1-19)

PREAMBLE

The Governments of the Contracting States.

Determined to consolidate and strengthen the bonds which have historically existed among their peoples;

Sharing a common determination to fulfil the hopes and aspirations of their people for full employment and improved standards of work and living;

Conscious that these objectives can most rapidly be attained by the optimum utilisation of available human and natural resources of the Region; by accelerated, co-ordinated and sustained economic development, particularly through the exercise of permanent sovereignty over their natural resources; by the efficient operation of common services and functional co-operation in the social, cultural, educational and technological fields; and by a common front in relation to the external world;

Convinced of the need to elaborate an effective regime by establishing and utilising institutions designed to enhance the economic, social and cultural development of their peoples;

Have Agreed as Follows:

Chapter I

PRINCIPLES

Article 1

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY

By this Treaty the Contracting Parties establish among themselves a Caribbean Community (hereinafter referred to as "the Community") having the membership, powers and functions hereinafter specified.

Article 2

MEMBERSHIP

1. Membership of the Community shall be open to:-

(a) (i) Antigua
(ii) Bahamas
(iii) Barbados
(iv) Belize
(v) Dominica
(vi) Grenada
(vii) Guyana
(viii) Jamaica
(ix) Montserrat
(xv) St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla  
(xi) St. Lucia  
(xii) St. Vincent  
(xiii) Trinidad and Tobago

(b) any other State of the Caribbean Region that is in the opinion of the Conference able and willing to exercise the rights and assume the obligations of membership in accordance with Article 29 of this Treaty.

2. States listed in paragraph 1(a) of this Article of the Governments of which sign this Treaty in accordance with Article 22 and ratify it in accordance with Article 23 shall become Member States of the Community.

Article 3

DEFINITION OF LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND MORE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

For the purpose of this Treaty the States specified in sub-paragraph 1(a), (iii), (vii), (viii) and (xiii) of Article 2 shall be designated More Developed Countries and the remainder listed in the said sub-paragraph 1(a), other than the Bahamas, shall be designated Less Developed Countries until such time as the Conference otherwise determine by majority decision.

Article 4

OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMUNITY

The Community shall have as its objectives:

(a) the economic integration of the Member States by the establishment of a common market regime (hereinafter referred to as "the Common Market") in accordance with the provisions of the Annex of this Treaty with the following aims:

(i) the strengthening, co-ordination and regulation of the economic and trade relations among Member States in order to promote their accelerated harmonious and balanced development;

(ii) the sustained expansion and continuing integration of economic activities, the benefits of which shall be equitably shared taking into account the need to provide special opportunities for the Less Developed Countries;

(iii) the achievement of a greater measure of economic independence and effectiveness of its Member States in dealing with states, groups of states and entities of whatever description;

(b) the co-ordination of the foreign policies of Member States; and
(c) functional co-operations, including-

(i) the efficient operation of certain common services and activities for the benefit of its peoples;

(ii) the promotion of greater understanding among its peoples and the advancement of their social, cultural and technological development;

(iii) activities in the fields specified in the Schedule and referred to in Article 18 of this Treaty.

Article 5

GENERAL UNDERTAKING AS TO IMPLEMENTATION

Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the carrying out of obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from decisions taken by the Organs of the Common Market. They shall facilitate the achievement of the objectives of the Common Market. They shall abstain from any measures which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.

Chapter II

ORGANS OF THE COMMUNITY

Article 6

PRINCIPAL ORGANS

The principal organs of the Community shall be:-

(a) the Conference of Heads of Government (hereinafter referred to as "the Conference");

(b) the Common Market Council established under the Annex (hereinafter referred to as "the Council").

Article 7

THE CONFERENCE--COMPOSITION

The Conference shall consist of the Heads of Government of Member States. Any member of the Conference may, as appropriate, designate to represent him at any meeting of the Conference.
Article 8

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

1. The primary responsibility of the Conference shall be to determine the policy of the Community.

2. The Conference may establish, and designate as such, institutions of the Community in addition to those specified in paragraph (a) to (g) of Article 10 of this Treaty, as it deems fit for the achievement of the objectives of the Community.

3. The Conference may issue directions of a general or special character as to the policy to be pursued by the Council and the Institutions of the Community for the achievement of the objectives of the Community, and effect shall be given to any such directions.

4. Subject to the relevant provisions of this Treaty, the Conference shall be the final authority for the conclusions of treaties on behalf of the Community and for entering into relationships between the Community and International Organisations and States.

5. The Conference shall take decisions for the purpose of establishing the financial arrangements necessary for meeting the expenses of the Community and shall be the final authority on questions arising in relation to the financial affairs of the Community.

6. The Conference may regulate its own procedure and may decide to admit as its deliberations observers, representatives of Non-Member States or other entities.

7. The Conference may consult with entities and other organisations within the region and for this purpose may establish such machinery as it deems necessary.

Article 9

VOTING IN THE CONFERENCE

1. Each member of the Conference shall have one vote.

2. The Conference shall make decisions and recommendations by the affirmative vote of all its members.

3. A decision shall be binding upon each Member State to which it is directed. A recommendation shall have no binding force. Where, however, a Member State fails to observe a recommendation of the Conference, it shall submit a report to the Conference as early as practicable and in any event not later than six months thereafter, giving reasons for its non-compliance.
4. For the purposes of this Article, abstentions shall not be construed as impairing the validity of decisions or recommendations of the Conference provided that not less than three-quarters of its members including at least two of the More Developed Countries vote in favour of any decision or recommendation.

Article 10

INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY

Institutions of the Community shall be:

(a) the Conference of Ministers responsible for Health;
(b) the Standing Committee of Ministers responsible for Education;
(c) the Standing Committee of Ministers responsible for Labour;
(d) the Standing Committee of Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs;
(e) the Standing Committee of Ministers responsible for Finance;
(f) the Standing Committee of Ministers responsible for Agriculture;
(g) the Standing Committee of Ministers responsible for Mines;
(h) any other institution that may be established and designated as such by the Conference in accordance with Article 8.

Article 11

COMPOSITION OF INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY

1. Each Institution of the Community as set out in paragraphs (a) to (h) of Article 10 of this Treaty shall consist of representatives of Member States. Each Member State shall designate a Minister of Government as its representative on each such Institution.

2. Where the Minister designated under paragraph 1 of this Article is unable to attend a meeting of the Institution the Member State may designate any other person as an alternate to attend such meeting in his stead.

3. Where the Conference establishes any other Institution in the exercise of the power conferred on it by paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Treaty, the composition of such Institution shall be determined by the Conference.

Article 12

FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

1. Subject to the relevant provisions of Article 8 of this Treaty, the Institutions of the Community shall formulate such policies and perform such functions as are necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the Community within their respective spheres of competence.

2. The Institutions of the Community may regulate their own procedure and:
(a) may establish such subsidiary committees, agencies and other bodies as they consider necessary for the efficient performance of their functions; and

(b) may decide to admit at their deliberations observers, representatives of non-Member States or other entities.

Article 13

VOTING IN INSTITUTIONS

1. Each Member State represented on an Institution shall have one vote.

2. Unless otherwise provided for, decisions of an Institution shall be made by an affirmative vote of all its members. For the purposes of this paragraph, abstentions shall not be construed as impairing the validity of decisions of an Institution provided that not less than three-quarters of its members including at least two of the More Developed Countries vote in favour of such decisions.

3. Recommendations shall be made by a two-thirds majority vote of all its members including at least two of the More Developed Countries and shall have no binding force. Where a Member State fails to observe a recommendation of an Institution in whole or in part, it shall submit a report to the Institution making the recommendation as early as practicable and in any event not later than six months after receiving notice of such recommendations giving reasons for its non-compliance.

4. Observers at meetings of Institutions shall not have the right to vote.

Article 14

ASSOCIATE INSTITUTIONS

1. The following institutions shall be recognised as Associate Institutions of the Community:

   (a) the Caribbean Development Bank;
   (b) the Caribbean Investment Corporation;
   (c) the West Indies Associated States Council of Ministers;
   (d) the East Caribbean Common Market Council of Ministers;
   (e) the Caribbean Examinations Council;
   (f) the Council of Legal Education;
   (g) the University of Guyana;
   (h) the University of the West Indies;
   (i) the Caribbean Meteorological Council;
   (j) the Regional Shipping Council;
   (k) any other institution designated as such by the Conference.

2. The Community shall seek to establish such relationships with its Associate Institutions as will promote the achievement of its objectives.
Article 15

THE COMMUNITY SECRETARIAT

1. The Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat shall be recognised as the Community Secretariat. The Community Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as "the Secretariat") shall be the principal administrative organ of the Community. The headquarters of the Secretariat shall be located in Georgetown, Guyana.

2. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Community may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the Conference (on the recommendation of the Council) for a term not exceeding 5 years and may be re-appointed by the Conference. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Community.

3. The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Conference, the Council, and of the Institutions of the Community. The Secretary-General shall make an Annual Report to the Conference on the work of the Community.

4. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and his staff shall neither seek nor receive instructions from any government whether of Member States or otherwise or from any other authority. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as officials of the Community, and shall be responsible only to the Community.

5. Each Member State undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and his staff and shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

6. The Conference shall approve the Staff Regulations governing the operation of the Secretariat.

7. The Secretary-General shall approve Staff Rules for the operation of the Secretariat.

Article 16

FUNCTIONS OF THE SECRETARIAT

1. The functions of the Secretariat shall be as follows:

   (a) to service meetings of the Community and any of its Institutions or Committees as may from time to time be determined by the Conference;

   (b) to take appropriate follow-up action on decisions made at such meetings;
(c) to initiate, arrange and carry out studies on questions of economic and functional co-operation relating to the region as a whole;

(d) to provide services to Member States at their request in respect to matters relating to the achievement of the objectives of the Community;

(e) to undertake any other duties which may be assigned to it by the Conference or any of the Institutions of the Community.

CHAPTER III
CO-ORDINATION AND FUNCTIONAL CO-OPERATION

Article 17
CO-ORDINATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES

1. To the end that Member States aim at the fullest possible co-ordination of their foreign policies within their respective competences and seek to adopt as far as possible common positions in major international issues, there is hereby established a Standing Committee of Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs.

2. The Committee shall have the power to make recommendations to the Governments of Member States represented on the Committee.

3. Only Member States possessing the necessary competence with respect to the matters under consideration from time to time may take part in the deliberations of the Committee.

4. Where after the coming into force of the Treaty a Member State achieves full sovereign status such State shall elect whether it wishes to be bound by the provisions of this Article.

5. The recommendations of the Committee shall be made by an affirmative vote of all the Member States competent and participating in the deliberations.

6. The provisions of Article 13 shall not apply to this Article.

Article 18
FUNCTIONAL CO-OPERATION

Without prejudice to the requirements of any other provisions of this Treaty, Member States, in furtherance of the objectives set out in Article 4 of this Treaty, undertake to make every effort to co-operate in the areas set out in the Schedule of this Treaty.
Article 19

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Any disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty, unless otherwise provided for, and particularly in Article 11 and 12 of the Annex, shall be determined by the Conference.
The Government of the Contracting States,

CONVINCED that the West Indies (Associated States) Council of Ministers since its establishment in 1966 has done much to further regional co-operation in many fields and has rendered valuable services to its member countries;

RECOGNISING that since the establishment of the said Council of Ministers significant constitutional and other changes have taken place in the region;

AFFIRMING their determination to achieve economic and social development for their peoples as enunciated in the Agreement of the 11th day of June, 1968, establishing the East Caribbean Common Market;

INSPIRED by a common determination to strengthen the links between themselves by uniting their efforts and resources and establishing and strengthening common institutions which could serve to increase their bargaining power as regards third countries or groupings of countries;

HAVING IN MIND the strong views expressed by the said Council of Ministers regarding the desirability of retaining and formalising the arrangements for joint action by its member countries;

DETERMINED to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of their peoples for development and progress;

HAVE AGREED as follows:

**Article 1**

Establishment of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States

By this Treaty the Contracting Parties establish among themselves the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (hereinafter called 'The Organisation') having the membership, powers and functions hereinafter specified.

**Article 2**

Membership

1. Full membership of the Organisation shall be open to those countries which immediately prior to the establishment of the Organisation have been members of the West Indies (Associated States) Council of Ministers, namely:

(a) Antigua
(b) Dominica
(c) Grenada
(d) Montserrat
(e) St. Kitts/Nevis
(f) Saint Lucia
(g) Saint Vincent and The Grenadines

2. The independent States listed in the preceding paragraph the Governments of which sign and ratify this Treaty in accordance with Article 20 thereof shall immediately become full members (hereinafter referred to as 'The Member States') of the Organisation.

3. Notwithstanding that a territory or group of territories listed in Paragraph 1 of this Article is not a sovereign independent State, the Heads of Government of the Member States of the Organisation (hereinafter referred to as 'The Authority') may be a unanimous decision admit such territory or group of territories as a full member of the Organisation and such territory or group of territories shall thereby qualify as a Member State under this Treaty.

4. Any other State or territories in the Caribbean region may apply to become Full or Associate Members and shall be admitted as such by a unanimous decision of the Authority. The nature and extent of the rights and obligations of Associate Members shall be determined by the Authority.

Article 3

Purposes and Functions of the Organisation

1. The major purposes of the Organisation shall be:

(a) to promote co-operation among the Member States and at the regional and international levels having due regard to the Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community and the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) to promote unity and solidarity among the Member States and to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence;

(c) to assist the Member States in the realisation of their obligations and responsibilities to the international community with due regard to the role of international law as a standard of conduct in their relationship;

(d) to seek to achieve the fullest possible harmonisation of foreign policy among the Member States; to seek to adopt, as far as possible, common positions on international issues and to establish and maintain wherever possible, arrangements for joint overseas representation and/or common services;
(e) to promote economic integration among the Member States through the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the East Caribbean Common Market; and

(f) to pursue the said purposes through its respective institutions by discussion of questions of common concern and by agreement and common action.

2. To this end the Member States will endeavor to co-ordinate, harmonise and pursue joint policies particularly in the fields of:

(a) External Relations including overseas representation;
(b) International Trade Agreements and other External Economic Relations;
(c) Financial and Technical Assistance from external sources;
(d) International Marketing of Goods and Services including Tourism;
(e) External Transportation and Communications including Civil Aviation;
(f) Economic Integration among the Member States through the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the East Caribbean Common Market;
(g) Matters relating to the sea and its resources;
(h) The Judiciary;
(i) Currency and Central Banking;
(j) Audit;
(k) Statistics;
(l) Income Tax Administration;
(m) Customs and Excise Administration;
(n) Tertiary Education including University;
(o) Training in Public Administration and Management;
(p) Scientific, Technical and Cultural Co-operation;
(q) Mutual Defence and Security; and
(r) Such other activities calculated to further the purposes of the Organisation as the Member States may from time to time decide.
General Undertaking as to Implementation

Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the carrying out of obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from decisions taken by the institutions of the Organisation. They shall facilitate the achievement of the purposes of the Organisation; in particular, each Member State shall take all steps to secure the enactment of such legislation as is necessary to give effect to this Treaty and decisions taken thereunder;

Institutions of the Organisation

1. There are hereby established the following principal institutions through which the Organisation shall accomplish the functions entrusted to it under this Treaty:

   (a) The Authority of Heads of Government of the Member States of the Organisation (referred to in this Treaty as 'The Authority');
   (b) The Foreign Affairs Committee;
   (c) The Defense and Security Committee;
   (d) The Economic Affairs Committee; and
   (e) The Central Secretariat.

2. The institutions of the Organisation shall perform the functions and act within the limits of the powers conferred upon them by or under this Treaty and by the Protocols thereto. They may establish such subsidiary institutions as they deem necessary for the performance of their functions.

Composition and Functions of the Authority

1. The Authority shall be composed of Heads of Government of the Member States.

2. Any member of the Authority may, as appropriate, designate a Minister to represent such member at any meeting of the Authority.

3. Only Member States possessing the necessary competence in respect of matters under consideration from time to time shall take part in the deliberations of the Authority.
4. The Authority shall be the supreme policy-making institution of the Organisation. It shall be responsible for, and have the general direction and control of the performance of the functions of the Organisation, for the progressive development of the Organisation and the achievement of its purposes.

5. The Authority shall have power to make decisions on all matters within its competence. All such decisions shall require the affirmative vote of all Member States present and voting at the meeting of the Authority at which such decisions were taken provided that such decisions shall have not force and effect until ratified by those Member States, if any, which were not present at that meeting, or until such Member States have notified the Authority of their decisions to abstain. Such decisions by the Authority shall be binding on all Member States and on all institutions of the Organisation and effect shall be given to any such decisions provided that it is within the sovereign competence of Member States to implement them.

6. The Authority may make such recommendations and give such directives as it deems necessary for the achievement of the purposes of the Organisation and for ensuring the smooth functioning of the institutions of the Organisation.

7. The Authority may establish, and designate such, institutions of the Organisation in addition to those specified in sub-paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of this Treaty, as it deems necessary for the achievement of the purposes of the Organisation.

8. Subject to the relevant provisions of this Treaty, the Authority shall be the final authority for the conclusion of treaties or other international agreements on behalf of the Organisation and for entering into relationships between the Organisation and other international organisations and third countries.

9. Subject to the relevant provisions of this Treaty, the Authority shall take decisions for the purpose of establishing the financial arrangements necessary for meeting the expenses of the Organisation and shall be the final authority on questions arising in relation to the financial affairs of the Organisation.

10. The Authority shall meet at least twice a year. It shall determine its own procedure including that for convening meetings, for the conduct of business thereat and at other times, and for the annual rotation of the office of Chairman among its members in accordance with the principle of alphabetical order of the Member States.

11. The Authority shall in addition meet in extraordinary session whenever it deems necessary in accordance with the regulations laid down in its rules of procedure.
Article 7
Composition and Functions of the Foreign Affairs Committee

1. The Foreign Affairs Committee shall consist of the Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs in the Government of the Member States or such other Ministers as may be designated by the Heads of Government of the Member States.

2. Only Member States possessing the necessary competence in respect of matters under consideration from time to time shall take part in the deliberations of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

3. The Foreign Affairs Committee shall be responsible to the Authority. It shall take appropriate action on any matters referred to it by the Authority and shall have the power to make recommendations to the Authority.

4. The Foreign Affairs Committee shall have responsibility for the progressive development of the foreign policy of the Organisation and for the general direction and control of the performance of the executive functions of the Organisation in relation to its foreign affairs.

5. The decisions and directives of the Foreign Affairs Committee shall be unanimous and shall be binding on all subordinate institutions of the Organisation unless otherwise determined by the Authority.

6. Subject to any directives that the Authority may give, the Foreign Affairs Committee shall meet as and when necessary. It shall determine its own procedure, including that for convening meetings, for the conduct of business thereat, and at other times and for the annual rotation of the office of Chairman among its members in accordance with the principle of alphabetical order of the Member States.

Article 8
Composition and Function of the Defense and Security Committee

1. The Defense and Security Committee shall consist of the Ministers responsible for Defence and Security or other Ministers or Plenipotentiaries designated by Heads of Government of the Member States.

2. Only Member States possessing the necessary competence in respect of matters under consideration from time to time shall take part in the deliberations of the Defence and Security Committee.

3. The Defence and Security Committee shall be responsible to the Authority. It shall take appropriate action on any matters referred to it by the Authority and shall have the power to make recommendations to the Authority. It shall advise the Authority on matters relating to external defence and on arrangements for collective security against external aggression, including mercenary aggression, with or without the support of internal or national elements.
4. The Defense and Security Committee shall have responsibility for coordinating the efforts of Member States for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security against external aggression and for the development of close ties among the Member States of the Organisation in matters of external defence and security, including measures to combat the activities of mercenaries, operating with or without the support of internal or national elements, in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

5. The decisions and directives of the Defence and Security Committee shall be unanimous and shall be binding on all subordinate institutions of the Organisation unless otherwise determined by the Authority.

6. Subject to any directives that the Authority may give, the Defence and Security Committee shall meet as and when necessary. It shall determine its own procedure, including that for convening meetings, for the conduct of business thereat and at other times, and for the annual rotation of the Office of Chairman among its members in accordance with the principle of alphabetical order of the Member States.

Article 9

Composition and Functions of the Economic Affairs Committee

1. The Economic Affairs Committee (hereinafter referred to in this Article as 'The Committee') shall consist of such Ministers in the Governments of the Member States as may from time to time be appointed to the Committee by Heads of Government of the Member States.

2. Only Member States possessing the necessary competence in respect of matters under consideration from time to time shall take part in the deliberations of the Committee.

3. The Committee shall have as its functions those functions entrusted to the Council of Ministers under the Agreement of 11th June, 1968, establishing the East Caribbean Common Market.

4. The provisions of the said Agreement, to the extent that they are not incompatible with the provisions of this Treaty, shall be deemed to be incorporated in and to form an integral part of this Treaty. The provisions of the said Agreement, are set out in Annex 1 to this Treaty.

Article 10

The Central Secretariat

1. The Central Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as 'The Secretariat') shall be the principal institution responsible for the general administration of the Organisation.
2. The Secretariat shall comprise a Director-General and such other staff as the Organisation may require.

3. The Director-General shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the Organisation and shall have responsibility for the general direction and control of the Organisation. He shall be appointed by the Authority to serve in that capacity for a term of four (4) years and shall be eligible for re-appointment.

4. In the performance of his functions, the Director-General shall be responsible to the Authority, the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Defence and Security Committee and the Economic Affairs Committee. He shall be responsible for the general efficiency of the administrative service, for co-ordination of the activities of the Organisation and for the operation of the administrative apparatus in general. He shall similarly be responsible to any institution established by the Authority pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Article 6 of this Treaty.

In particular, his duties shall include the following:

(a) to service meetings of institutions of the Organisation;
(b) to take appropriate follow-up action on decisions, recommendations or directives taken at such meetings;
(c) to keep the functioning of the Organisation under continuous review and to report his findings to the appropriate Chairman;
(d) to make reports of activities and an annual report to the Authority on the work on the Organisation; and
(e) to undertake such work and studies and perform such services relating to the functions of the Organisation as may be assigned to him from time to time and also make such proposals relating thereto as may assist in the efficient and harmonious functioning and development of the Organisation.

5. The terms and conditions of service of the Director-General and other staff of the Secretariat shall be governed by such rules and regulations as are approved by the Authority.

6. In appointing officers to posts in the Secretariat, due regard shall be paid, subject to the paramount consideration of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity, to the desirability of maintaining an equitable distribution of appointments to such posts among citizens of the Member States. Subject to the provisions of this paragraph, the Director-General shall have the discretion to appoint all staff to the Secretariat provided that Directors are appointed with the prior approvals of the Authority.

7. The Director-General shall have the responsibility to ensure that all persons found suitable for employment are duly cleared before engagement in respect of security.
8. In the performance of their duties the Director-General and other members of the staff of the Secretariat shall neither seek nor accept instructions from any Government or from any other authority external to the Organisation. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organisation.

9. Each Member State undertakes to respect the exclusive International character of the responsibilities of the Director-General and other members of the staff of the Organisation and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 11

Co-ordination and Harmonisation of Foreign Policy

1. Unless objection is offered by the receiving States or international organisations and conferences concerned, Member States of the Organisation may establish and maintain arrangements for joint overseas diplomatic or other representation, including, where appropriate, the accreditation of one representative to one or more States, international organisations or conferences.

2. Where such objection, referred to in the preceding paragraph, is made by an international organisation or conference by virtue of its constitution or rules of procedure or for any other reason and where the Member States are members of such organisation or conference, the Director-General shall take all appropriate steps, consistent with the constitution or rules of procedure of such organisation or conference, as to ensure the optimum realisation of the benefits of their membership of such organisation or conference.

3. The Director-General shall have the authority and responsibility for transmitting directives of the Authority on joint foreign policy matters to heads of overseas diplomatic and other mission established by the Organisation. He shall take precedence in matters of protocol over the heads of such missions.

4. Heads of diplomatic or other missions of the Organisation shall be recommended for appointment by the Authority after consultation with the Foreign Affairs Committee. Provided that they may at any time resign their offices by written notice to the Director-General, who shall promptly transmit such notice to the Member States of the Organisation.

5. Subject to the preceding paragraph, the staff of such missions shall be appointed by the Director-General. In appointing such staff he shall have due regard to the provisions of Paragraph 6 and 7 of Article 10 of this Treaty. The terms and conditions of service of such staff shall be governed by such rules and regulations as govern the staff at the headquarters of the Organisation.

6. The expenses for diplomatic or other representatives referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be apportioned among the Member States participating in such arrangements.
Article 12

External Auditor

1. There shall be an External Auditor of the Organisation who shall be appointed and removed by the Authority.

2. Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph the regulations governing the terms and conditions of service and powers of the External Auditor shall be approved by the Authority.

Article 13

The Budget of the Organisation

1. There shall be established a budget of the Organisation.

2. All expenses of the Organisation shall be approved in respect of each financial year by the Authority and shall be chargeable to the budget.

3. Revenues of the budget shall be derived from annual contributions by the Member States and from such other sources as may be determined by the Authority.

4. The budget shall be in balance as to revenues and expenditures.

5. A draft budget for each financial year shall be prepared by the Director-General for the approval of the Authority.

6. There shall be special budgets to meet extraordinary expenditures of the Organisation.

7. Each Member State undertakes to pay regularly its annual contribution to the budget of the Organisation.

Article 14

Procedure for the Settlement of Disputes

1. Any dispute that may arise between two or more of the Member States regarding the interpretation and application of this Treaty shall, upon the request of any of them, be amicably resolved by direct agreement.

2. If the dispute is not resolved within three months of the date on which the request referred to in the preceding paragraph has been made, any party to the dispute may submit it to the conciliation procedure provided for in Annex A to this Treaty by submitting a request to that effect to the Director-General of the Organisation and informing the other party or parties to the dispute of the request.

3. Member States undertake to accept the conciliation procedure referred to in the preceding paragraph as compulsory. Any decisions or recommendations of the Conciliation Commission in resolution of the dispute shall be final and binding on the Member States.
Article 15

Participation in other Arrangements

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall preclude any Member State from participating in other arrangements either with other Member States or non-Member States provided that its participating is such arrangements does not derogate from the provisions of this Treaty.

2. The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before the entry into force of this Treaty between Member States, or between Member States and other countries or organisations shall not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty.

3. To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with this Treaty, the Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established. Member States shall, where necessary, assist each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a common attitude.

Article 16

Relations with other International Organisations and Other Countries

1. The Organisation shall seek to establish such relations with other International Organisations and other countries as may facilitate the attainment of its purposes. To this end, the Organisation may conclude formal agreements or establish effective working relationship with such Organisations and Governments of other countries.

2. The Organisation may decide, in accordance with its rules of procedure, to admit as observers at its deliberations representatives of non-Member States or other entities.

Article 17

Privileges and Immunities

1. The Organisation as an international organisation, shall enjoy legal personality.

2. The Organisation shall have in the territory of each Member State:

   (a) the legal capacity required for the performance of its functions under this Treaty; and

   (b) power to acquire, hold or dispose of movable or immovable property.

3. In the exercise of its legal personality under this Article, the Organisation shall be represented by the Director-General.
4. The privileges and immunities to be granted to the senior officials of the Organisation at its headquarters and in the Member States shall be the same as accorded to members of a diplomatic mission accredited at the headquarters of the Organisation and in the Member States under the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961. Similarly the privileges and immunities granted to the Secretariat at the headquarters of the Organisation shall be the same as granted to diplomatic missions at the headquarters of the Organisation and in the Member States under the said Convention. Other privileges and immunities to be recognised and granted by the Member States in connection with the Organisation shall be determined by the Authority.

Article 18

Headquarters of the Organisation

The location of the headquarters of the Organisation shall be determined by the Authority.

Article 19

Setting-up of the Institutions

1. At its first meeting after the entry into force of this Treaty the Authority shall, inter alia:

   (a) admit to membership in the Organisation the non-independent territories included in Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of this Treaty, before consideration of any other matter;

   (b) appoint the Director-General;

   (c) determine the headquarters of the Organisation;

   (d) make decisions for the establishment of financial arrangements for meeting the expenses of the Organisation; and

   (e) give such directions to the institutions of the Organisation as are necessary for the expeditious and effective implementation of the provisions of this Treaty.